His work is best known for its discussion of the
Jewish principles of faith, in which he argues with other thinkers such as
Maimonides. Albo stated that any religion (
dat elohit), including Judaism, must have the following three fundamental principles, which he calls
ikkarim (fundamentals) or
ikarim kollelim (general fundamentals): • belief in the
existence of God • belief in the
revelation of God, • belief in
divine justice, as related to the idea of
immortality. From these three principles, Albo posited that a religion must have eight derivative principles (
shorashim [roots] or
ikkarim peratiim [specific fundamentals]) which follow logically from the three fundamentals: • From the existence of God: • God's unity • God's incorporeality • God's timelessness • God's perfection: in God there can be neither weakness nor other defect. • From the revelation of God: • God's prophecy • God's prophet authentication • From the reward and punishment of God: • God's omniscience • Reward and punishment, whether in this world or the World to Come According to Albo, an individual who rejects one of either the three fundamental or the eight derivative principles is called a "heretic" in Jewish sources. Similarly, a religion which rejects one of these eleven principles is a false religion. Albo argues that the theologies of both
Christianity and
Islam misunderstand one of the "fundamentals" and thus reject one of the "derivative principles", making them false religions. Whereas, according to him, Judaism contains a correct understanding of these principles. Albo also derives six "secondary principles" which a Jew should believe, but are not part of the fundamental or derivative principles. He calls these
anafim (branches), as the "tree" of Judaism can stand without them (unlike the trunk or roots). These principles are: •
Creation ex nihilo • The unique greatness of
Moses' prophecy • The eternity of the Torah (i.e. that it will not be replaced by a different law) • That performing even one mitzvah entitles one to enter the World to Come (because otherwise, entering the World to Come would be harder after the Torah was given than beforehand via the basic
Seven Laws of Noah, which would contradict the idea that the Torah is a beneficial gift to Jews). • Resurrection • The messiah Denying these principles, too, makes a Jew a heretic and disqualifies him from the World to Come, even though these principles are not necessary for the existence of religion. However, elsewhere in the work Albo says that denying the messiah did not make the Talmudic Rabbi Hillel into a heretic. Albo's work contains a number of internal contradictions, Maimonides himself had been influenced by a desire to obviate certain Christian and
Muslim claims. His emphasis upon the absolute
incorporeality of God finds its true light only when the
Christian doctrine of the incarnation is borne in mind. His
Messianic expectation, with the stress upon the constancy with which its future fulfillment is to be looked for, had also an anti-Christian bearing. But this very point, the Messianic dogma, had in turn soon become a source of anxiety to the Jews, forced to meet in public disputations the champions of the Church. Among the spokesmen of the Church were some converts from Judaism. These were not slow to urge this Messianic dogma of Maimonides as far as they might, to embarrass the defenders of Judaism. Before the time of Maimonides the question of the corporeality of the Messiah appears not to have been among the problems discussed in the polemics between the Church and the Jewish community. But half a century after him, when his Messianic doctrine had been accepted as one of the essential articles of the faith, it was this point that was pushed into the foreground of the discussions. Having participated in one of these public disputations, Albo must have become conscious of the embarrassment which the Maimonidean position could not but occasion to the defenders of Judaism. In his scheme, therefore, the Messiah is eliminated as an integral part of Jewish faith. In its stead he lays stress upon the doctrine of divine justice. The title of his book indicates his method at the outset. Basic to his investigation is the recognition that "human happiness is conditioned by knowledge and conduct." But "human intellect can not attain unto perfect knowledge and ethical conduct, since its power is limited and soon exhausted in the contemplation of the things the truth of which it would find; therefore, of necessity, there must be something above human intellect through which knowledge and conduct can attain to a degree of excellence that admits of no doubt." The insufficiency of human intellect postulates the necessity of divine guidance; and thus it is the duty of every person to know the God-given law. But to know it is possible only if one has established the true principles, without which there can be no divine law. Seeing that on this vital theme there are so much divergence, confusion, and shallowness, Albo resolves to erect a structure for the true religion.
Religious flexibility Albo finds opportunity to criticize the opinions of his predecessors, yet he takes pains to avoid heresy hunting. Accordingly, he endeavors to establish the boundary-lines between which Jewish skepticism may be exercised without risk of forfeiture of orthodoxy. His canon for distinguishing heterodoxy from orthodoxy is the recognition of the truth of the
Torah. A remarkable latitude of interpretation is allowed. Albo rejects the assumption that
creation ex nihilo is an essential implication of the belief in God. Albo freely criticizes Maimonides' thirteen principles of belief and Crescas' six principles. Albo states that neither Maimonides nor Crescas keeps in view his own fundamental criterion; namely, the absolute indispensability of a principle without which the trunk of the tree could not subsist; and on this score he rejects parts of their creeds. ==Other content==