At the end of 2024, Turkey reopened its consulate in Benghazi. and later to
Misrata, making it the airline's third Libyan destination after Tripoli and Benghazi. The inaugural Misrata flight ceremony was attended by Turkish Ambassador Guven Begec, Libyan Transport Minister Muhammad Al-Shahoubi, Turkish Airlines Sales President Mahmut Yayla, and other officials. On 23 January,
Tunisia sent a formal letter to the UN opposing Libya's maritime zone declaration, claiming it violates the UNCLOS and asked to negotiate a mutually acceptable boundary. Turkish construction firms expanded in eastern Libya, signing contracts with the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, led by Belgassim Haftar, for projects in Benghazi,
Al-Bayda,
Shahhat and
Tobruk. By June, Libya's eastern parliament aligned with Haftar considered ratifying the Turkey maritime agreement, a move viewed as courting Ankara while undermining Tripoli's Government of National Unity. In late June 2025, Libya's
National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed a
memorandum of understanding with Turkey's state-owned oil company
TPAO to conduct offshore geological and geophysical surveys, prompting protests from Greece, the EU, Malta, and Egypt. In July, Libya formally opposed Greece's claims to maritime zones south and west of Crete, rejecting the median line proposed by Greece and calling on the UN and international community to ensure stability. During IDEF 2025 in Istanbul, an annual defense fair held in the city, Turkish Defense Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and Commander of the Land Forces met Saddam Haftar, Migration from Libya to Greece surged by approximately 173% and an EU diplomat indicated that Libya might be attempting to weaponize migration in coordination with Turkey to pursue shared political objectives. The EU sought to manage the surge by cooperating with Benghazi authorities on migration, but Haftar expelled the delegation, triggering a crisis within the EU. In response, Greece deployed warships to patrol the border with Libya, introduced stricter migration regulations and began training Libyan coast guard personnel from both eastern and western Libya. In August, Turkey, Italy and Libya held talks in Istanbul on migration and other areas of cooperation, agreeing to reconvene later to assess the outcomes of their committees. In August 2025, the Turkish Navy corvette
TCG Kınalıada docked in Benghazi as part of a
Turkish Naval Forces tour of Libyan ports, following an earlier stop in Tripoli. In Tripoli, the vessel was received by Libyan Army Chief of Staff Mohammed Al-Haddad, and Turkish–Libyan naval units, including the Turkish TCB-59 helicopter, conducted joint maritime drills. Turkish officials discussed expanding military cooperation, particularly in naval, air and air defense training with the Libyan Army Chief of Staff. The Benghazi visit included a high-level delegation led by Turkish Ambassador Guven Begec, Defense Ministry Director-General Lt. Gen. Ilkay Altindag, Consul General Serkan Keramanlioglu, Rear Admirals Refik Levent Tezcan and Huseyin Tigli, and Navy Captain Ilkay Beril Aydemir. Saddam Khalifa toured the warship afterward. TCG Kınalıada had previously visited Alexandria in August 2024, symbolizing improved Turkish–Egyptian ties. Shortly after the Benghazi visit,
Turkish intelligence chief
Ibrahim Kalin met Khalifa Haftar, Saddam Haftar, and Belgassim Haftar in Benghazi, inviting Khalifa Haftar to Turkey; Haftar accepted for a planned September visit. A high-level Turkish delegation, led by the head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency also met the Board of the
University of Benghazi. Turkey signaled it was considering deploying military advisers and trainers to eastern Libya. On 18 August, Malta formally protested Libya's maritime map submitted to the UN, arguing it violated international law and encroached on Malta's continental shelf and EEZ, and called for dialogue under UNCLOS. If approved, the deal would reinforce Turkey's challenge to what it calls a Greek-imposed blockade enforced by the Greek islands. It would also provide legal and political justification for expanded Turkish gas exploration in disputed waters and support a sustained naval presence in the central Mediterranean. For eastern Libya, the agreement could offer investment opportunities and increased political leverage. The European Union reiterated its opposition in June and September 2025, stating the deal violates international law and third states sovereign rights and has no legal effect and urged compliance with UNCLOS and dialogue. In early September 2025, the head of the
Egyptian General Intelligence Service, held a meeting with the Director of Turkey's
National Intelligence Organization. Their discussions focused on regional and international issues, with particular attention to the situations in Gaza,
Sudan, and Libya. Also in early September, during the Gastech 2025 conference in Milan, the premier forum for natural gas, LNG, hydrogen, climate technologies, and artificial intelligence, the Turkish Energy Minister
Alparslan Bayraktar had a meeting with Libya's Oil and Gas Minister Khalifa Abdulsadek. Both ministers expressed mutual interest in expanding joint projects and investment opportunities in the energy sector. Furthermore, Saddam Khalifa Haftar met in Rome with Ibrahim Dbeibah, a key adviser to Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, along with U.S. presidential adviser
Massad Boulos. Their discussions focused on a wide range of issues, including security, military affairs, politics, and energy. In addition, the Turkish Foreign Minister
Hakan Fidan visited Italy to meet with his Italian counterpart,
Antonio Tajani, for talks focused on energy security, Mediterranean connectivity, irregular migration (particularly from Libya), defense industry collaboration, science and technology, and key regional issues, including Libya. Fidan emphasized that Turkey has played a crucial role in reducing migration flows from Libya, and both countries signed a deal to deepen cooperation between their coast guards and law enforcement agencies to combat irregular migration in the Mediterranean and jointly work toward ensuring Libya's stability. In the same period, the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, based in eastern Libya, announced it had signed memorandums of understanding with the Italian company GKSD S.r.L. The agreements cover cooperation in health, infrastructure, clean energy, and environmental sectors. The signing took place during a meeting between the Fund's Director General, Belgassim Khalifa Haftar, and the head of the
Italian Intelligence Service, who led a high-level Italian delegation. The President of GKSD S.r.L. was also present. Meanwhile in Greece, according to the Greek newspaper
Kathimerini, Belgassim Haftar also visited Athens to discuss enhancing cooperation in the areas of construction, energy, investment, and transport. The visit also coincided with preparations for an upcoming Greek trade mission to Benghazi in the fall. During the talks, both sides highlighted the historic relations between Greece and Libya, and expressed a shared desire to strengthen and build a genuine dialogue. They also agreed to continue training Libyan coast guard officers in Greece, and Belgassim Haftar reportedly assured that the House of Representatives would not ratify the maritime memorandum. The Greek Foreign Minister also expressed satisfaction with the significant decline in migrant flows from Tobruk to Crete. In addition,
Chevron Corporation, in partnership with
HelleniQ Energy, submitted a binding offer in Greece for four offshore blocks, some of which lie close to the median line that Greece claims as the boundary of its Exclusive Economic Zone. Greek officials consider Chevron's move a strong signal of trust, and they believe that if Chevron later pursues Libyan offshore blocks located south of Greece's claimed EEZ boundary, it could result in a de facto maritime delimitation, even in the absence of formal treaties. Around the same time, during an official visit to
Malta, the Government of National Unity of Libya and the
Government of Malta reached an agreement to initiate discussions on maritime border issues. The talks, held between Libya's Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Al-Taher Al-Baour, and Maltese Foreign Minister
Ian Borg, focused on resolving maritime boundaries through bilateral dialogue, with the possibility of expanding to multilateral talks if other countries become involved. Additional key topics included political developments in Libya, illegal migration, joint border management, coordination between coast guards, and development initiatives aimed at addressing the root causes of migration. In addition, Turkey began training Haftar's forces, with the Turkish Ministry of Defense releasing a video showcasing the training. In mid-September 2025, Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan revealed that Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, has been in regular contact with Turkish intelligence and the foreign ministry. Erdogan noted that this engagement reflects Turkey's recent shift toward a more multi-dimensional diplomatic approach in Libya. He expressed strong expectations that the Benghazi-based authorities could soon ratify the 2019 maritime delimitation agreement. According to Erdogan, such a move would be a significant step toward promoting peace and securing Libya's place in the international legal order. In addition, during a joint Turkish–Libyan working group meeting in Ankara, Turkish Trade Minister
Omer Bolat announced that Turkey has proposed holding the Turkish–Libyan Joint Economic Commission meeting in December, the first time since 2009. He emphasized the strong potential for expanded cooperation between the two countries in several key sectors, including natural resources and renewable energy. He also revealed that Turkey has begun implementing a long-term, multiple-entry visa system for Libyan citizens. On 21 September, Greek Prime Minister
Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced that technical discussions on maritime delimitation with Libya have officially begun. A Libyan delegation visited Athens, and the next round of talks is scheduled to take place in Tripoli. According to analysts, this diplomatic engagement marks a shift toward greater responsibility by both countries. By choosing dialogue over confrontation, Greece and Libya may have opened the door to a long and complex negotiation process, which is seen as essential for maintaining regional stability and preventing direct conflict. However, expectations for concrete outcomes remain low, as Turkey continues to be a dominant force in the region. The recent deal between Greece and Chevron is widely seen as an effort by Greece to position itself, not Turkey, as Libya's legitimate maritime partner. Yet in reality, Turkey remains a central player. Turkey considers its agreement with Libya untouchable, and with Libya lacking both a unified political front and the will in Tripoli to annul the MoU, the deal remains in effect although Greece deems it "illegal". Turkey's entrenched influence in western Libya continues to undermine Greek efforts, severely limiting Athens ability to shift the status quo. For its part, Libya is attempting to balance its relationships with both Greece and Turkey, leveraging the dynamic to attract diplomatic attention, investment opportunities, and bargaining power in negotiations over migration with Europe. However, this balancing act carries significant risks, it could deepen internal divisions within Libya or provoke backlash from groups loyal to Turkey. In October 2025, Greece introduced a proposal for a regional cooperation framework involving Libya, Egypt, Cyprus, and Turkey. The plan suggests a multilateral "5×5" approach, where five countries would work together on five key areas: migration, marine environmental protection, connectivity, maritime zone delimitation, and civil protection. Greece aims for this framework to evolve into a permanent regional mechanism. In late October, Khaled Haftar visited Greece, where he met with the Greek Defense Minister and the Chief of the Greek National Defense General Staff. Around the same time, Turkey's Defense Ministry released videos showing the Turkish military training General Haftar's forces. In February 2026, the Turkish national energy company Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) signed a memorandum of understanding with BP for collaboration in Iraq and Libya. At the same time, Turkey's head of intelligence met with the Libyan prime minister in Tripoli to discuss matters of mutual interest. In August 2025, he held a separate meeting with General Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi. In the same month (February), Turkey stated that Greece's cooperation with Chevron off Crete violates international law and good neighbourly relations, while Greece responded that its actions were in accordance with international law.
Perspectives of analysts during this period Turkey's expanding role in Libya is driven by a calculated effort to exploit shifting geopolitical conditions, particularly
Russia's distraction in Ukraine and the
U.S. and
U.K. focus on energy security in the
Middle East and
North Africa. Ankara's engagement with eastern Libya and rapprochement with Egypt represent a strategic pivot designed to reshape the Eastern Mediterranean balance of power, with implications extending beyond Libya to
Gaza,
Lebanon, and
Israel. Turkey’s policy shift has eroded trust on both sides of Libya's divide, alienating former allies in Tripoli while legitimizing Haftar's eastern authorities. This shift reveals that Ankara now prioritizes economic access and maritime leverage, positioning itself as an indispensable actor in the Libyan conflict and ensuring it cannot be excluded from any future settlement. At the center of Turkey's Libya strategy is the preservation and expansion of the Turkish–Libya maritime agreement, which underpins the "
Blue Homeland" doctrine and enables Ankara to challenge Greece and Cyprus. By courting Haftar through arms sales and military cooperation, Turkey is positioning itself as a dominant external power broker in Libya's fragmented security sector, ensuring long-term leverage regardless of which Libyan faction prevails. Turkey's growing influence in Africa, particularly in Libya's energy and defense sectors, has increased its strategic value to the U.S. and Europe, which increasingly view Ankara as a useful partner for countering Russian and Chinese influence despite ongoing regional frictions. Coordination among Turkey,
Italy, and the United States reflects a shared willingness to trade political consistency for short-term stability, prioritizing economic engagement and migration control over meaningful Libyan reconciliation. ==See also==