Election of the Head of State According to the Loi Fondamentale, Parliament had to meet to elect the head of state within 48 hours of the appointments of the presiding officers of each chamber. Bolikango and Kasa-Vubu were the only two declared candidates. Lumumba had promised to support the former in the election in exchange for PUNA's support for his government's investiture. Afterward he secretly instructed the nationalist parliamentarians to vote for Kasa-Vubu, figuring that this would please the most pressure groups and appease the ABAKO constituency, which many feared would effect a secession of the Lower Congo. Mpolo thought electing Kasa-Vubu would be a mistake and sought to postpone the vote to give Lumumba time to reconsider his decision. During the session he took the floor and suggested that, in light of heightened tensions between Bolikango's and Kasa-Vubu's supporters, the assembly be adjourned to facilitate further discussions between the political parties on their candidates of choice. Confused by the proposal, Kasongo (who was presiding) asked if it had been made on behalf of the government. Displeased, Lumumba indicated that it was not. Instead of using his power to adjourn, Kasongo deferred to the assembly, which decided to proceed with the election. Thomas Kanza coaxed Lumumba to step outside of the chamber where he, his father, and Mpolo attempted in vain to change his mind. Lumumba refused to alter his decision on the grounds that ABAKO members would revolt and that, in his personal opinion, Kasa-Vubu would make a better head of state. Kasa-Vubu won the vote, 150 to 43 with 11 abstentions. The election of Kasa-Vubu brought about wide-ranging acceptance of the Congo's new administration. The Belgian press reacted positively to the development, while the Léopoldville's daily newspaper ''Courrier d'Afrique'', edited by a Mukongo, showed much warmer approval of the government. However, it also solidified the oppositional alignment of PUNA, CONAKAT, and the MNC-K. Bolikango's supporters were infuriated by the result, as were many Bangala soldiers. Nevertheless, the discontent seemed to pose little threat to the Lumumba Government's operations or credibility, except in Kasai (in regard to the MNC-K). International opinion expressed satisfaction at the striking of a proper balance in leadership. Belgian politicians hoped that Kasa-Vubu would check Lumumba's impulses and personal disdain for Belgian policies. He was officially sworn in as president on 27 June.
Organising administration and preparations for independence At the onset of his premiership Lumumba had two main goals: ensure that independence would bring a legitimate improvement in the quality of life for the Congolese and unify the country in a centralised state by eliminating tribalism and regionalism. He was also worried that opposition to his government would appear rapidly and had to be managed quickly and decisively. To achieve the first aim, Lumumba figured a comprehensive "Africanisation" of the administration, in spite of its risks, would be necessary. There were 9,800 Belgian civil servants in the Congo, all of whom held senior positions. Of the 12,485 Congolese functionaries, only 637 held higher level posts. Of the top three grades in the civil service, only three posts were held by Congolese. The Belgians were opposed to Africanisation, as it would create inefficiency in the Congo's bureaucracy and lead to a mass exodus of unemployed civil servants which they would be unable to handle back in Europe. All the same the proposal could not be quickly enacted before independence; Lumumba was wary of a hasty reorganisation that would jeopardise the administration and reluctantly favored a slower transformation. He also considered the Africanisation of the territorial service to be important, but since the central government was preoccupied the task mostly fell to the responsibility of the provincial authorities. Seeking another gesture that might excite the Congolese people, Lumumba proposed to the Belgian government a reduction in sentences for all prisoners and an amnesty for those serving a term of three years or less. Ganshof feared that such an action would jeopardise law and order and he evaded taking any action until it was too late to fulfill the request. Lumumba's opinion of the Belgians was further soured by the affair, which also contributed to his fear that independence would not appear "real" for the average Congolese. He was also wary of the continued dominance of the Catholic Church in Congolese affairs, but declared that his government would support freedom of religion and the
separation of church and state. Though he was optimistic about his opportunity to govern, he was disappointed by the fact that his government—composed of inexperienced men and so hastily established—could not function properly and that he had to work with many politicians who opposed his agenda. Meanwhile, the Council of Ministers held its first meetings. Most of the cabinet was concerned about the formalities that were to be in play during independence ceremonies and, following an appeal for advice to the Belgian Foreign Ministry, they adopted an
order of precedence that was nearly identical to the system used in Belgium. Ministers also concerned themselves with housing, and several visited Belgian officials at their homes in search of prospective residences. Lumumba was unable to move himself and his staff into his designated residence and offices until the Belgian Governor-general vacated the premises on 5 July. The establishment of the new administration was mired with substantial confusion. The Belgians had expected 10 ministers, not 23 (of whom 20 held responsibility over a unique ministry), so most departments had to be divided. As a result, many ministers were confused as to the location of their offices, the composition of their staffs, and the scope of their responsibilities. Organisational charts for the ministries were under evaluation as late as 28 June. The large number of departments also greatly fractured authority; social policy was shared between three ministries (Social Affairs, Labour, Youth and Sports) and economic policy was shared between four (Economic Affairs, Economic Coordination and Planning, External Commerce, Finance). The ministries were set up according to the Belgian model whereby each was split into two sections. The first consisted of a minister's personal cabinet of up to 12 members (for which no minimum qualifications were specified) under the charge of a
chef de cabinet. The cabinets' establishment was the primary concern of ministers and their clientele and they were the only government organisations speedily instituted during the hand-over of authority. The second section of a ministry was composed of several departments led by a secretary-general. Tasked with advising a minister on "political" and "administrative" functions, respectively, the two branches were predisposed to coming into conflict over the duality of authority they held in their ministries. In the ministries that were established before independence the cabinet posts were mostly filled by loyal members of the responsible minister's party. A minority were held by Europeans, with exception of the seats in the Defence cabinet, which were completely occupied by Belgian officers. A handful of the secretariats were given to some of the few Congolese university graduates. In the confused political situation many ministers were mistrustful of others and made such appointments based on regional or tribal affiliations. Petty tribal, religious, and personal disputes among staff hampered the establishment of the administration. Three hundred Congolese personnel were sent to Belgium for training in various ministries but very little changed in the lower levels of the administration; most clerks received the same salary as they had previously and were left under the control of the same Belgian civil servants. The ministries of Foreign Affairs, Youth and Sports, Education, and Information, relative to the other departments, were initially able to function under Congolese management. On the eve of independence the chief of the
Sûreté Nationale (security police) was attached to the Prime Minister's office, allowing Lumumba to monitor the activities of Gbenye and Mwamba who both, acting in their respective capacities as Minister of Justice and Minister of Interior, had tried to cement their own control over the organisation. With the independence of the country, the new government also inherited a complex financial situation. The political uncertainty of 1959 led to the overall withdrawal of over £90 million from the Congo by the private sector before the end of the year. In 1960 the flight of capital averaged £7 million a month until the Belgian authorities intervened. By then, the
Central Bank of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi had been drained to a point where it could no longer fulfill its financial obligations. To provide stability, the
National Bank of Belgium agreed to back its operations. In return, the Central Bank transferred all of its gold and dollar reserves to Brussels and agreed that the Congo's
monetary and
fiscal policy would be decided upon by both institutions, greatly limiting the economic freedom of the new government. The Congolese were left in effect with no monetary authority and so could not issue currency or generate credit. The Belgians also persuaded several significant businesses to deposit a total of £17.5 million in the Congo's treasury (which had only £4.9 million in December 1959) as advance payments for future taxes, duties, and dividends. However, this action in-effect guaranteed that the country's future profits would meet its deficits, greatly jeopardising the future
liquidity of the Congo's finances. A drop in world commodity prices starting in 1956 had decreased the profitability of the Congo, leading to three-and-a-half years of deficits, though the Belgians proposed subsidising it. Lumumba's government was also liable for a
national debt of £350 million. Managing it was estimated to expend 24.2% of the Congo's 1960 budget, by far the largest debt burden of any relinquished African colony. However, this was somewhat alleviated by two factors. Firstly, most of it was incurred through development work. Secondly, the government assumed control over a
portfolio of assets worth approximately £240 million, including a significant amount of shares of the UMHK and several important parastatals. In addition to the £13.5 million in servicing the debt, the 1960 second semester budget also called for an expenditure of £38 million in regular appropriations. It only provided for £28.5 million in receipts, so the Belgian subsidy (which was to come in monthly installments) was required to keep it balanced. On 27 June the Lumumba Government convened and announced that the country would be known after independence as the
Republic of the Congo. During the meeting a committee was established to draft a Treaty of Friendship, Assistance, and Co-operation to be signed with Belgium. It stipulated that the Belgian civil servants in the Congo and the Belgian officers of the Force Publique would remain at their posts and receive compensation from the Belgian government. It also allowed for
Belgian metropolitan troops to continue to garrison the bases of
Kitona and
Kamina until another agreement could arrange the installations' handover to the Congolese government. The text of the treaty was hurriedly finished and on 29 June the agreement was signed by Belgian Prime Minister
Gaston Eyskens, Belgian Foreign Minister
Pierre Wigny, Lumumba, and Bomboko. Most observers familiar with the Congolese situation believed that the new government would not, with so much technical assistance, really operate independently of Belgium and some feared that regardless of such support it would not be able to function effectively. Meanwhile, foreign delegations arrived in the capital in advance of the Independence Day festivities. The Soviet gestures to Lumumba guaranteed a straightforward arrangement in their diplomatic relations with the Congolese government and an ambassador was assigned to attend the independence ceremony. More complicated negotiations regarding foreign relations took place with other states, such as Ghana. Congolese ministers were invited to an array of receptions, parties, and conferences. Their associations revealed the different factions in the government; some individuals heavily associated with the representatives of socialist countries or "progressive" Africans and Asians, while others only mingled with Westerners and their sympathisers. As these divisions surfaced, the ministers began to label each-other according to their beliefs; the categories ranged from socialist and anti-imperialist to
reactionary and pro-Belgian. The ministers' names on the government list circulated among the press were increasingly appended by their respective party affiliation. This development, according to Kanza, led foreigners to pigeonhole ministers with their parties' beliefs.
Independence The Independence Day formalities were arranged by the Belgians. The itinerary began with an 11:00 ceremony at the Palais de la Nations, where King Baudouin and President Kasa-Vubu were due to deliver speeches. Kasa-Vubu's address, which was submitted to the Council of Ministers in advance for review, consisted of two parts. The first concerned the Congo's history and its future, while the second acted as a tribute to Baudouin. Lumumba was upset that he was not listed in the programme, and he secretly drafted his own speech with the assistance of Kanza and Mandi and informed Kasongo, who was to preside over the ceremony, of his intention to speak. Baudouin's address was paternalistic in nature. He opened by celebrating the Congo's first Belgian colonists and Leopold II. He cautioned the Congolese not to make any sudden alterations to the institutions of government they were being given, encouraged them to be wary of foreign interference, and stated that they now had to show themselves worthy of being granted independence. The Congolese audience disliked the speech, and Kasa-Vubu omitted the tribute to Baudouin in his oration. Kasongo then called Lumumba to the podium. The Prime Minister delivered
a charismatic, nationalist address which praised the Congolese independence movement and spoke toward the necessary sacrifices to be taken to improve the country. He highlighted the abuses the Congolese people had faced under colonial rule and stressed the importance of the Congo as a new African state. The Belgian press and population had an extremely negative reaction, and both believed the Prime Minister's speech was proof of a radical and anti-Western outlook. After the speech Lumumba and Bomboko signed the accords officially conferring sovereignty upon the Congo with their Belgian counterparts. Independence Day and the three days that followed it were declared a national holiday. The Congolese were preoccupied by the festivities which occurred in relative peace. Meanwhile, Lumumba's and Gizenga's offices were overtaken by a flurry of activity. Lumumba, for his part, was mostly preoccupied with a lengthy itinerary of receptions and ceremonies. Bomboko, Kanza, and Mandi were busy attempting to organise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bomboko was upset by the fact that most foreign contacts were made either through the entire government or through Lumumba, instead of directly through him. On 1 July Lumumba sent a wire to the UN to request membership, stating that the Congo "accepts without reservation the obligations stipulated in the
Charter of the UN and undertakes to abide by the same in absolute good faith." UN Secretary-General
Dag Hammarskjöld cabled the Foreign Ministry, pointing out the difficulty in admitting the country into the UN under its name in the face of another application for membership from the
neighboring Congo, preparing for independence from French control. A delegation was sent from
Brazzaville to resolve the matter with Kanza and Mandi. Problems of mutual concern between the two countries were also discussed. In the end, it was decided that the former Belgian Congo would be recognised as the Republic of the Congo or Congo-Léopoldville while the former French Congo would be known as the Congolese Republic or Congo-Brazzaville. The Lumumba Government also signed the
Third Geneva Convention. On 3 July the government ordered the arrest of Kalonji's "rival" Kasai provincial government, precipitating unrest in Luluabourg. The following morning Lumumba convened the Council of Ministers to discuss the unrest among the troops of the Force Publique. The ministers resolved to establish four committees to study respectively the reorganisation of the administration, the judiciary, and the army, and the enacting of a new statute for state employees. All were to devote special attention to ending racial discrimination. Lumumba announced the decision over radio that evening. Parliament assembled for the first time since independence and took its first official legislative action by voting to greatly increase the salaries of its members. Lumumba, fearing the repercussions the raise would have on the budget, was among the few to object, dubbing it a "ruinous folly".
Mutiny of the Force Publique and the Belgian intervention The Force Publique was long characterised by repressive police actions and entrenched racial segregation. With the exception of 10 adjutants appointed shortly before independence, no Congolese soldier was able to advance past the rank of sergeant. Many hoped that independence would result in immediate promotions and material gains, but were disappointed by Lumumba's slow pace of reform. The rank-and-file felt that the Congolese political class—particularly ministers in the new government—were enriching themselves while failing to improve the troops' situation. There was dissatisfaction that Lumumba had appointed an unpopular colonel to a high post in the Ministry of Defence, and the troops from Équateur and southern Kasai were additionally upset that Bolikango and Kalonji were not included in the government. Many of the soldiers were also fatigued from maintaining order during the elections and participating in independence celebrations. On the morning of 5 July General
Émile Janssens, commander of the Force Publique, in response to increasing unrest among the Congolese ranks, summoned all troops on duty at Camp Léopold II. He demanded that the army maintain its discipline and wrote "before independence = after independence" on a black board to emphasise that the situation would not change. That evening the Congolese sacked the canteen in protest of Janssens. He alerted the reserve garrison of Camp Hardy, 95 miles away in Thysville. The officers tried to organise a convoy to send to Camp Léopold II to restore order, but the men mutinied and seized the armoury. The "
Congo Crisis" which followed would come to dominate the tenure of the Lumumba Government. The following morning the troops in Thysville began arresting Europeans and confiscating firearms. Some soldiers drove to other towns in the Lower Congo, spreading the mutiny. Meanwhile, Janssens finalised plans to attack Camp Hardy and had alerted the commander of the Belgian metropolitan troops in the Congo. The government countermanded his order and instead dispatched Mobutu, Kisolokele, and the Vice President of Léopoldville Province to negotiate with the mutineers. They succeeded in releasing the captive Europeans and began evacuating them to the capital. Bands of angry soldiers roamed the capital, and Lumumba interrupted a cabinet meeting at his residence to invite one group to share its grievances. In an attempt to placate the mutinous troops, he dismissed Janssens and promoted every soldier by one grade. He also dismissed the Belgian officer in charge of the Sûreté and forced him into exile, precipitating a collapse of the organisation completed by the departure of most other Belgian personnel. In Léopoldville, several Congolese soldiers had been convinced that Lumumba had brought Soviet troops into the country to disarm the Force Publique. Angered by this, they stormed the hotel rooms of Soviet diplomats. Upon hearing what had occurred, Lumumba directed Bomboko to assume responsibility of the security of all foreign delegations present in the Congo and ensure that the Soviets could safely leave the country. Bomboko ordered Kanza to escort the delegation to
N'djili Airport where they both convinced the Congolese soldiers to allow the Soviets to depart in peace. On 7 July formal negotiations between the mutineers and the government on the reorganisation of army began. Though the situation in the capital was relatively calm, anxiety grew among the European community, which began to arm itself with weapons from illegal stockpiles. Belgian civilians began seeking passage to the French Congo or refuge in the Belgian embassy to await repatriation. Bomboko and Delvaux devoted much of their time to assisting them. The provincial presidents, who had been summoned to the capital, met with the Council of Ministers to discuss domestic security in the context of the mutiny. Other matters, including the appointment of administrative staff and the budget, were also considered. Tshombe specifically requested that Katanga be allocated a unique budget in consideration of its mineral wealth. Lumumba promised that he would consult his advisers on the proposal but stated that he was more concerned with ensuring order in the provinces. Belgian officials appealed to Lumumba to allow for Belgian troops to intervene to preserve law and order. In public, Lumumba stated that intervention was not necessary. In private, the government considered the possibility of intervention as a necessity and that it could be requested under the terms of the Treaty of Friendship. A ministerial committee was established to monitor the mutiny. , appointed chief of staff of the Armée Nationale Congolaise|left On 8 July the full Council of Ministers convened in an extraordinary session under the chairmanship of Kasa-Vubu at Camp Léopold II in Léopoldville to address the task of Africanising the garrison. By then the severity of the mutiny had convinced the ministers that radical reform was necessary in order to maintain the army's discipline. The Council first heard soldier delegations' grievances; the root cause of their dissatisfaction was that the army's leadership was wholly European despite independence from Belgium. The ministers then debated over who would make a suitable army chief of staff. The two main candidates for the post were Mpolo and Mobutu. The former had shown some influence over the mutinying troops, but Kasa-Vubu and the Bakongo ministers feared that he would enact a coup if he were given power. The latter was perceived as calmer and more thoughtful. In the end, Mobutu was given the role and awarded the rank of colonel. The ministers then decided that the Minister of Defence should appoint a Congolese sergeant major to replace Janssens as commander-in-chief of the army with the rank of general. Lumumba, at the suggestion of Mwamba, selected
Victor Lundula for the role. In addition to the appointments a state committee for the army—officially renamed the
Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC)—was formed and put under the charge of a Congolese officer. It was further determined that the President would
ex officio be the supreme commander of the military, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence would control the army in a structure approved by Parliament, and all army units would be placed under the command of Congolese officers. Delegations were to be dispatched across the country to implement the latter reform. The ministers resolved to retain all Belgian officers "prepared to serve the Congo loyally" and guarantee the security of their income, families, and property so they could act as advisers to their successors.
Marcel Lengema replaced Mobutu as Secretary of State to the Presidency. The ministers decided it would be best to publicise their decisions as soon as possible. Immediately after the Council adjourned, the garrison of Camp Léopold II was summoned to the barrack square. Lumumba, acting in his capacity as Minister of Defence, announced the actions the government was taking to address the army's grievances. A communique was distributed by the secretariat of the Council of Ministers to the press and radio, summarising the government's decisions. The Congolese soldiers were satisfied with them, and tensions relaxed. Nevertheless, European civilians continued to try and flee the country. On 9 July the government delegations left the capital to oversee the Africanisation of the ANC. Mobutu traveled to Équateur and while he was there Mpolo acted as ANC Chief of Staff. Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba went directly to
Matadi where tensions were quickly worsening. From that point until later in the month the two worked closely with one another and made most major decisions together. After appointing a new garrison commander, supervising the election of other officers, and securing the release of captive Europeans, the pair left the city to inspect other units throughout the Lower Congo. European officers handed over control to the Congolese in Kivu and Orientale without incident, but the military situation in Kasai and Katanga remained tense and was marked by violence. The government's decision to Africanise the army caused anxiety in the civilian populace of the latter province, which feared such a reform would result in the collapse of domestic security. The provincial government refused to support Africanisation and appealed directly to Belgium to intervene to resolve the situation. The troops subsequently mutinied. Meanwhile, in Brussels news of conflict and abuses against Europeans brought public pressure against the Belgian government to take action. Ganshof and
August de Schryver were sent to Léopoldville with an ultimatum for Lumumba: either a formal request for Belgian military assistance could be made or metropolitan troops would act on their own initiative to protect Belgian citizens. As Lumumba was not in the capital, Ganshof and de Schryver met with other ministers in an attempt to persuade them to agree to a military intervention. Discussions continued late into the evening and though some members of cabinet appeared receptive, Deputy Prime Minister Gizenga was obstinately opposed to such action and ultimately refused to consent. Overnight orders to intervene were delivered several times to the Belgian troops at Kamina base only to be repeatedly countermanded by the government. Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu were informed of the planned intervention and, though initially receptive to the idea, were disturbed that the Belgian government would not make guarantees regarding respect for Congolese sovereignty and subsequently asked that all Belgian troops be withdrawn from Congolese soil. Regardless, the Belgians' decision to intervene ultimately prevailed and at 06:00 on 10 July metropolitan troops from Kamina flew into
Élisabethville, the capital of Katanga Province, and occupied the local airport. In the afternoon Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu returned to the capital having successfully quelled the unrest in the Lower Congo and convinced that negotiation could resolve the situation. Later they decided to solicit aid from the UN in restructuring the Force Publique. Ministers of the cabinet met with UN representative
Ralph Bunche to discuss what technical assistance the UN could offer to the Congolese administration. Bunche shortly thereafter informed Hammarskjöld of the Congolese government's intended request. By evening Lumumba had learned of the Belgian intervention in Élisabethville. He was furious that the Belgians had acted contrary to the Treaty of Friendship and delivered a response over radio: We have just learnt that the Belgian government has sent troops to the Congo and that they have intervened. The responsibility of Belgium is great. We protest bitterly against these measures which prejudice good relations between our countries. We appeal to all Congolese to defend our Republic against those who threaten it. At the same time the Belgians launched a second intervention in Luluabourg. On 11 July Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu flew to the town. After overseeing the election of new officers for the garrison, Lumumba joined Kasa-Vubu in admonishing the Europeans to stay. Most refused to do so unless they had the protection of the Belgian troops. After lengthy negotiation Lumumba agreed to the condition and communicated to the Belgian consul-general that the force could remain in the province of Kasaï for two months. Back in Léopoldville, Ganshof and de Schryver continued to meet with the ministers with the hopes of establishing a mutual guarantee of security for both Europeans and Africans. Then, for reasons not entirely clear, Belgian units intervened in Matadi. Fighting broke out and 12 Congolese were killed. News of the conflict (along with exaggerated casualty reports) spread to other army camps across the country, resulting in a wave of renewed mutinies and anti-Belgian hostility. Between 10 and 18 July, Belgian forces intervened 28 times in Congolese localities. With the exception of the Luluabourg authorisation, the Belgian troops never acted with the permission of the government. The Force Publique mutinies increased the unpopularity of the army and cost the government a significant amount of support in rural areas. The insecurity they caused also impeded economic production and the distribution of goods and distracted the leadership from addressing other problems facing the administration. Order was ultimately restored largely through the use of the gendarmerie, a more wieldy and reliable institution than the army.
The Katangese secession , leader of CONAKAT and President of the declared State of Katanga A number of CONAKAT leaders and Europeans made an attempt shortly before 30 June to declare Katanga an independent country. The Belgian government foiled their plans, as it favored its colony emerging as a unified state. The Force Publique mutiny and the refusal of Lumumba to accede to a military intervention caused the Belgians to alter their opinions; secession could provide them a way to reestablish order in the region and protect their large commercial interests in local industry. CONAKAT politicians also grew increasingly worried that Lumumba would dislodge their provincial government and replace them with BALUBAKAT members. On the evening of 11 July Tshombe, accusing the central government of communist leanings and dictatorial rule, announced that Katanga was
seceding from the Congo. When the ANC officer responsible for the Africanisation of the Élisabethville garrison arrived in the city, Katangese authorities immediately detained and expelled him. He flew to Luluabourg and informed Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu of the secession. The two decided to fly to Katanga for to examine the situation themselves. Katangese Minister of Interior Munongo denied them permission to land at the airport and radioed that while Kasa-Vubu could visit Katanga if he wished, Lumumba was not allowed to enter the territory. Infuriated, the President and Prime Minister returned to Luluabourg. They subsequently requested assistance from the
UN Security Council in restructuring the ANC via telegram and informed the cabinet of their appeal. Belgian troops immediately began to withdraw to Katanga following the declaration of independence, damaging infrastructure along the way. They disarmed ANC units that remained loyal to the central government, and several Belgian officers were appointed to a newly created
Katangese Gendarmerie. The secession had the support of the UMHK, which assisted in the establishment of the new Katangese state—logistically and financially—and urged the Belgian government to support it. The company never sought to negotiate a compromise with Lumumba's government. The Belgian government subsequently established a technical assistance mission in Élisabethville and encouraged its citizens in the local administration to remain at their posts. While the secession was viewed favorably among conservatives in Western circles, leftist media saw the development as an attempt by Belgium to retain control over its economic interests and undermine the Lumumba Government. The government was frequently criticised in the Belgian press, while the Katangese situation was praised. Two of the largest newspapers in Léopoldville, ''Courrier d'Afrique
and Présence Africaine'', repeatedly attacked the administration for its failure to end the state of crisis. At 15:30 on 12 July the government convened in Léopoldville in the absence of the president and prime minister with Belgian Ambassador
Jean van den Bosch, Ganshof, de Schryver, and eventually United States Ambassador
Clare H. Timberlake. Bomboko directed most of the meeting, and proposed, in light of the strained relations between Belgium and the Congo, that a "foreign neutral army" be brought in to maintain order. After his initial suggestion of Israeli troops was agreed as too impractical, Bomboko advanced the idea of using United States forces. The ministers then penned a formal request of 3,000 troops for use in the capital and the Lower Congo which the United States government rejected, instead supporting the direction of aid through the UN. Later that day Gizenga addressed a moderate letter to Van den Bosch that implored the latter's government to be mindful of the Treaty of Friendship. That evening Kashamura went on the radio to declare that the government was "indignant" towards the Belgians' actions in Matadi. On the morning of 13 July Bomboko retrieved Belgian officers and their families from Thysville and brought them to the capital. Meanwhile, other ministers went to the Palais de la Nation, where the Chamber was in session. Kashamura pronounced that "Belgium overwhelmingly voted for the declaration of war against the Congo." Delvaux and the President of Léopoldville Province met with the Belgian commander-in-chief of the intervention at N'djili Airport, where the Congolese, after a long debate, agreed to try to set up joint patrols in the capital, "to organise camaraderie between white and black soldiers", and for a "member of the government to be delegated to [the Belgian metropolitan army command] to act in agreement with it". But in the late afternoon the Congolese government, under the leadership of Gizenga, decided, following the refusal of the United States government, to seek military aid from Ghana, pending the arrival of an international peacekeeping force. Gizenga arranged for all attending ministers to sign the letter so that none could disassociate from it. He announced the decision over radio. During the evening the government sent a letter to Van den Bosch demanding the withdrawal of all Belgian troops from Léopoldville by 05:00 the next day under the threat of severing diplomatic relations. Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu then sent another telegram to the UN, stating that peacekeepers were requested to guard the Congo's sovereignty against Belgian aggression and warning that if the request was not speedily fulfilled they would turn to the
Bandung Powers for assistance. The following day they sent a message to Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev from
Kindu, asking that he monitor the situation in the Congo closely. In New York City the UN Security Council adopted
UNSC Resolution 143, calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops and authorising the Secretary-General to send military and technical assistance to the Congo in consultation with the government to restore law and order. This resulted in the establishment of a
large UN multinational peacekeeping force (generally known by its French acronym of ONUC). Foreign contingents arrived in the capital shortly thereafter. Hammarskjöld later stated that these were to form a "temporary security force" that, although acting with the consent of and performing some of the tasks of the government, was completely under UN command. Later that day Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu, in part to satisfy pressing demands from Parliament, and also upset by the continuation of military interventions, announced that they were severing diplomatic relations with Belgium: Following first Belgium's flagrant violation of the Treaty of Friendship of 29 June with the Republic of the Congo as to the clause stating that Belgian troops could not be used on Congolese territory without express request by the Government of the Congo and second because of the attack on our territorial integrity which Belgium has committed in provoking the secession of Katanga which attack was proved first by the Belgian troops' refusal to permit the Chief of State to land in Élisabethville Tuesday 12 July and second by the nomination of a Belgian officer to command the army in Katanga, our Government has decided in consequence of the act of aggression against the Republic of the Congo to break off all diplomatic relations with Belgium from this day 14 July 1960. Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu then instructed their Belgian pilot to fly them from Kindu to Stanleyville. Acting under orders from Brussels, he took them to Léopoldville, where they were both greeted by a large Belgian contingent at N'djili Airport. Later they made another attempt to fly to Stanleyville, but their pilot turned back after saying the aircraft suffered a "fault". They were harassed by Belgian paratroopers and refugees on their return and were under the impression that Congolese sovereignty was being disrespected. Most Congolese were deeply upset by their treatment and felt that the Belgian intervention—even if initially justified—had gone too far. The leadership began turning its attention away from resolving the ANC's systemic problems and more towards checking Belgian military action. A handful of observers were concerned that Lumumba was acting without proper consultation with his ministers or Parliament. On 16 July Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu succeeded in flying to Stanleyville. Lumumba appealed for calm among the garrison, but after hearing of more interventions, he and Kasa-Vubu demanded that all Belgian metropolitan forces withdraw from the Congo in 24 hours or they would request military aid from the Soviet Union. This was done to put pressure on UN officials to ensure the Belgian departure and leave open the option of assistance from another party. UN officials reacted to the ultimatum by calling a meeting to N'djili Airport with the Belgian commander-in-chief and Bomboko and Kanza. All present agreed that the demand was unfortunate and that it would not be possible for the Belgians to withdraw so quickly. Bomboko and Kanza, both surprised by the ultimatum, promised to try and secure a retraction of the measure at the next cabinet meeting. Bunche managed to secure assurance from the Belgian command that all metropolitan troops would leave Léopoldville by 23 August. The last of the Belgian troops did not leave the Congo until 7 August, except in Katanga, where the soldiers did not evacuate until 4 September. On 17 July Yav, a member of Tshombe's CONAKAT, announced his resignation from the Lumumba Government and departed for Katanga. Nyembo followed suit. Meanwhile, ONUC contingents began disarming mutinous soldiers with considerable success, much due to the cooperation of Mpolo. On 19 July Lumumba had ONUC suspend this practice, on the grounds that such confiscations were humiliating and that if the peacekeepers were not going to resolve the Katangese secession he would need the ANC to be prepared to do so.
Interactions with Parliament Parliament was convened in an extraordinary session from late June until late July and its discussions during the time were dominated by the mutiny of the Force Publique and the Katangese secession. On the whole the Chamber of Deputies approved of the government's activities while the Senate did not. Throughout July and August the Senate offered frequent criticism of the actions of the members of the government. On 5 July it refused to offer its consent to Lumumba's suggested state commissioners, citing his failure to consult provincial officials on the nominations (it later confirmed Sendwe as State Commissioner for Katanga). The government found the Senate's insistence on monitoring its activities to be overbearing. On 14 July Lumumba spoke to the Chamber, detailing his treatment by Belgians and Katangese, and explaining that his long absence from the capital was necessitated by his tour to calm the disorders in the interior. He asked that Parliament unite with his government to manage the situation, and most deputies subsequently expressed their support. The following day Kanza, Bomboko, and Delvaux appeared before Parliament to reject accusations of personal "complicity" in regards to the Belgian intervention and to affirm their concurrence with the actions taken by Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu to restore order. On 18 July the Senate expressed its disapproval of Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu's threat to seek support from the Soviet Union while the Chamber refused a proposition to grant the government
emergency powers. Meanwhile, the nature of the material being issued by Kashamura's Ministry of Information was subjected to an increasing amount of criticism, being labeled "controlled and distorted" by Catholic circles. On the initiative of Iléo, the Senate resolved on 19 July to review the content of government press releases and investigate the possibility of a motion of censure against Kashamura. Parliament also sought to review the government's programme. After the issue was initially raised by several senators on 7 July, the Chamber and the House both concurred that the programme had to be tabled by 19 July. The failure for this demand to be met led to two days of intense debate in which several members of Parliament threatened to withdraw their confidence in the government. Multiple senators filed an interpellation on 7 August directed at Lumumba, requesting an answer for the lack of a programme. Eventually one was released by Kashamura in his capacity as Minister of Information. It read in part as follows: • The local authority of chiefs and notables to be sustained, however, in the interests of stability. • The Government welcomes democratic opposition once reconstruction has got under way. • The Government guarantees individual liberties; separates Church and State. Government is preparing legislation to end
arbitrary arrest. Free Marriage. • The Republic will be a State of law, thus relative separation of powers. • Legislative: Chamber of Deputies.Senate.Executive, represented the Head of State.Each has equal initiative. • Members of the Government share in the legislature in two ways:(a) Under authority of Head of State they present legislative projects to the Chambers.(b) As deputies or senators they vote. • Judicial: Immediate Africanisation of magistracy as fast as studies permit. • Executive: Has to take necessary measures for implementing the laws. [Head of State] is first and foremost the servant of the legislator. Governmental Declaration • He deals with general rules and particular appointments.Foreign Affairs: The Congo will follow a policy of:Trades: Aims as follows: • (i) To maintain existing markets; to expand these markets. • (ii) Open door policy re Imports, as far as is consonant with protection of indigenous industry. • (iii) Import/Export reciprocity programme. • (iv) The Government declares that private property is the prerogative of individual freedom. It refuses to acknowledged nationalisation, as a general rule. • The Government is especially anxious for rural development—communal and collective organisations to be tried. Roads and services to be improved. Town lodgings to be regulated. Co-ops to be government fertilised; other technical and financial assistance to individual traders, etc. • The Government is anxious to develop a prosperous middle class. • Central Bank and National Institute of Development to be set up. • Mines: At present account for 35–40% of Treasury Revenues. 14 milliard francs invested in 1959. 80,000 workers in 1959. • The Government aims to develop zinc, cobalt, manganese, gold, etc. based on private initiative; opportunities in Kivu and
Bakongo area, where alumina and power are found at
Boma. • Land Policy: Holdings to be limited in future. Compensation and tenurial stabilisation being prepared. Plan of Economic Co-ordination • Finance: Five milliards overseas investment needed. Tax won't supply enough; also moves for loans from International Agencies and Belgium are in train. Congo has every intention of staying within Belgian currency zones. • Communications drive. Other matters: Salary policy without discrimination of race...or sex • Qualifications standards in construction of rational wages system. A general effort for total wage rise by 30%. Drive to reduce unemployment. Work tribunals and Inspection bodies. Promotion of Co-operatives, Housing Families,
Social Security legislation, Youth and Sports. • Education programme: Illiteracy drive (adult and child). Primary Instruction for all. Subsidies for Secondary, Normal, and Technical education with equal treatment of girls. Building up educational cadres.
Collapse of administration The disorder that engulfed the Congo prevented almost all of the government ministries from functioning. Most of this was due to the flight of European functionaries, which had begun leaving
en masse after de Schryver confirmed that all Belgian civil servants would be guaranteed employment in the metropole. By the end of July 5,589 Belgian civil servants had fled the Congo, soon to be joined by an additional 1,129 in August. Almost all of those working for the central government in Léopoldville left. All of the Europeans in the Bureau Central des Traitements (the office in charge of government salaries) had departed, leaving the office in the hands of a Congolese chief clerk. All but one of 175 postal workers vacated their posts, alongside all 542 agricultural experts (some later returned) and most of the 328 Belgians running telecommunications systems. Health services were not as adversely affected, since many of the rural divisions were already managed by Congolese while a substantial number of private practitioners that remained in the country handled work in urban areas. The effects on education were not immediately felt because schools were out of session and most of the teachers were in Europe, though it was unlikely that many would return for September classes. Though the government no longer had to pay the large salaries of many Europeans, the cost benefits were largely offset by the pay increases for soldiers and regular Congolese civil servants (a 30% wage hike for all Congolese functionaries was declared in July). Other administrative areas deteriorated during the time, including sanitation, the postal service, railways, air traffic control, and radio communications. The mutinies deprived the government of an effective means of law enforcement. Provincial institutions were left to operate independently by the collapse. From 20 July onward, the Belgian government attempted to stem the flight of functionaries and convinced some to return to their posts. Ambassador Van den Bosch wanted to avoid a total administrative collapse and worked to ensure the retention of Belgian personnel. In doing so he established contacts with ONUC, Congolese ministers in favor of a strong relationship with Belgium, and certain ministries (namely Finance, Economic Affairs, and External Commerce). He also communicated with the remaining Belgian civil servants who were anxious about serving in an administration that had the disapproval of the Belgian government, advising those in the employment of moderate ministers or the Presidency to continue their work while cautioning those attached to the "extremists" (e.g. Lumumba and Kashamura) to avoid any undertakings that would harm Belgian interests. Throughout July several ministries, including Agriculture, Justice, and Labor, warned Belgian absentees that if they did not resume their duties their employment would be terminated. In the Ministry of Finance there was entrenched opposition to the return of employees that had fled to Belgium. Most of the Congolese civil servants filled the leadership gap by electing their peers to senior posts, some of whom had received the abbreviated training in Belgium. A handful of positions were given out based solely on political considerations by politicians or political parties. With some exceptions, the majority of the appointees faced substantial confusion in their new roles. The situation was complicated by the fact that many Belgian functionaries had withdrawn with keys to filing cabinets and destroyed their documents. The handover in the Ministry of Economic Coordination and Planning under Kabangi's leadership was relatively smooth, and the department busied itself with organising the distribution of foreign food aid to the interior of the Congo. At the end of July the ministry dispatched delegations to the provincial capitals in consultation with the UN to appraise the provinces' economic needs. Almost all Belgian employees of the Ministry of Finance vacated their posts, but the transition to Congolese management occurred quickly and with minimal disruption. This was because most of the department's Congolese staff were already experienced accountants, held an apolitical attitude towards their work, and were committed to learning how to operate in their new roles. Their activities were made easier by the fact that Belgian employees of the Central Bank had remained working in the capital. Still, an internal survey concluded that even after reform additional technicians were needed by the ministry, and recruitment of foreign experts was sought. ONUC personnel also took up many posts in the administration working on a mostly collaborative basis with the Congolese, though they did assume managerial responsibility of health, communication, and some transportation services. ONUC also instituted several successful job training programs for government functionaries. Nevertheless, observers concurred throughout July and August that on the whole the government operated in a state of disorder. Without a functioning administration, the agriculture and construction sectors which depended upon their services suffered, as did
public works and parastatals. Critical infrastructure support components such as steamboats, locomotives, agricultural machinery, communications hardware, and dredging equipment, despite sustaining only minimal damage during the army mutinies, were not maintained during the summer and ultimately deteriorated beyond repair. Public expenditure regulations, tax collection (especially of
income tax), and foreign exchange controls faltered, driving down receipts. There was no effective monitoring of the amount and use of the funds taken by the provincial administrations. Numerous wage increases drove up regular expenses by about £3 million. Payments on the public debt dropped dramatically. The government began running monthly deficits of FC 700 million ($14 million). To handle the costs, the Central Bank began supplying the government with advances of an average of over FC 500 million per month (the statutory limit on advances was twice raised by presidential decree),
Joseph Malula, the Catholic bishop of Léopoldville, denounced the Lumumba Government's support of separation of church and state, and specifically the secularisation of the latter. In order to distract from their activities, opposition groups began peddling a rumor of a Gizenga coup. Suspicious, Lumumba asked Gizenga to lead Bomboko, Kanza, Mwamba, and Mpolo to New York on 8 August to address the UN Security Council. Lumumba's supporters convinced Gizenga to let Bomboko speak for the delegation at the UN. The speech he delivered had been drafted by the other four ministers and was critical of Belgium's actions. This put up a front of cabinet solidarity and briefly discouraged thought of Bomboko's more pro-Belgian attitudes. Lumumba also faced dissent in the central Congo. Following independence, Baluba throughout Katanga and Kasai became the subject of violent attacks. Kalonji and his allies made an official call to the Baluba across the Congo to return to their "homeland" in the southern portion of the province on 14 July. Initially, they envisaged the division of Kasai in two in order to allow for the creation of a quasi-autonomous MNC-K and Luba-dominated provincial government. Rapidly, however, Kalonji realised that the chaos in the rest of the Congo could be used to secede unilaterally and declare full local independence. On 9 August he announced the secession of the "
Mining State of South Kasai". This complicated any future military action against Katanga, as the rail line from the military base in Luluabourg to the province ran through Kalonji's territory. Throughout August Lumumba increasingly withdrew from his full cabinet and instead consulted officials and ministers he trusted, such as Mpolo, Mbuyi, Kashamura, Gizenga, and Kiwewa. Kasa-Vubu's wishes frequently went unheeded by the government. Lumumba kept Kashamura on in spite of his displayed incompetence and disorganisation, instead addressing the problems by assigning most of Kashamura's responsibilities to his own press secretary, Serge Michel. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister's office was in disarray and few members of his staff did any work. His
chef de cabinet, Damien Kandolo, was often absent and acted as a spy on behalf of the Belgian government. Lumumba was constantly being delivered rumors from informants and the Sûreté, encouraging him to grow deeply suspicious of others. Kanza attempted in vain to exercise a moderating influence on the Prime Minister. Gizenga privately expressed his disapproval of Lumumba's methods. All the while Mulele was attempting to organise a
student exchange program with
Eastern European countries and nationalise
Lovanium University. He succeeded in proposing the latter action in a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 16 August, but backlash from Christian groups dissuaded Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu from carrying it out. The Council of Ministers met with decreasing frequency throughout August; by September, it was hardly convening at all. Meanwhile, large amounts of capital were withdrawn from the country while exports fell dramatically. Without Katangese participation in the economy, hard currency earnings were halved. On 6 August the government responded to the deteriorating situation by adopting a decree that forbade international payments. The order was never published or otherwise communicated to those it would have concerned and the Central Bank still permitted a number of transactions. Between 1 July and 15 August the bank's foreign currency reserves fell from about $75 million to $35 million. The Lumumba Government threatened to expropriate the abandoned European enterprises if their owners did not return to the Congo and reopen them, but never followed through with any action. It also sought financial support from the
International Monetary Fund and dispatched Nkayi and Delvaux to
Geneva for negotiations with Belgian authorities. Lumumba and the Council of Ministers were completely bypassed in the implementation of the decisions agreed upon during the discussions; in early September Nkayi, with the sole sanction of Kasa-Vubu, established a monetary council and began issuing new paper currency. Though it was resolved that the Central Bank would be liquidated, the measure was never carried out. By September the government's financial situation was ruinous; a combination of disrupted tax collection, the inaccessibility of Katanga's mining industry, the closure of European enterprises, falling production, and declining volume of foreign trade had brought about a severe reduction in revenue. Neither soldiers, civil servants, nor
public contractors could be properly compensated. Affected individuals' faith in the government suffered, as did the overall morale and discipline of the ANC. There were no funds available for the necessary imports required to keep certain segments of the population fed. Lacking in foodstuffs, these groups withdrew their support for the administration. Lumumba believed that
Albert Ndele, Nkayi's
chef de cabinet and the acting Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance, had directed the Geneva negotiations and would implement Belgium's financial goals at the expense of the Congo's. Lumumba had Ndele dismissed only for the Council of Ministers to reinstate him on 1 September. The dire administrative and economic situation caused consternation among the trade unions; the government was threatened with a possible civil servants' strike at the hands of APIC, which was protesting politically partisan appointments. Dissension and subversion campaigns, including the dissemination of anti-Lumumba leaflets and inciting of army mutinies, were organised in Brazzaville with the support of President
Fulbert Youlou, Belgian intelligence services, the French
Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage, and the United States
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Batshikama, though a secretary of state in the Lumumba Government, spent two hours every evening in Brazzaville hosting an anti-Lumumba radio programme. Wigny directed the Belgian agents there to encourage the Congolese opposition to remove Lumumba through presidential revocation, as a parliamentary motion of censure was deemed too likely to fail. In a meeting with his advisers on 18 August President Eisenhower suggested that he wanted Lumumba to be killed; the CIA subsequently organised an assassination operation. Belgium made similar plans. By the end of the month rumors were circulating in the capital of Western overtures to Kasa-Vubu to replace Lumumba's government.
Attempts at reconsolidation During a meeting on 1 August the Council of Ministers established a new department, the Ministry of Public Function. Ngenge was given charge of the portfolio, while an experienced clerk was made its secretary-general. Within 15 days of its inception the ministry had produced a plan for staggered Africanisation of the administration (taking
living wages, staff competence, and fiscal austerity into consideration) and drafted a standard
contract of employment for much-needed foreign technicians. At the end of the month the ministry, with the support of the UN, hosted a meeting of the various government secretaries-general to discuss ways of stemming the politicisation of the civil service. Lumumba returned to the Congo on 8 August and soon thereafter met with the Council of Ministers. The following day he proclaimed an ''
état d'exception'' throughout the Congo, and his government carried out its expulsion order against Ambassador Van den Bosch. Mandi insisted that his ousting did not signify a permanent rupture between Belgium and the Congo. Lumumba announced that all other Belgian diplomatic staff would face arrest if they did not leave the country. He subsequently issued several orders in an attempt to reassert his dominance on the political scene. The first outlawed the formation of associations without government sanction. A second asserted the government's right to ban publications that produced material likely to bring the administration into disrepute. On 11 August the ''Courrier d'Afrique'' printed an editorial which declared that the Congolese did not want to fall "under a second kind of slavery". The editor was summarily arrested and four days later publication of the daily ceased, followed shortly thereafter by the delivery of shut-down orders against the
Belga and
Agence France-Presse wire services. Lumumba also decreed the nationalisation of Belga, creating the Agence Congolaise de Presse, creating a medium through which the government's platform could be more easily communicated to the public. Bolamba was given responsibility for the agency. Another order stipulated that official approval had to be obtained six days in advance of public gatherings. On 16 August Lumumba announced the installation of a
régime militaire espécial for the duration of six months, including the establishment of military tribunals. He also initiated the arrest of public figures who opposed him. Meanwhile, Kasa-Vubu faced criticism from ABAKO and President Youlou for not curbing Lumumba's authoritarian actions. He resisted their pressure, and on 13 August he broadcast an appeal for unity and support for the government. Nevertheless, he cautioned the government against arbitrariness and excess: If I am under a moral obligation to support and defend the government within the limits set by the law, the members of the government themselves have a duty to work together as a team. Their policy must be the policy of the government and not that of one party, one race, or one tribe. It must be a policy which reflects the interests of the nation and which allows humanitarian values to flourish in freedom. This imperative excludes all feelings of hatred, suspicion, and bad faith towards those who have collaborated loyally with us. It is also the duty of the government to respect the institutions which have been set up and to abide by the normal rules of democratic practice. In New York, the UN Security Council discussed the issue of sending ONUC troops into Katanga. Bomboko debated with Belgian delegates over the nature of the military intervention in Katanga. On 9 August the body passed
a resolution that called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from Katanga with all necessary haste and affirmed that peacekeepers should enter the province, but not act as a party to any belligerent. Tshombe acceded to the resolution, and ONUC established itself in Katanga, but did not interfere with Tshombe's government. Belgian troops grew inactive and were gradually withdrawn. Lumumba remained frustrated and five days later he sent a letter to Hammarskjöld, declaring that the Secretary-General had ignored his obligations under the 14 July resolution to consult the Congolese government before taking action and had failed to assist it in restoring law and order throughout the entire country. With the UN refusing to take action against the secessions, Lumumba decided that his government would have to reintegrate the territories on its own. The
central government's assault to retake South Kasai began on 23 August. Lumbala advised the army during the operation and organised the arrests of the rebel leadership. All
Sabena aircraft in the Congo were requisitioned by the government for the offensive, while technical and materiel assistance was requested from the Soviet Union. The Soviets supplied 14
Ilyushin transports and 100 trucks. Soldiers were flown into the Kasai region with little supplies. ANC units secured
Bakwanga, the South Kasaian capital, on the night of 27–28 August with little resistance, temporarily ending the secession. Kalonji fled to Élisabethville where he vowed to continue his rebellion. Soldiers began seizing food and vehicles in preparation for the assault on Katanga. Conflict erupted between the army and resident Baluba and quickly degenerated into indiscriminate massacres of the latter by the former. International observers reported the deaths of hundreds of Baluba on 29 and 30 August. Colonel Mobutu ended the campaign on 1 September without consulting the government. Hammarskjöld found the event to be "a case of incipient genocide" and believed that Lumumba, having given the orders to commence the offensive in an "almost casual manner", had lost all sense of responsibility. The American press depicted the Prime Minister's regime as a Soviet puppet and dependent on Soviet aid. Western opinion held him at fault for the atrocities. The violence and ultimate failure of the anti-secessionist push greatly damaged the government's faltering reputation. While the operation was underway, Lumumba sought African support for the anti-secessionist campaign and proceeded with the Pan-African Conference in Léopoldville. Representatives from 13 independent countries and four nationalist movements attended. The opening of the conference on the morning of 25 August was marred by large demonstrations from ABAKO, PUNA, and MNC-K supporters outside the meeting hall. Police fired into the air to disperse the crowd, inciting panic and greatly disturbing the foreign delegations. In his opening speech, Lumumba spoke broadly and appealed to African unity. Almost all of the delegations recommended that the attack on Katanga be halted and that the Congolese government mend its relations with the UN. Lumumba was disappointed by their attitude and realised that he would not be able to secure their military support and that rapprochement with the UN was necessary. Nevertheless, he was not dissuaded from pursuing the South Kasai–Katanga offensive; on 27 August he flew to Stanleyville to rally reinforcements for the campaign. Back in the capital, Bomboko chaired the Pan-African Conference. The foreign delegations variously encouraged stronger discipline of the army, better relations with the UN, and that the Congo had to decide whether or not to use force or negotiation against Katanga. In response, the Congolese representatives issued a new policy statement, clarifying that the government was not asking the African states or the UN to attack Katanga but only that the former provide it with technical assistance and refuse Tshombe aid and for peacekeepers to assist in the expulsion of Belgian troops. The statement further said that the government would not negotiate with Tshombe and that the ANC would attempt to occupy Katanga following the Belgian withdrawal and, that failing, an appeal for bilateral African military aid might be made. The foreign delegations accepted the new policy, believing that the offensive against Katanga would soon fail and that they could later mediate a resolution to the secessionist dispute. Following the conference various African diplomats urged UN officials to warm their relations with Lumumba and to encourage more cooperation between him and Kasa-Vubu. Hammarskjöld complained that the "spirit of reconciliation" had "gone far too far on the line of compromise", and said that the "utterly incompetent" Lumumba Government had a "complete misconception of [its] rights in relation to the UN and [its] own role in the world." He also added that the Prime Minister should be "forced to constitutionality". == Dissolution ==