The Unencumbered Self A central argument of the book is that Rawls' theory relies on a conception of the self that is "unencumbered," meaning that individuals are considered as free, rational agents independent of particular social, historical, or communal ties. This notion is exemplified in Rawls'
original position, a hypothetical decision-making scenario in which individuals choose principles of justice behind a "
veil of ignorance," unaware of their personal characteristics, social status, or particular values. At a basic level, Sandel's critique suggests that Rawls' model does not reflect how people actually conceive of themselves in everyday life. Sandel agrees that people do not make moral and political decisions in a vacuum but rather within the contexts of their relationships, histories, and social roles. Sandel deepens this argument by asserting that an individual’s identity is not merely influenced by external circumstances but is
constitutively shaped by them. That is, who we are is inextricably tied to the particular communities,
traditions, and histories that form us. To assume a person can abstract from these defining features is to misrepresent the nature of human selfhood.
The Problem of Moral Agency Sandel further critiques Rawls by questioning whether the liberal self, as depicted in
A Theory of Justice, can genuinely possess the depth required for
moral agency. He argues that if individuals are truly independent of communal ties, they would lack the attachments necessary to develop a coherent moral identity. Moral commitments, in this view, are not merely chosen but are constitutive of who individuals are. At a surface level, Sandel’s claim is that Rawlsian liberalism risks portraying moral choices as isolated, rational calculations, rather than as deeply embedded in one's existing values and traditions. At a more profound level, Sandel challenges the assumption that moral deliberation occurs within a purely procedural framework. Instead, he suggests that our moral reasoning is inherently situated – it emerges from within a web of pre-existing obligations, narratives, and self-understandings that cannot be bracketed away without distorting the reality of ethical life. By failing to account for this, Rawls' theory presents a vision of justice that is not fully responsive to the ways people actually conceive of their duties and commitments.
Justice and Community Another key argument in the book is that Rawls' emphasis on fairness and individual rights risks neglecting the importance of communal attachments and shared values. Rawls argues that principles of justice should be chosen independently of any particular conception of the
good life, ensuring neutrality among different moral and religious doctrines. However, Sandel contends that this neutrality is itself a substantive moral commitment rather than a purely procedural framework. Initially, Sandel's critique might seem to suggest that Rawls underestimates the role of social relationships in shaping ethical life. However, his argument runs deeper: he asserts that political philosophy cannot avoid substantive moral commitments, even when it claims to be neutral. The effort to construct a just society without endorsing any particular conception of the good, Sandel argues, already assumes a particular
liberal ethic—one that prioritizes
individual autonomy over more embedded forms of belonging. A truly adequate account of justice must therefore recognize that principles of justice are always informed by deeper conceptions of the good life.
Critique of Liberal Neutrality Sandel challenges the liberal claim that justice can be formulated without reference to particular conceptions of the good life. He argues that all political theories, including Rawls', inevitably make implicit assumptions about human flourishing. While Rawls aims to construct a framework that allows individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good, Sandel maintains that such a framework cannot be truly neutral. Instead, he argues that any theory of justice must engage with substantive questions about what it means to live a good human life. At first glance, this argument may seem like a call for greater moral engagement in political philosophy. However, Sandel's position extends further: he suggests that the very
attempt to avoid substantive moral commitments leads to an internally incoherent liberalism. By refusing to take a stand on what constitutes a good life, liberalism paradoxically ends up imposing its own vision of the good – one rooted in individual autonomy and procedural fairness. Sandel thus invites a rethinking of justice that acknowledges its inherently ethical dimensions rather than treating it as a purely formal or neutral construct. ==Publication history==