Mass surveillance in Russia

Semantic Archive The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) uses a special analytical search system designed by the Russian firm Analytic Business Solutions called "Semantic Archive". The advertised features of Semantic Archive are: • Automated collecting and processing of information obtained from heterogeneous sources, both internal (file documents, proprietary databases, e-mails) and external (online databases, news media, blogs, forums, social networks). • Single uniform storage for all types of collecting documents. • Knowledge extraction, i.e. automatic and semi-automatic extraction of objects, events and relationships from documents. • Maintaining of knowledge base and collecting dossiers on particular projects, investigations, partners, competitors, clients, etc. • Revealing of hidden or implicit relationships between objects. • Visual presentation of knowledge in the form of semantic network. • Variety of reports used to present results of research. It is used by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of the Interior (MVD) to monitor open sources and the Internet, including the blogosphere and social networks. SORM Russia's System of Operational-Investigatory Measures (SORM) requires telecommunications operators to install hardware provided by the Federal Security Service (FSB) which allows the agency to monitor users' communications metadata and content, including phone calls, email traffic, and web browsing activity. The SORM-1 (implemented in 1995) system captures telephone and mobile phone communications, SORM-2 (implemented in 1999) intercepts Internet traffic, and SORM-3 collects information from all forms of communication, providing long-term storage of all information and data on subscribers, including actual recordings and locations. In 2014, the system was expanded to include social media platforms, and the Ministry of Communications ordered companies to install new equipment with deep packet inspection (DPI) capability. Developed and implemented by the "Advanced Scientific - Research Projects" enterprise St. Petersburg. Within the framework of the practical use of the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, it has made it possible to identify and solve grave and especially grave crimes, the system is also operated by other state services and departments; 2014 Winter Olympics In response to the threats posed by Islamic insurgents as well as its proximity to the Georgian territory, the Russian government used comprehensive screening practices during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. It was also reported to have served as a testing ground for comprehensive and invasive surveillance, which made Sochi the most policed environment in history. The blanket surveillance program was deployed from February 7 to 23. The FSB made classified arrangements for significant upgrades to SORM equipment in Sochi prior to the event. All communication and Internet traffic by Sochi residents is now captured and filtered through deep packet inspection systems at all mobile networks using the SORM 3 technology, described as "giant vacuum cleaner which scoops all electronic transmissions from all users all the time". The state invoked the right to lawful interception to track all digital activities within its national borders. Aside from security perimeters staffed by the police, the government also installed 5,500 closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras to monitor the surrounding countryside. == Data retention ==

Bloggers law A 2014 law dubbed "Bloggers law" includes data retention provisions. According to the law, bloggers with over 3,000 daily readers are required to register and can no longer remain anonymous online. Organizations that provide platforms for their work such as search engines, social networks, and other forums must maintain computer records on Russian soil of everything posted over the previous six months. Major services required to comply include Facebook, Skype, Gmail, and Twitter. Public Internet As of August 2014, operators of public Wi-Fi networks in Russia have to identify users by IDs. The identification data is to be stored for at least six months. Yarovaya law In July 2016, President Vladimir Putin signed into law two sets of legislative amendments commonly referred to as the Yarovaya Law after their key author, Irina Yarovaya. According to the amendments, Internet and telecom companies are required to store communications and metadata for 6 months to 3 years. They are required to disclose them, as well as "all other information necessary," to authorities on request and without a court order. It also requires an email and messaging service providers to have cryptographic backdoors. The surveillance regulations have taken effect on 1 July 2018. == Anonymity ==

Operators of free Wi-Fi hotspots (restaurants, libraries, cafes etc.) are legally required to collect personal details of all users, identify them using passports, and store the data. "Organizers of information dissemination" such as online messenger services that allow unidentified users are banned as of January 2018. Messaging services, email and social networks that use encrypted data are required to permit the Federal Security Service (FSB) to access and read their encrypted communications without a court order starting in July 2018. == Probiv data market ==

Russia's mass surveillance infrastructure has created an unintended security vulnerability through probiv, an illicit black market where personal data from government and corporate databases is bought and sold. The market operates through networks of corrupt officials from police, telecommunications companies, banks, and security services who sell access to restricted databases for fees as low as $10. Russian law enforcement agencies themselves routinely use probiv to track activists and opposition figures, as the black market provides more convenient access than official departmental databases. Surveilance data enters the probiv market and can be purchased through Telegram bots. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian intelligence services have exploited probiv to identify Russian military officials operating inside Russia. == References ==