, commanding the British First Army, inspecting the 24th Motor Machine Gun Battalion at Dieval, 12 June 1918. The motorbikes are Clyno 744 cc twin cylinder machines fitted with a sidecar and Vickers machine-guns. The MGC saw action in all the main theatres of war, including the
Western Front in France and Belgium,
Sinai and Palestine Campaign,
Mesopotamian campaign, Egypt, Salonika,
East Africa campaign and
Italian front. In its short history, the MGC gained an enviable record for heroism as a front line fighting force. In the latter part of the war, as tactics changed to
defence in depth, it commonly served well in advance of the front line. It had a less enviable record for its casualty rate. Some 170,500 officers and men served in the MGC, with 62,049 becoming casualties, including 12,498 killed, earning it the nickname 'the Suicide Club'. While the undeniable bravery and self-sacrifice of the corps stands testament to the men and their regimental esprit de corps it is also a symptom of the fixed belief on the part of senior commanders that machine guns were confined to a marginal if useful role, that of an adjunct to massed rifle fire, ignoring the proven potential of this weapon in the indirect role (in effect rifle-calibre fire employed as ultra-short artillery.) By correctly setting up the same weapons more commonly used in the direct role (over open sights) the delivering of accurate and sustained fire at high elevation became less an art than a science that could reliably deliver plunging fire at approximately twice the maximum effective range of hand-held weapons of identical calibre, but not so convincingly a belief to hold that the machine gunners were in effect hiding behind the front lines while uselessly firing into the air, making a show instead of dying beside riflemen whose weapons used practically identical ammunition. This conviction may explain–from both sides–the persistence with which machine gunners were placed in exposed positions where their fire was only marginally effective but enemy troops could be seen to fall victim to it, and the great personal bravery with which those same men fought when the same enemy concentrated their forces against the greater threat represented by an unsupported sandbag emplacement. As stated by Paul Cornish in
Machine Guns and the Great War: "The theory behind this technique had long been understood... as early as 1908... the mathematical work required to provide a reliable basis for the conduct of such fire was carried out by a group of British enthusiasts at the Hythe musketry school... However, it was 1915 before such fire was successfully carried out in the field..." Cornish goes on "To conduct such fire the proposed target would be located... the relative position of the machine gun relative to it would be determined with ruler and protractor.. calculations would be made to determine the gun's potential cone of fire and the trajectory of its bullets (an important consideration if firing over the head of friendly troops). A clinometer, combined with a graduated elevation dial fitted to the tripod would be employed to set the gun to the correct elevation..." The obvious complexities and the exacting preparations - in effect identical to those of artillery gunners - may have seemed arcane and pointless to those who carried - or whose men carried - rifles firing the same ammunition but could neither see (or more importantly imagine) the terminal effect of a long-range barrage. When properly employed it was unarguably a devastating deterrent, as witnessed by those who took the trouble to seek out the areas interdicted but for those who took the trouble to do so were often regarded uncritical advocates of novel, untried tactics. While in the more sustained direct fire role, properly supported: The 100th Company of the Machine Gun Corps at High Wood on August 24, 1916 was ordered to "give sustained covering fire for 12 hours onto a selected area 2000 yards away in order to prevent German troops forming up there for a counter-attack while a British attack was in progress" The ten machine guns of the company used 100 new barrels and "every drop of water in the neighbourhood, including the men's drinking water and contents of the latrine buckets, went up in steam to keep the guns cool" . And in that 12-hour period the ten guns fired a million rounds..." Towards the end of the Great War some if not all deeply-entrenched attitudes were changing, and not only on the part of British and Commonwealth personnel. Following the extensive barrage fire at
Vimy Ridge and
Battle of Messines a demonstration was held on the dunes at Camiers by request of
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig,
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the
British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front, who insisted all his Corps commanders attend. French observers were treated to a similar demonstration, after which the concept was swiftly introduced into the
French Army where it was embraced as a means to economise on artillery shells with the extraordinary assertion the results were more demoralising 'by means of continuity' than the result of shelling. Subsequently a machine gun school was established near the site of both demonstrations and machine gun barrages were successfully employed by the French forces at
Meuse and
Verdun. ==Post war==