Maritime Militia

The US Military refers to the Maritime Militia as the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). ==History==

of USNS Impeccable in international waters, 8 March 2009 China's maritime militia was established after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the Chinese Civil War and forced the Kuomintang (KMT) to flee the mainland to Taiwan. The newly consolidated communist government needed to augment their maritime defenses against the nationalist forces, which had retreated offshore and remained entrenched on a number of coastal islands. Therefore, the concept of people's war was applied to the sea with fishermen and other nautical laborers being drafted into a maritime militia. The nationalists had maintained a maritime militia during their time in power, but the communist government preferred to craft theirs anew given their suspicion of organizations created by the nationalists. The CCP also instituted a national-level maritime militia command to unite the local militias, something the KMT had never done. In the early 1950s, the Bureau of Aquatic Products played a key role in institutionalizing and strengthening the maritime militia as it collectivized local fisheries. Bureau of Aquatic Products leaders were also generally former high-ranking PLAN officers which lead to close relations between the organizations. The formation of the maritime militia was influenced by the Soviet "Young School" of military theory, which emphasized coastal defense over naval power projection for nascent communist powers. The maritime militia was particularly important from the 1950s through the 1970s, during which it had a significant role in national defense and territorial assertion. In the 1960s and 1970s, the PLAN established maritime militia schools near the three main fleet headquarters of Qingdao, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. China's fishing fleet was being downsized until 2008, when maritime militia funding lead instead to an expansion. This expansion has led to an increase in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. In 2019, the United States issued a warning to China over aggressive and unsafe action by their Coast Guard and maritime militia. The maritime militia is believed to be behind a number of incidents in the South China Sea where high powered lasers were pointed at the cockpits of aircraft. This includes an attack against a Royal Australian Navy helicopter. In 2022, satellite images showed that more than a hundred militia vessels operated in the South China Sea on a daily basis. The number of vessels peaked in July 2022, when around 400 militia vessels were deployed in the South China Sea. The movement and the observed behavior of the militia vessels remained consistent over the years. In 2023, militia activity around key features in the South China Sea averaged 195 vessels per day, representing a 35 percent increase from the previous year. In June, 2025, a Chinese maritime militia vessel with hull number 16838 ran aground near Pag-asa Island in the West Philippine Sea and, for the first time on record, deployed a parachute anchor that dragged across a coral reef. The anchor caused significant damage to 307 square meters of coral, marking the first documented case of a Chinese militia vessel inflicting reef destruction through this method within Philippine waters. The incident highlighted growing concerns over the environmental impact of maritime militia operations in ecologically protected zones. ==Structure and characteristics==

China's fishing militia consists of a mixture of purpose-built maritime militia fishing vessels (MMFV) as well as normal fishing boats, called Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFVs), which get recruited by the central government via various subsidy programs. The maritime militia operates from mainly ten ports within the Guangdong and Hainan Provinces of China. Some Maritime Militia units are equipped with naval mines and anti-aircraft weapons. The increasing sophistication of militia vessels' communication equipment is a double-edged sword for Chinese authorities. New equipment, as well as training in its use, has substantially improved command, control, and coordination of militia units. However, the vessels' resulting professionalism and sophisticated maneuvers make them more identifiable as government-sponsored actors, dampening their ability to function as a gray-zone force. Such improvements also potentially make militia vessels more threatening during at-sea confrontations, raising the risk of unintended escalations with foreign militaries. ==Tasks==

The PRC considers its large fishing fleet an essential part of its sea power, helping with the pursuit of its maritime interests in disputed waters. The maritime militia carries out three different tasks in China's dispute strategy, also referred to as maritime rights protection: It is active in disputes over the territorial features as well as disputes over the extent of zones of jurisdictions, and it regulates foreign activities - especially military activities - in waters claimed by the PRC. While the first two tasks target mostly neighboring countries, such as Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam and their conflicting interests in the South China and East China Sea, the third task is primarily a response to the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) by the US. == Grey-zone warfare ==

, April 13, 2021 Various academic journals and media articles claim that the maritime militia increasingly takes part in anti-access and area denial missions in a continuously growing area of the western Pacific in what has been described as Grey-zone warfare. By using law enforcement and fishing vessels, instead of traditional naval assets, the PRC is able to stay with its actions in a greyzone area, avoiding a military conflict while still being able to successfully pursue its maritime claims. According to research from the Taiwanese Institute for National Defense and Security Research, China's maritime militia is part of their "grey zone" tactics, which are used to wage conflict against China's neighbors without crossing the threshold into conventional war. The maritime militia is a particularly useful gray zone force because Chinese authorities can deny or claim affiliation with its members depending on context. China can send its militia to harass foreign vessels in contested areas, but publicly assert that the vessels are independent from government control, thus avoiding escalation with other states. At the same time, if militia members are hurt during confrontations with foreign vessels, the Chinese government can claim the need to "defend" its own fishermen, mobilizing domestic nationalism to improve its bargaining position in a crisis. China conducts maritime gray‑zone operations affecting both Taiwan and the Philippines - deploying civilian and quasi‑military vessels and dual‑use infrastructure in waters around Taiwan, the Scarborough Shoal and the Second Thomas Shoal - thereby undermining Taiwan’s maritime jurisdiction and hampering the Philippines’ access and maritime rights in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Chinese maritime militia vessels conduct “gray zone” surveillance in the waters near the Taiwan Strait median line . Some of the incidents, which are generally defined as greyzone operations within the academic discourse, are the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009, the Senkaku Island incident in 2010, the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012, the Hai Yang Shi You 981 standoff in 2014, == Control ==

The Maritime Militia is required to operate in certain areas and support the military. The militia is funded through various government subsidies, and some personnel receive full-time salaries from state-owned companies. For instance, multiple fishermen went against the central government by using maritime militia policy to fish for protected and endangered species in disputed waters. Moreover, factors such as food security and economic advantages influence fishermen to operate outside of China's exclusive economic zone, since the PRCs jurisdictional waters are polluted, and a depletion of China's fishery resources can be noticed. Therefore, while the maritime militia is involved in greyzone operations, it is misleading to portray it as a professional coherent body, which can be systematically used by the central government. ==See also==