2021 Cabo Delgado offensives

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province began in 2017 when radicalized locals took up arms. Despite the area's wealth in natural resources, it had long been neglected and marginalized by the Mozambican central government. The rebels belonged to an Islamist group known by a variety of names, locally called al-Shabaab. The Mozambican government mismanaged the crisis, and the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) were unable to crush the rebellion. From 2018, there were growing indications that the local rebels had begun to align with the Islamic State (IS). The group and its regional branch, IS-CAP, eventually started to describe the Cabo Delgado insurgents as their followers. In 2020, the rebels were able to greatly expand their influence, even capturing the strategically important town of Mocímboa da Praia in a major offensive. In early 2021, the insurgents reduced their activity geographically, and instead focused on well-defended areas which were still controlled by the government in the insurgency's core zones. Most importantly, the rebels attacked and destroyed the town of Palma from March to April 2021. By mid-2021, around 3,000 people had been killed and up to 800,000 civilians been displaced as a result of the insurgency. Militias are also known to murder and torture suspected rebels and captured insurgents. plane to Mozambique, July 2021 On 9 July 2021, Rwanda sent 1,000 personnel (700 soldiers, 300 policemen) to assist the Mozambican government against the rebels. commanded by South African Major General Xolani Mankayi, a veteran of the South African National Defence Force's intervention in the Burundian Civil War. However, the initial SADC force consisted of just 738 soldiers and 19 civilian experts, limiting its ability to operate and provide effective military aid to Mozambique. As international troops became more involved in the Cabo Delago insurgency, IS simultaneously increased the number of claims for attacks in Mozambique. == Offensives ==

First offensive Soon after their arrival, the Rwandans launched an offensive alongside FADM. Simultaneous to this offensive, Tanzania strengthened its border defenses, with the Tanzanian police carrying out operations to catch retreating rebels in Kibiti District. IS-CAP and pro-government forces clashed at Awasse; IS claimed that its forces had put up a fierce defense and killed several pro-government soldiers. It was later confirmed that the Rwandans had indeed suffered several casualties during the battle of Awasse. These successes were attributed to the Rwandans' ability to react quickly and professionally to repeated rebel ambushes along the roads. On 20 August government forces captured Mbau, killing 11 militants. Mbau had served as the rebels' "military and spiritual headquarters"; the RDF later reported that the insurgents had even built bunkers there. Three days later, Rwandan troops captured an insurgent base called "Ubaua" in Quissanga District; the base was possibly already abandoned, as no fighting was reported. On the same day, a FADM soldier accidentally killed a civilian in Chitunda without being punished for this, resulting in locals complaining about the military acting with impunity. On 24 August, rebels massacred ten fishermen at Mucojo, Macomia District. Two days later, the FADM stopped a boat which was possibly smuggling food supplies to rebels off Mocimboa da Praia District. A joint FADM-RDF unit captured a rebel base near Ntchinga, Muidumbe District, on 27 August. On 28 August, SAMIM troops reportedly raided an insurgent position at Muera River, capturing equipment and documents. and heavy fighting was still reported in the Messalo River valley. On 12 September, insurgents ambushed a Rwandan convoy between Mbau and Indegue, Mocímboa da Praia District, with a land mine. SAMIM troops also began to deploy in Niassa Province; groups of insurgents were suspected of having retreated or otherwise relocated to Niassa. On 25 September, pro-government forces reportedly overran another militant base at Chitama, killing several rebels including a commander named Rajab Awadhi Ndanjile who had led the rebel forces operating in Nangade District and a founding member of the insurgency. while several reports emerged according to which pro-government militias and Mozambican security forces were abusing civilians and killing prisoners. On 1 October, FADM and insurgents battled at Miangalewa. Five days later, pro-government forces ambushed insurgents in Limala, southern Mocimboa da Praia District, killing a rebel leader known as "Muhamudu". On 20 October, rebels launched another raid into Tanzania, targeting Kilimahewa village, Tandahimba District. They burnt a warehouse and captured several civilians, although a TPDF contingent arrived in time to rescue the hostages. For the rest of the month, insurgents attacked civilians in Macomia District. Four days later, SAMIM reportedly destroyed three rebel bases in northern Macomia District, rescuing 13 kidnapped civilians. Surviving militants fled to the north of the Messalo River. From 1 to 10 November, SADC conducted a minor offensive in eastern Muidumbe District; the operation reportedly succeeded in destroying a number of rebel bases. On 6–7 November, five rebels voluntarily surrendered to pro-government forces in Macomia and Muidumbe District. This was unusual, as the insurgents severely punish any desertion, while government forces often outright murder or torture any captured rebels; according to Cabo Ligado researchers, the surrenders thus suggest that the supply situation of the insurgents had become very dire. Rebels also attacked Ntuleni, between Palma and Mocimboa da Praia, on 7 November, but a combined RDF-FADM force pursued, cornered and destroyed the raiding party with the help of drones. == Aftermath ==

By mid-November, the rebels were conducting a counter-offensive to counter the pro-government advances of the previous months. From 8 to 14 November, the rebels increased their attacks on settlements, targeting Lijungo, Nangade District, and the villages of 5º Congresso, Nanjaba, and Nambini in Macomia District. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for some of these raids and other attacks on civilian targets in the area. The raids prompted pursuits by joint FADM-SAMIM groups that managed to catch up with the Lijungo and 5º Congresso attackers, killing several. In addition, FADM-SAMIM troops successfully ambushed insurgents at Mandimba, eastern Nangade District, on 9 November, while militiamen claimed to had killed four rebels near 5º Congresso three days later. The rebels also expanded their operations in Mueda District, raiding several localities from 12 to 16 November, and launching more cross-border attacks into Tanzania. Pinnacle News claimed that the rebels set up a new base at Nambungali, northern Mueda District. Clashes also continued further south from 18 to 19 November, centered at 5º Congresso and other sites in Nangade as well as Macomia Districts. Two days later, insurgents attempted to storm a camp in Mueda District, but were repelled by a local militia. == Analysis ==

The reconquest of Mocímboa da Praia was a major symbolic and strategic success for the Mozambican government, especially as it had previously struggled to contain the rebellion. Furthermore, the town can be used as staging point for further counter-insurgency operations and opens up roads, possibly ending the state of siege for several northern communities. Even though the first offensive was a success, however, the pro-government forces were unable to inflict substantial casualties on the insurgents. The RDF admitted by 5 August that just 70 rebels had been killed up to that point. In addition, the government forces were not able to rescue kidnapped civilians. Overall, the Islamists appeared to have conducted a fighting retreat during the first offensive, evacuating their personnel and sparing their fighters for future battles instead of holding territory. Observers argued that the intervention of Rwandan troops had proven crucial for the first offensive, as their support had enable the FADM to break through in areas such as the N380 corridor where its previous counter-insurgency operations had failed to dislodge the rebels. In contrast to FADM soldiers who often retreated when ambushed by rebels, the RDF soldiers have the "training, leadership, and experience" to break through ambushes. Analysts of the Cabo Ligado project argued that this was the main difference to the Mozambican security forces, as the Rwandans differed very little in their operational doctrine from the FADM. The Rwandans have also won approval from local civilians due to their disciplined conduct and attempts to treat locals fairly. Many locals began to treat the Rwandans as "heroes", waving Rwandan flags and acquiring pictures of Rwandan President Paul Kagame. In sharp contrast, the locals generally suspect Mozambican security forces of being abusive and corrupt, although thousands of locals signed up to join the military or police to protect their families. By mid-September 2021, surrendered rebels described the insurgency as being in a state of chaos, with many militants deserting. Kidnapped civilians also stated that the rebels had begun to suffer from a significant lack of supplies. In the next two months, the rebels were struggling to gather food, as the pro-government forces had driven them off their fields. However, the rebels were still capable of offensive actions, as proven when they launched a counter-offensive in November 2021. Cabo Ligado argued that despite having been weakened, "IS-affiliated insurgents in northern Mozambique are proving resilient". ==References==