Arab Cold War After the end of
World War II in 1945, the United States and
Soviet Union were the two major world powers. Two years later, the
Truman Doctrine was issued, aimed at containing the spread of communism and the Soviet Union. The
Cold War is generally considered to have begun around this time. As the world divided into the
Eastern (communist) and
Western (capitalist) Blocs, a struggle for ideological geopolitical supremacy between the US and USSR emerged. One of the ways it manifested was through
proxy wars in various global regions. One of those regions was the
Middle East, where the
Arab Cold War took place. After the
Suez Crisis in 1956, there was an increase in Arab hostility to the West as well as increased Soviet influence in
Egypt and
Syria. The crisis also encouraged
pan-Arabism and increased the popularity and influence of
Gamal Abdel Nasser,
President of Egypt. The United States feared that the region was susceptible to the spread of communism. The
Eisenhower Doctrine was announced by
President of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower in January 1957. It pledged American economic and military aid to prevent communism from spreading in the Middle East.
James P. Richards began to tour the Middle East and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and
United States European Command began to make plans for intervention in the region. Their plan centered around the
United States Sixth Fleet, stationed in the
Mediterranean Sea, the
Middle East Force and several
Air Force units. 11,000 soldiers were made ready for combat in the region. While the doctrine was never formally invoked, In 1957, shortly after the announcement of the
Eisenhower Doctrine—which Chamoun's regime had been the only Arab government to openly endorse "without reservation"—the United States became concerned that parliamentary elections set for June would result in the election of a parliament that was hostile to the US. Many Muslims in the nation supported Nasser and the
United Arab Republic (UAR).
Kamal Jumblatt and
Rashid Karami, Druze and Sunni leaders, respectively, condemned Chamoun's support for the doctrine as violating the National Pact. US attempts to influence the election included approving the sending of $12.7 million in military or financial aid and sending operatives from the
Central Intelligence Agency (including
David Atlee Phillips,
Miles Copeland Jr. and
Wilbur Eveland) to the region, who provided "campaign contributions" towards pro-West politicians. In late May 1957 pro-Chamoun troops killed seven and wounded seventy-three protesters in Beirut. In the following month, opposition leaders argued that Chamoun "had bought so many votes and gerrymandered so many districts that the balloting would be meaningless." The election was an American success, as fifty-three out of sixty-six parliamentarians supported Chamoun. The US continued to provide aid to Chamoun, fearing Soviet and UAR influence in the region. Chamoun's opponents maintained that the election was invalid and needed to be re-held. On 8 May 1958 a Lebanese journalist,
Nasib Al Matni, was assassinated in his office in Beirut. He was a pro-Nasserist and anti-Chamoun Maronite. While the United States feared that a movement against Chamoun could harm their interests in the region, they were reluctant to withdraw support for him, as
Fouad Chehab, the chief of staff of the
Lebanese Army, was the most likely figure to succeed Chamoun.
Robert M. McClintock, American ambassador to Lebanon, described Chehab as "a neutral legume who would require careful pruning to grow in the right direction." As a result, the US did not formally support Chamoun's effort. Protests by various groups—mainly the Sunnis and the Druzes—began in February against the Christian Chamoun, who had also aligned himself in support of the US and Britain, actions that protesters considered breaches of the National Pact. Demonstrations also protested that Chamoun had not allowed Lebanon to join the UAR. The protesters felt that "Chamoun was not willing to modify his foreign policy unless he was forced to." Tensions between Maronite Christians and Arab Muslims continued to rise after the killing of Nasib Al Matni on 8 May. Matni was the editor of
Al Telegraf and had been critical of Chamoun's rule. Chamoun requested American military intervention in early May against the threat to his power under the Eisenhower Doctrine, although McClintock noted that there was an "absence of overt Communist aggression". The leader of the UAR, Nasser, began publicly calling for Arab unity. Various nations, including Lebanon, blamed Nasser's actions for the increase in sectarian unrest, and the Lebanese government filed a formal complaint to the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 22 May 1958, accusing the UAR of meddling in the nation's affairs. The UNSC passed a resolution on 11 June 1958 that recommended sending a group to Lebanon "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders". A "Group of Three"—
Galo Plaza,
Rajeshwar Dayal and
Odd Bull—
Dag Hammarskjöld, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, and members of the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization were soon dispatched to Lebanon to form the
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). ==Operation Blue Bat==