Response of Casares Quiroga's Government , president of the
Popular Front government from May 1936. He presented his resignation after learning of the assassination of Calvo Sotelo, but the president of the Republic,
Manuel Azaña, did not accept it. His response to the assassination was not as forceful as such an important event required. The Spanish government convened at ten o'clock in the morning at the headquarters of the Presidency, unaware at that moment of the final confirmation of José Calvo Sotelo’s death. Upon receiving the news, Prime Minister Santiago
Casares Quiroga reacted with visible concern, reportedly muttering to his military aide, “What a mess they have gotten us into". In response, he immediately contacted
Diego Martínez Barrio, president of the Cortes, to suggest suspending parliamentary sessions for at least a week to allow tempers to cool and to minimize the risk of further incidents. Martínez Barrio agreed with the proposal, noting that many deputies regularly carried weapons and that heightened tensions could easily lead to violence. He had already reached out to various parliamentary groups, most of whom supported the suspension—except for the
CEDA, which insisted that an ordinary session should be held to address the assassination. The monarchists also objected, though not as firmly. Casares Quiroga also sought the legal counsel of the Attorney General and the Undersecretary of Justice, Jerónimo Gomáriz, to determine appropriate candidates for special judges to oversee the investigations into the deaths of both Lieutenant Castillo and Calvo Sotelo. The edition was a huge success, widely circulated before police could confiscate remaining copies. The government responded by indefinitely suspending the newspaper, accusing it of spreading false information When
Ya's journalists confronted the Minister of the Interior, Juan Moles, he claimed that while he had permitted publication, he had not authorized the claims about the perpetrators. Another conservative paper,
La Época, was also shut down indefinitely after its director, the
Marquis of Las Marismas, refused to publish a censored version that excluded the term "murder". Other regional papers such as
El Día in Alicante and
El Lunes in Oviedo also faced suspensions for evading censorship.
Luis Romero later described the statement as circumstantial and superficial, failing to address the gravity of the situation. It vaguely committed to using the Public Order Law to maintain peace without clearly acknowledging the political crisis at hand. José María Gil-Robles, leader of the CEDA, dismissed the note as anodyne, expressing frustration at the government's inability to treat Calvo Sotelo’s assassination with the seriousness it deserved. The statement concluded with a generalized appeal to republican legality and national progress, calling on the “serenity” of the Spanish people to help preserve civilization and lawfulness. However, for many observers, this fell far short of the strong governmental leadership needed at that moment. Romero observed that the government, fully aware of its lack of control, merely delegated responsibility to a special judge while attempting to present the deaths as a balanced tit-for-tat narrative, suggesting that Calvo Sotelo’s assassination was a direct consequence of that of Lieutenant Castillo. Gabriele Ranzato went further, describing the government’s failure to issue a categorical denunciation or take aggressive investigative steps as a fatal misstep. According to him, Casares Quiroga should have led a much more assertive response—not only to dispel any notion of governmental involvement in the assassination, but to contain the rising indignation and tension that were pushing Spain toward disaster. The lack of a firm statement also gave weight to right-wing accusations that Casares himself might have been complicit, based on a remark he had made during a parliamentary session on June 16 that was later interpreted as a threat. Although newspapers at the time did not give this interpretation, its significance grew in retrospect. Ranzato also criticized President
Manuel Azaña for his silence during these critical hours. Bullón de Mendoza agreed, stating that Azaña, as President of the Republic, once again failed to rise to the demands of the moment. The government’s passivity in the face of a politically charged assassination, and its effort to treat both deaths as equivalent tragedies, further destabilized an already volatile political environment. On the morning of Wednesday, July 15, during a session of the
Permanent Deputation of the Spanish Cortes,
José María Gil-Robles, leader of the right-wing CEDA party, launched a scathing attack on the government’s handling of the assassination of José Calvo Sotelo. He denounced the official response as grossly inadequate, criticizing the government for issuing what he called an “anodyne note” that equated two incomparable cases and deflected responsibility onto the judiciary. Gil-Robles underscored the shocking nature of the crime—a sitting member of parliament, a political minority leader, taken from his home at night by agents of the state and murdered—questioning how such an event could be treated with such nonchalance. Historians such as Gabriele Ranzato argue that the murder of Calvo Sotelo appeared likely to go unpunished. The authorities displayed passivity and reluctance in pursuing the main culprits, despite their identities being widely known. Only a handful of lesser figures from the group that carried out what was referred to as the “punitive expedition” were arrested. Similarly, Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza believes that the Popular Front’s main concern following the assassination was not justice, but suppressing what it believed to be an imminent military uprising.
Luis Romero emphasizes that the government’s mishandling of the investigation, combined with the involvement of state security agents, inconsistencies in the response, and previous remarks by Prime Minister Casares Quiroga in the Cortes, deeply entrenched the belief on the political right—and even among some apolitical sectors—that the government was either complicit in or responsible for the crime. He notes that while the right certainly exploited the situation, their belief in official involvement was sincere, with blame often directed at those most politically detested, including President
Azaña. This lack of decisive government action may have stemmed from the pressure it was under from leftist parties and organizations allied within the Popular Front. These groups, enraged by the assassination of Lieutenant José Castillo, were demanding a firm stance against the right wing. Nearly two hundred Falangists and right-wing activists were arrested, and the offices of Calvo Sotelo’s party,
Spanish Renovation, were shut down. In an attempt to maintain an appearance of impartiality and authority, The anarchist newspaper
Solidaridad Obrera strongly protested this move, accusing the government of conflating their movement with fascism and weakening the anti-fascist front. Meanwhile, press censorship was intensified. Public gatherings were banned, and even the parliamentary immunity of deputies no longer shielded their speeches from government censors. A circular was sent out on July 13 to all civil governors, warning them of potential subversive action in response to Calvo Sotelo’s death and instructing them to maintain close coordination with trusted security forces, monitor transportation routes, and arrest suspicious individuals acting as intermediaries. According to Payne, there is evidence that Prieto and his allies deliberately shielded the perpetrators, even going so far as to intervene to halt judicial proceedings. This claim is based on the 1981 testimony of Assault Guard lieutenant Alfredo León Lupión, who told historian Ian Gibson that Casares Quiroga initially wanted to arrest all the officers of the Assault Guard unit involved. During a meeting with leftist leaders on the night of July 13, Prieto allegedly threatened political consequences if such arrests took place. According to León Lupión, Casares Quiroga responded by stating that any officer found to have been clearly guilty would indeed be detained. Azaña also rejected advice from
Diego Martínez Barrio, President of the Cortes, who urged him to replace the cabinet and take firm action against both the far right and far left to restore order and confidence. Azaña acknowledged the need for change but insisted on waiting, believing that accepting Casares’s resignation would compromise his honor. At a government meeting held the next day, July 16, some ministers called for bringing moderate figures into the cabinet to calm the national crisis. Others voiced concern about the infiltration of radical elements into state institutions, an issue that had been starkly exposed by the role played by uniformed state agents in Calvo Sotelo’s murder.
Response from the left , president of the
Cortes and leader of
Republican Union. He was one of the few left wing Republican politicians who at least privately appreciated the significance of the assassination of
José Calvo Sotelo. He tried unsuccessfully to get
Manuel Azaña to accept the resignation of
Santiago Casares Quiroga and to appoint a new government ready to impose "harsh sanctions that would show the recovery of all the levers of power".
Diego Martínez Barrio, President of the Cortes and a moderate Republican unaffiliated with the radical sectors of the Popular Front, was one of the few prominent left-wing figures genuinely appalled by the murder of José Calvo Sotelo. While avoiding open criticism to preserve Popular Front unity, he hinted at the government’s failure by stating: “Citizens cannot feel unprotected by the State".
La Vanguardia echoed these concerns, warning of rising anarchy if a strong, authoritative government did not emerge.
Antoni Rovira i Virgili, writing in
La Humanitat, also called for legal order and an authentic Republic. Another leftist Republican, Mariano Ansó, later described the assassination as the most severe attack on the Republic since the revolts in Catalonia and Asturias, especially after learning the culprits included security officers. He dismissed Castillo’s murder as a valid justification.
Felipe Sánchez Román, not part of the Popular Front, openly condemned the killing and offered condolences to Calvo Sotelo’s family. In contrast, fellow leftist
Rafael Sánchez Guerra was jeered when he attempted to sign the condolence book. editor of
El Socialista, would later describe the murder as “truly monstrous. The Republican press emphasized the death of Castillo, while right-wing papers like
ABC and
El Debate highlighted Calvo Sotelo’s, though their coverage was limited by government censorship.
Ahora sought balance, describing both murders as “abominable crimes".
Política, aligned with the
Republican Left, gave prominence to Castillo’s death, minimizing coverage of Calvo Sotelo’s. Its editorial condemned both right-wing provocateurs and left-wing retaliators.
El Liberal criticized violence on both sides, insisting that those who resort to force are unfit to govern.
El Obrero de la Tierra, aligned with the radical caballeristas, justified Calvo Sotelo’s assassination as a consequence of fascist aggression and called for the formation of Popular Militias to crush any uprising. The
Communist Party of Spain (PCE) went further. On July 13, it introduced a bill proposing the dissolution of right-wing organizations, imprisonment of their leaders, and confiscation of their press. The bill blamed “reactionary and fascist elements” for Castillo’s death and accused them of conspiring against the Republic. Meanwhile, the
PSOE, led by
Indalecio Prieto’s centrist faction, convened a meeting of leftist organizations, issuing a statement in support of the government. Prieto’s article “Apostillas a unos sucesos sangrientos", Upon their return from London on July 14,
Francisco Largo Caballero and other caballeristas rejected the PSOE executive’s joint statement, refusing to recognize its authority. They eventually joined discussions but maintained a separate stance, advocating for workers’ committees and the arming of Popular Militias. According to
Stanley G. Payne, this proposal effectively sidelined the state in favor of parallel revolutionary structures. was buried
Julián Zugazagoitia later recalled that many leftists did not view Calvo Sotelo’s assassination as consequential, believing the proletariat’s support made the Republic invincible.
Francisco Largo Caballero himself had earlier stated, “If they stage a coup, let them. The working class cannot be defeated." In London, he reaffirmed his strategy: the Popular Front was only a temporary alliance; the ultimate goal was to replace the Republic with a socialist government. At Castillo’s funeral on July 14, large crowds from the workers’ movement demonstrated their strength. Tensions rose when they encountered mourners from Calvo Sotelo’s funeral nearby. That night,
Indalecio Prieto wrote in
El Liberal that “Spaniards, even after death, continue to hate each other,” lamenting that even the dead could not share the same morgue.
Commotion on the right (and in the liberal sectors) and funeral in 1931, when he was a member of the Association in the Service of the Republic. He was shocked by the assassination of Calvo Sotelo. He wrote to Marcelino Domingo on the 16th: "Spain is ashamed and indignant,
as it has never been before" (italics in the original). The assassination of José Calvo Sotelo provoked shock and indignation across Spain, The conservative press, despite government censorship, gave extensive coverage.
El Pueblo Manchego, a Catholic newspaper, published an editorial on July 15 stating, “We are at war. Whoever doubts it does not know how to see or understand the realities of Spain,” and called for a “National Front” to resist revolutionary threats. The Bar Associations of Madrid and Barcelona agreed on protest letters (the lawyers who signed them would be "purged" by the Republican authorities during the civil war). The Bar Associations of Madrid and Barcelona issued protest letters—signatories were later purged during the Civil War. The Bar Association of Zaragoza sent a telegram denouncing the murder as a national disgrace. Shock was also evident among liberals supportive of the Republic.
Gregorio Marañón wrote to Marcelino Domingo criticizing the government's inaction: “Spain is ashamed and indignant, as it has never been before". Many centrist and conservative leaders concluded that the state had lost control of its security forces. Alejandro
Lerroux later recalled that by failing to punish the crime, the government demonstrated its impotence. From his prison cell in Alicante,
José Antonio Primo de Rivera, leader of the Falange, used the assassination to justify the military uprising. On July 17, the day of the coup, he declared: “A group of Spaniards, some soldiers and others civilian men, rises today against the treacherous, inept, cruel and unjust Government that leads [Spain] to ruin.” He described the murder as a deed of “scoundrelly ferocity... unparalleled in Modern Europe". Former King
Alfonso XIII, in a letter to the Count of Los Andes, claimed the killing was planned and involved government complicity: “If now the Army does not start reacting... we can prepare to see all those who can do something fall one after another. A wreath was sent by Alfonso XIII. Two demonstrators were killed and several wounded. The violence continued in the city center, with additional casualties reported. No members of the Guard were injured. On July 15, censorship did not prevent the monarchist newspaper
ABC from publishing a full-page obituary, using the term “assassinated” to describe Calvo Sotelo’s death: “José Calvo Sotelo, former Minister of Finance and deputy to Cortes. He died assassinated in the early morning of 13 July 1936.
RIP. His family, the national forces he represented, his friends and co-religionists, ask for a prayer for the eternal rest of his soul."
Meeting of the Permanent Deputation of the Cortes , where the meeting of the
Permanent Deputation took place Both the Government and the President of the Cortes agreed to suspend parliamentary sessions until tensions subsided. However, the
CEDA opposed the decision and insisted on holding a session to address the situation. When Diego Martínez Barrio, President of the Cortes, refused, CEDA leader José María Gil-Robles retorted: “Communicate to the perpetrators of Calvo Sotelo’s death that tonight I am sleeping at home, in case they want to come and assassinate me", At 11:30 a.m. the session began, notably without the presence of Prime Minister
Santiago Casares Quiroga, who was represented by Ministers
Augusto Barcia Trelles and Juan Moles (Interior). After the motion to extend the state of alarm was read, the monarchist representative
Fernando Suárez de Tangil, Count of Vallellano, addressed the assembly. He read a statement drafted by
Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, describing Calvo Sotelo's murder as a "true
State crime" and blaming the government for either instigating or being complicit in the act. Though Sainz Rodríguez later admitted he had no proof, this accusation would be perpetuated throughout the
Franco dictatorship. Two weeks earlier, Sainz Rodríguez had signed an arms deal in Rome to acquire 43 Italian fighter planes, a significant move in preparing for a coup. According to historian
Ángel Viñas, this was a decisive step in facilitating Franco’s later transport of the Army of Africa to the peninsula. The monarchist statement accused the government of fostering an atmosphere of violence that enabled the assassination, citing prior threats made in Parliament, including one by the Socialist
Ángel Galarza. It also launched a scathing attack on Prime Minister Casares Quiroga, referencing his past actions and alleged threats to Calvo Sotelo. The monarchist bloc concluded by announcing its withdrawal from the Cortes, claiming that Spain was no longer a normal or civilized state. Martínez Barrio responded cautiously. While acknowledging their grief, he declared that parts of the statement would be excluded from the official record to prevent further inflaming tensions. Specifically, he removed references to the government’s "crime of State," as well as the attacks on Casares Quiroga and statements suggesting institutional complicity in violence. Gil-Robles protested the redactions, accusing the government of silencing the opposition. Though he rejected the direct accusation of government involvement in the assassination, he charged the government with moral responsibility for fostering a climate of violence. He cited past threats, incendiary rhetoric, and inaction as evidence. In the latter part of his speech, Gil-Robles implicitly justified the insurrection, characterizing the rising tide of opposition as a legitimate reaction to tyranny. He argued that the Popular Front government had lost credibility and could no longer count on public trust or democratic legitimacy, and that those who still believed in legality would be replaced by more radical actors driven by national outrage. In his absence, Minister of State Augusto Barcia responded to Gil-Robles with a speech described by Ranzato as evasive and clumsy, by Gibson as dignified yet restrained, and by Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza as “vacuous". Barcia criticized Gil-Robles’ language as “monstrous,” and shifted blame to the center-right governments of the prior biennium—specifically the CEDA—for the prevailing instability. He claimed the government had taken all possible measures to investigate the murder, appointing the highest-ranking judge to oversee the case impartially. , leader of the
centrist sector of the
PSOE. He responded to Gil-Robles' speech with the argument that the violence of that moment was the consequence of "the enormous ferocities committed on the occasion of the repression of the
events of October 1934" carried out by the radical-cedist government.
Indalecio Prieto, a moderate socialist and critic of leftist violence in previous months, also failed to break ranks with the far left. Ranzato suggests that Prieto was compromised, as the assassins of Calvo Sotelo were members of his own security detail. Instead of distancing himself, Prieto resorted to familiar arguments: that the violence of 1936 was rooted in the brutal repression of the October 1934 uprising, and that the right bore its share of moral responsibility. Prieto insisted that while Calvo Sotelo’s murder was tragic, it was no more tragic than any other politically motivated killing. He equated it with the murder of socialist Lieutenant José del Castillo (Sirval) and blamed the right’s earlier tenure for fostering the lawlessness now afflicting Spain. His writings in
El Liberal warned of impending conflict, calling on the working class to prepare for a harsh and total confrontation if civil war broke out. Gil-Robles, in his rebuttal, countered Prieto’s relativism, demanding a full reckoning for the Socialist-led uprising in Asturias in 1934. He accused Prieto and his allies of unleashing revolutionary chaos that had now engulfed the Republic.
José Díaz, General leader of the
Communist Party of Spain, also invoked the Asturias repression, decrying the use of colonial troops against Spanish workers. He warned Gil-Robles against any plot to overthrow the Republic, while simultaneously criticizing the government for its half-hearted response to right-wing subversion. He pledged that the working class would both support the Republic and oppose any fascist uprising.
Manuel Portela Valladares, a centrist, was one of the few voices to maintain neutrality. He opposed the extension of the state of alarm, arguing that a government that had declared itself openly partisan could not enforce such a measure with impartiality. Joan Ventosa of the Lliga took a more confrontational stance. Following the session, Gil-Robles, like many other right-wing leaders, left Madrid. He returned to Biarritz, from where he had rushed back upon hearing of Calvo Sotelo’s death. The article reflected the growing conviction among the radical left that a confrontation was inevitable—and winnable. The belief prevailed that the proletariat, should civil war erupt, would triumph swiftly.
Consequences Impact on the military The assassination of José Calvo Sotelo on July 13, 1936, served as the definitive catalyst for the Spanish military rebellion that would erupt days later into the Spanish Civil War. While the military conspiracy had been in motion for months, the murder decisively ended the indecision of many hesitant officers and provided the conspirators with both the moral justification and psychological momentum to proceed. Historians broadly agree that the assassination did not initiate the conspiracy but acted as its
accelerant.
Eduardo González Calleja emphasizes that while the coup was already being prepared, the killing “increased the determination of the conspirators and encouraged those who still hesitated". Similarly,
José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez underscores that the event was not a turning point in planning but exacerbated an already deeply polarized and volatile political environment.
Joan Maria Thomàs, for his part, affirms that the assassination of Calvo Sotelo was "decisive in arousing greater support among the generals and officers for the coup and, above all, in arousing support for it among sectors of the population". It also induced the passivity of democratically oriented military personnel when it came to defending the Republic.
Luis Romero states: "On July 13, the conspiracy is well advanced, on the verge of exploding the rebel movement, but the shock produced by the death of Calvo Sotelo has a definite influence in the final setting of the date, in deciding the hesitant and subsequent events".
Ian Gibson considers that the assassination "gave the rebels —whose conspiratorial plans were already well advanced on July 13— a new and unbeatable justification for the
Movement in the eyes of world opinion. It convinced the still hesitant military that the time had come to take sharp decisions." Republican military officer Jesús Pérez Salas wrote in his memoirs about the impact of Calvo Sotelo's assassination on the Army as follows: was informed of the conspiracy led by
General Mola, which he did not join until the last moment (after learning of the assassination of Calvo Sotelo). For General Emilio Mola, the assassination posed a risk of premature action: so electrified were the clandestine networks like the
Unión Militar Española (UME) and the Falange that Mola had to rush to Logroño on July 14 to prevent an unsanctioned uprising on the 16th. Some factions even contemplated kidnapping President Manuel Azaña, though the plan was abandoned due to the proximity of the larger uprising. The most significant transformation occurred in General Francisco Franco, whose commitment to the coup had remained lukewarm until this point. On July 12—just one day before the assassination—Franco had sent a message to Mola implying a need for delay ("not very extensive geography"), reflecting his skepticism about the readiness and coherence of the conspiracy. Mola was deeply disturbed by Franco’s reluctance, even considering sending General Sanjurjo to Morocco in Franco’s place. However, upon learning of Calvo Sotelo’s murder, Franco underwent a decisive shift. On July 14, he informed Mola of his commitment to the rebellion. According to his cousin and aide Franco Salgado-Araujo, Franco believed the assassination, perpetrated by members of the state’s own security forces, signaled the moral collapse of the Republic and convinced him that armed intervention was now not only justified but necessary. Stanley G. Payne and Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza both argue that this marked the “limit situation” Franco had often referenced as a condition for rebellion. Luis Romero comments that while Franco
may have joined the uprising regardless, it was Calvo Sotelo’s assassination that removed any lingering doubts. Hugh Thomas had earlier expressed a similar view, stating that the conspirators, though long preparing, may have lacked the resolve to act without this shocking event.
Beginning of the uprising , organizer and main promoter of the 1936 coup conspiracy, for which he was known by the code name of "The Director". Mola was the one who defined the political and military plan of the
coup d'état of July 1936 whose relative failure provoked the
Spanish civil war. He tried to avoid the mistakes made during the failed
Sanjurjada of four years earlier. All ultimately followed General Mola’s order for the uprising to begin on Friday, July 17, in the
Spanish Protectorate in Morocco—coinciding with news that forces there would be ready by July 16. On the peninsula, the rebellion was to unfold gradually between Saturday, July 18, and Monday, July 20. Unlike the original plan for a simultaneous uprising, Mola allowed each garrison to act when deemed appropriate, aiming to trigger a domino effect. The only fixed date and time was for the Protectorate: July 17 at 17:00. This was communicated on July 15 by Mola to his liaison in Madrid, Lieutenant Colonel
Valentín Galarza. The day before, the
Dragon Rapide plane arrived at the Gando aerodrome (Gran Canaria) to transport
General Franco from the Canary Islands to Morocco. It avoided landing in Tenerife—where Franco was stationed—due to inadequate facilities. Franco used the funeral of General Amado Balmes, who had died in a firearm accident, as a pretext to travel there. At 7:15 a.m. on July 17, a liaison sent from
Bayonne by Mola dispatched three coded radiotelegrams—to Franco in Tenerife,
General Sanjurjo in Lisbon, and Lieutenant Colonel
Juan Seguí Almuzara in Melilla—reaffirming the order to begin the uprising at 17:00. However, according to Luis Romero, the radiograms were dated July 18, and the coup in Melilla was advanced to the afternoon of July 17 to avoid the arrest of conspirators gathered at the Boundary Commission offices in the Alcazaba. Some conservative figures not directly involved in the conspiracy were warned and advised to leave cities such as Madrid or Barcelona.
Francesc Cambó departed from Barcelona, while Alejandro Lerroux went to Portugal, where he expressed support for the coup.
Melquiades Álvarez chose to remain in Madrid and was later killed in the sacking of the
Model Prison of Madrid on 22 August 1936. Committed right-wing leaders began leaving Madrid after Calvo Sotelo’s funeral on July 14 or following the Permanent Deputation meeting on July 15. José María Gil-Robles departed for Biarritz that same day;
Antonio Goicoechea left for a farm near the Portuguese border on July 17. That day, Calvo Sotelo’s widow and children also left Madrid on the Lisbon express, prompted in part by threatening graffiti, including one reading: "the descendants of Calvo Sotelo will follow the same path as their father." They arrived in Lisbon on July 18, where General Sanjurjo received them at the Estación del Rocío, reportedly telling the widow: "We have lost the most illustrious man in Spain." The family relocated to the rebel zone in September 1937. == Assessment ==