Linkage (policy)

There have been different uses of the term ‘linkage’ in reference to both domestic and international policy making. There is often debate over the true meaning of the term. Historians and academics have portrayed the meaning of ‘linkage’ in different lights. Common understandings of the term are that linkage means leverage – the linking of one event to another in order to maintain bargaining power or pressure on the opposing party involved. Another description of linkage comes from Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb. They describe linkage as "an up-to-date application of [Henry] Kissinger’s theories about balance of power." Specific types of linkages can be coercive or cooperative. They can also be prospective, such as promises or threats, and they can be retrospective, such as rewards or retaliation. == The politics of linkage ==

There are multiple theories behind linkage politics. The basic differences behind these theories are that the parties involved are either different or similar – with respect to their issue positions. For those parties that are different, the politics of linkage are based on the assumption that governments or parties involved make decisions as trade-offs. Linkage is "established by the players’ beliefs that cooperative behaviour in one setting influences the prospects for cooperation in other settings." By connecting events or issues that are not necessarily connected in a particular way, governments can boost their political and economic situations by surrendering less important issues for those that have a greater, all-round importance. For those parties that are similar, linkage politics are based on the observation that mutually beneficial exchange is more prevalent between similar countries. With similar issues, it becomes more about bargaining power and convincing the other country involved that they are receiving something worthwhile in return. == Origin and setting ==

Linkage policy became significant during the time of détente during the Cold War. This meant a relaxing of tensions, mainly between the East and the West. By 1971, the newly established Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was ready to accept US ideas about relaxing tensions. This was for a number of reasons. The Soviet Union had issues with the Czechoslovak Communist party in 1968 when their leader, Alexander Dubček, created reforms encouraging free speech and democracy. == Nixon-Ford era (1969-1977) ==

During the Presidencies of both Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, linkage diplomacy was used as a key foreign policy measure. It was particularly aimed at the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger, who was Nixon's National Security Advisor, said that the aim of this policy was to "free [American] foreign policy from oscillations between overextension and isolation and to ground it in a firm conception of the national interest." Following the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement in 1972, both the US and the Soviet Union agreed to practise mutual restraint. The terms of the agreement were vague. This meant that Nixon and Kissinger interpreted it as a justification of their own actions. As a result of this, part of this administrations perception of linkage was to convince Soviet leaders that they would have motivation for moderation, and also punishment for a contradiction of the previous agreements they had signed. Kissinger objected the intervention from Congress as he believed foreign issues are better resolved quietly than publicly in Congress. The success of quiet diplomacy can be seen in the following fact: in 1968 only 400 Jews were allowed to emigrate, but in 1973, nearly 35,000 were allowed to emigrate. Nixon and Kissinger were secretive in their policymaking. This was because they were suspicious of the bureaucracy. Decisions were made without the knowledge of William Rogers, who was the secretary of State at the time and responsible for the management of US diplomacy. Congress also grew suspicious and played a role in foreign policy as well. This secrecy and conflicting ideas made it difficult to gain concessions and make progress in foreign policy. == Jimmy Carter era (1977–1981) ==

While Nixon had the idea of championing Linkage policy during his time as president, Carter did not believe that linkage policy was the answer to cooling Soviet tensions early on in his presidency. He believed that the majority of his country's international concerns stemmed from the confrontational relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. In 1978 Brzezinski strove to link developments in the SALT II negotiations to revised Soviet behaviour in Africa. The Soviets had recently started constructing a military presence in Ethiopia, despite the US’ previously established relationship. After efforts of mediation from the Soviet Union failed, Somalia cut all ties and its friendship treaty with the USSR in 1977. The Soviet Union increased its presence by sending 10,000 soldiers into the country by early 1978. Another concern was the fall of the Shah in Iran in early 1979, and the perceived inability of the Carter administration to free the American hostages held there. This largely affected US policy and according to Brzezinski, led to the demise of détente. Carter's national security advisor, Brzezinski, believed that the Soviets found a sense of confidence and were emboldened by the US failure to react strongly to the USSR intervention of the Horn in 1978. He mentioned that this allowed them to be more aggressive in their foreign policy without the risk of US punishment. He believed linkage policy should have been developed and used more consistently throughout Carter's term as president. If this happened, the Soviets would have been less adventurous in their exploration of the Third World, and the SALT negotiations could have been saved. Following this, the US imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union including a grain embargo and a ban on the transfer of technology. == Looking back after the Cold War ==

There are multiple arguments as to whether linkage diplomacy had achieved its objectives by the end of the Cold War. Samuel Makinda states three reasons against the success of linkage policy. These include conceptual problems, unsolicited interference in Soviet internal affairs, and Soviet intervention due to American disenchantment. Conceptual problems The Basic Principles agreement was the basis on which Linkage policy was first imposed. The agreement was vague and not very specific. This meant that each country interpreted the agreement in their own way. This was the conceptual problem. For example, the US wanted ‘unilateral advantage’ in the Middle East but did not involve the Soviet Union in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. But when the Soviets wanted ‘unilateral advantage’ in Africa, the US wanted to punish them. Soviet internal affairs The US wanted to link their own issues with Soviet domestic policies. The SALT I agreement between the US and the Soviet Union in 1972 and the Basic Principles Agreement did not involve issues related to domestic policies. When the US did attempt to affect domestic policy in the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders regarded it as interfering in their internal affairs in an attempt to undermine their leadership. US disenchantment The US had disenchanted some countries in its attempt to deal with Soviet aggressiveness and expansion. For example, Ethiopia became disenchanted after developments in the Ogaden War. Angola also became disenchanted because they could not get US support due to their ideological inclinations. This meant that Soviet intervention in Africa was partly because these disenchanted countries invited them. == See also ==