Problems with speed As a vehicle turns it generates
centrifugal force, which is proportional to the square of the speed and inversely proportional to the radius. Even a small amount of force, acting across the length of the human body, creates a
moment that can make moving about difficult. Centrifugal forces are not normally an issue in an automobile because the occupants are seated, nor in an
aircraft where the fuselage is tilted so the centrifugal force passes through the line of the floor. It is primarily a problem in high-speed trains, where passengers and attendants often walk about while the train is moving. The force also pushes the entire train sideways, leading to wear of the outer rail. This was not an issue on early railways where the speed was low, but gained importance as line speeds increased and the radius of curvature became tighter. Dedicated high-speed railway lines were being constructed in
Japan in the 1960s. Japan had previously used a but decided to lay entirely new
standard gauge lines for these services, the
Shinkansen. The lines were designed for a running speed of , using gentle curves with minimum radii of , and entirely new signalling systems able to provide enough warning to stop a train at within . The Europeans were planning similar systems in several countries, while the UK, and Canada, could not justify such an expense given their passenger numbers.
Active tilt Another solution to this problem had been developed in the 1950s but not widely used: tilting trains. Tilting trains rock into the curve to tilt the passenger cars the same way that a superelevated track would tilt them inward. Tilting systems had been introduced in service by the Spanish
Talgo, but this system was "passive" and took some time to respond to curves. Great improvement can be made by making the system "active", reading the forces on the cars with sensors and quickly rotating them to the proper angle using
hydraulic rams.
British Rail ran an extensive experimental program on active tilt systems in the 1960s that was highly influential, and followed these studies in the 1970s with a new tilting train design, the
Advanced Passenger Train (APT). The technical design objectives for the APT included a maximum speed 50% higher than existing trains and curving speeds 40% higher, all while running on existing tracks within the limits of existing signals. While tilting reduces the problem for the passengers, it does not change the forces on the rails. A train going around a bend at high speed rides up onto the rails, and if the flanges on the inside of the wheels contact the rails they cause considerable wear. Eliminating this effect is difficult, but it can be reduced by lowering the weight of the locomotive, or eliminating the locomotive and distributing the motive power throughout the train. APT took the former route, and the original
APT-E used
gas turbine power. Gas turbines have an excellent
power-to-weight ratio, perhaps ten times that of a conventional
diesel engine, with the downside that they use considerably more fuel at idle. This was not a concern when the APT was first being designed, but after the
1973 oil crisis they quickly changed the design to be electrically powered. This was even lighter than the turbine version, but requiring the lines to be electrified at great cost. As a result, only the
West Coast Main Line from
London to
Glasgow used the electrically powered
APT-Ps.
Turbo The only route with passenger numbers and trip times suitable for high-speed service in Canada at the time was the Quebec City–Windsor Corridor, especially the portion between
Toronto and
Montreal that accounts for two-thirds of the passengers in the Corridor. The
TurboTrain, or simply "Turbo" as CN preferred, was CN's first attempt to provide higher speeds along the Corridor. Designed in the early 1960s by
United Aircraft Corp., the TurboTrain used a licensed version of Talgo's passive tilt system and a new turbine-powered locomotive. The CN trainsets were built in Canada by a consortium of
Dofasco for the
bogies and suspension system,
Alcan for the car bodies, and
Montreal Locomotive Works (MLW) for the engines and power systems. All three companies gained valuable experience with modern passenger train design as a result of the project. The Turbo was far from perfect, however. Its articulated bogies meant that the train could only be uncoupled in the maintenance yards. If there was a problem with a single car the entire train had to be taken out of service, and the inability to easily change train length significantly reduced its flexibility. The design featured unique doors at either end to allow two trains to be coupled into one longer one, but in practice this proved too much trouble to be worth it. Moreover, while the turbine power was lightweight and proved very reliable, it was also very inefficient in fuel terms.
LRC A competitor to the Turbo had been brewing for some time at this point. As early as 1966 an engineer in
Alcan had been formulating ideas for a new lightweight train and introduced the design to CN. The car body design was made mostly of aluminum for light weight, and built two inches lower than conventional sets to cut down wind resistance. This was the only suitable engine already being built at MLW; it was a relatively old design from the 1950s, and the LRC would prove to be one of its last uses in North America. To keep the train as a whole as streamlined as possible, the loco body was wrapped very tightly around the engine, at the same height as the cars. The resulting design was quite small even by modern standards, several feet shorter than the
GE Genesis that replaced them in Via service, and thousands of pounds lighter. The light weight and low wind resistance would allow higher speeds while using less power, improving fuel efficiency. The effort found strong support within the government. The Canadian Transport Commission studied the problem of offering Corridor service and concluded that "the most profitable strategy to adopt involves maximizing the potential of existing railway facilities through the introduction of new vehicle technology."
Designing the suspension The first consideration was whether or not a suitable tilting mechanism could be built into the bogies that would not require extra space or project into the car. Dofasco, a major steel manufacturer in
Hamilton, won the majority of the bogie development contracts. They developed a system that consisted of two parts, a bogie and suspension on the bottom, and a separate tilting mechanism on top. The tilt controls were developed by
SPAR Aerospace and
Sperry Rand Canada. The car body rode on rollers fitted into two U-shaped arms at the front and back of each bogie. Hydraulic rams moved the car from side to side along these arms, tilting it up to 8.5 degrees. This made the bottom of the coach slide sideways while it rotated, so that the axis of motion was in the middle of the car body, instead of the top (like the Turbo) or bottom (like most tilt systems). This reduced the feeling of motion on the passengers by keeping the rotation close to their
center of gravity, and reduced loads to 0.5 g. The companies had predicted that the development of the prototype would cost $2.48 million, and the government provided half of that under the PAIT agreements. The project overran the budget by $77,000, which the companies supplied out-of-pocket. The prototype coach was completed in 1971 and started testing with conventional locomotives. By the summer of 1972, it had seen of service, and a few relatively minor problems cropped up. Issues with the tilting mechanism were studied by a group at SPAR and
McMaster University, and several fixes incorporated into the design. By that point the prototype locomotive was 85% complete. During this period, CN executives started expressing concerns about the cost of the equipment, while their engineers stated a preference for electrically powered tilting in place of the hydraulic system. Dofasco stated that such a change would be impractical, upsetting CN. In response, CN requested a series of additional tests, delaying their decision on ordering the design. This was also likely a response to the problems encountered on the Turbo, which had been rushed into service for Expo '67 before rigorous testing had worked out its problems. With the PAIT funds exhausted in 1972 and the launch customer delaying its orders, the project went into a lengthy hiatus period where little progress was made. To continue testing without an order from CN, the consortium was forced to turn to the TDC for additional funds. It was not until July 1973 that an additional $460,000 was released to finish the locomotive and start testing. A four-phase program was envisioned to bring the LRC to production. The first two phases would have the coach running on normal mainline service through April 1973 as part of Phase 1 and runs at higher speeds in Phase 2 through to July 1974. Testing was further delayed due to a railway strike in Canada, which led the consortium to explore moving the high-speed tests to the U.S.'s
High Speed Ground Test Center in
Pueblo, Colorado. Although a deal was arranged in January 1974, testing continued in Canada. Later that year the consortium learned that the U.S. was considering foreign designs for service with Amtrak, so the contract was revived and the LRC prototype was sent for a six-week period starting in November 1974. The tracks it ran on included butted and welded rail, concrete and wooden ties, and was originally designed to test low-speed urban transport designs at speeds up to . During the testing the train covered at speeds of up to , and routinely took corners designed for at . In one all-day test it averaged including three 10‑minute stops to change crews.
Into production Bombardier purchased MLW in 1975, in part to gain access to the LRC. By this point, it had outstripped the development of the APT in the UK and would enter service before it. Although it had a lower top speed than the APT or Japanese designs, it was otherwise considered very advanced. Fuel economy was particularity noteworthy; the LRC used slightly more than with a five-car train, whereas existing fleets used just under , and the Turbo used . They also included heavy soundproofing, including of foam insulation throughout the body. Alcan and TDC were also highly critical of Bombardier's management of the MLW portion of the program, suggesting that their mid-level management lacked the know-how to conclude the project rapidly.
Service entry While work progressed on the LRC, the Canadian government was in the initial stages of fulfilling an
election promise made by
Pierre Trudeau in 1974 to implement a nationwide carrier similar to
Amtrak in the U.S. Although they agreed in principle to buy the LRC in 1975, purchase of the LRC was put on hold while the newly forming Via Rail was set up. CN, which had been wanting to rid itself of passenger service since the late 1960s, started passing off its existing passenger rolling stock to Via starting in 1976. In the meantime, in January 1977
Amtrak signed a $10 million lease agreement for two locomotives with five coaches each, with an option to buy the trains at any time, or return them after the two years were up. Amtrak was in the process of investigating high-speed service on their own
Northeast Corridor, especially between
New York City and
Boston. This portion of the line contained numerous curves, and they were investigating active tilt for at least this portion of the route. The "LRC 1" batch for Amtrak was completed in the fall of 1980. They ran in revenue service as Amtrak #38 and #39 (locomotives) and #40 to 49 (cars), where they were used on the
Beacon Hill (New Haven-Boston) and
Shoreliner (New York-Boston) services. Amtrak declined to take over the trains and they were returned to Bombardier in 1982. There were significant differences between these machines and the later Canadian sets, so they could not be easily mixed. Via used the Amtrak coaches for their International service to
Chicago, repainted in Via Rail colours, and renumbered 3501 to 3508, 3511 and 3512. Despite Amtrak not taking up the LRC design, there was some consideration, even at that early date, of an electric locomotive version of the same basic design. (numbered 3300 to 3349). This order was then expanded for another 10 locomotives. This batch of 20 became the "LRC 2" (loco numbers 6900 to 6920). In 1981, they placed another order for 10 locomotives (6921 to 6930) and another 50 coaches (3350 to 3399),
In service , Ontario during the initial Nightstar test runs, in the summer of 2000. This was one of the last runs of the LRC locomotives. The first Canadian production set was delivered to Montreal's
Windsor Station on 1 June 1981. The first fare-paying run was made from Toronto to Sarnia on 4 September 1981, on
Labour Day weekend. Initially, the LRCs were plagued with problems. One common problem was that the cars would "lock" in the tilted position even after the track had straightened out from a curve. At the time, Bombardier was estimating total sales of another 80 LRC sets, for up to $500 million. Their calculations showed that the LRC would have a cost per passenger of $23.26 over a trip, only slightly higher than conventional trains. Although the LRC used much less fuel per passenger than conventional sets, even less than a bus, no further sales were forthcoming. Via Rail put the trains into service, persisting through their initial teething pains and coming to depend on the LRC for the majority of its intercity service in the Quebec City–Windsor Corridor. The original LRC locomotives were gradually retired after ten to fifteen years of service, although #6905 was used during test runs of the new "
Renaissance" cars between Glen Robertson and Ottawa in 2000. The last run of an LRC locomotive was in 2001. ==Retirement and dispositions==