On November 8, 1935, Massey was appointed the
High Commissioner to the United Kingdom for
His Majesty's Government in Canada and arrived at
Canada House to find as his secretary the man who would be his successor as Governor General of Canada, Though these allegations were historically challenged as exaggerations,
Irving Abella and
Harold Troper claimed in their book
None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933–1948 that Massey was an enthusiastic supporter of the
Munich Agreement and worked in concert with various elected and non-elected people in government, including Mackenzie King and
Ernest Lapointe, to put obstacles in the way of Jewish
refugees fleeing Europe for Canada, or even using Canada as a stopover en route to some other country. However, Canadian immigration policy at the time favoured trained farmers, which excluded most Jews, who were largely city dwellers, and the Cabinet of Mackenzie King was already resistant to changes in the law. Seven decades later, these accusations against Massey resulted in a campaign in
Windsor, Ontario, to rename a high school that had originally been named in his honour. On 24 April 1938, the Sudetenland crisis began when the Sudeten German leader
Konrad Henlein in a speech in Karlsbad (modern Karlovy Vary) put forward the so-called Karlsbad programme, whose eight points would have given the Sudetenland much autonomy within Czechoslovakia. The Karlsbad programme had been written in Berlin, and the German government promptly endorsed the Karlsbad programme, saying it would go to war if Czechoslovakia rejected the Karlsbad programme. In the May crisis of 1938, Massey blamed President
Edvard Beneš of Czechoslovakia rather than Hitler, writing in a cable to Mackenzie King that it was Czechoslovakia that was the aggressor and Germany the victim. On 28 May 1938, the British Foreign Secretary
Lord Halifax in a meeting with all the Dominion high commissioners told them that the British government was convinced that Czechoslovakia with its mixture of Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ukrainians could not last as a unitary state, and the best solution would be to turn Czechoslovakia into a federation. Halifax felt the Karlsbad programme, through problematic in certain respects, offered the starting point to turn Czechoslovakia into a federation. After the meeting, Halifax took Massey aside for a talk, saying he was very interested in learning how English Canadians and French Canadians got along well in the Canadian federation, saying he envisioned a "Canadian solution" to the problems of Czechoslovakia. Halifax told Massey he wanted to see Czechoslovakia turned into a Canadian-style federation so that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans would act more like English Canadians and French Canadians and less like themselves. The fact that Beneš rejected the British advice to engage in constitutional changes to make Czechoslovakia into a federation until early September 1938 cost him much sympathy in London, and added to the perception that it was Beneš who was the danger to peace. During the Sudetenland crisis of 1938, Massey very much wanted President
Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States to step in as a mediator, and was disappointed when Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain told him that he did not think much of this plan, saying he much doubted that Roosevelt was willing to play the role of the mediator. Massey saw the Sudetenland crisis as a matter of "saving civilization" as he believed that another world war would be the end of Western civilization. On 12 September 1938, the crisis dramatically escalated when Hitler in his speech at the Nuremberg Party Rally announced that the acceptance of the Karlsbad programme was not enough and instead demanded the Sudetenland "go home to the
Reich", saying he now wanted the Sudetenland incorporated into Germany, a demand that President Beneš promptly rejected. The fact that Hitler engaged in much personal abuse of Beneš in his speech was not helpful to peace as Massey reported to Mackenzie King, but he still clung to his belief that it was Beneš who was the problem, not Hitler. Massey believed that Hitler's demands for the Sudetenland were moral and just, that Czechoslovakia was not worth fighting for, and it was France that by refusing to renounce its alliance with Czechoslovakia was the principle trouble-maker. Massey believed that Britain should only go to war if Hitler was seeking world domination, and as he did not believe that this was the case with the Sudetenland, he was opposed to war with Germany in 1938. On 14 September 1938, Massey met with te Water where both men agreed that "this astonishing episode" as they deemed it with Britain on the brink of the war must not be allowed to come to war, and that Britain should pressure Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland. On 19 September 1938, the Dominion secretary
Malcolm MacDonald met with all of the Dominion high commissioners to tell them that Chamberlain had agreed to Hitler's demand that the Sudetenland "go home to the
Reich" and that Britain would offer a "guarantee" of the rest of Czechoslovakia as the reward for ceding the Sudetenland. Bruce supported the idea of the "guarantee" and even offered to have Australia join in with "guaranteeing" Czechoslovakia; te Water was categorically opposed, saying there was no possibility of South Africa joining in; and Massey in his report to Mackenzie King offered no comment about his feelings other than to say the other high commissioners had insisted upon it. Massey added that he still felt that Beneš was the main danger to the peace, saying his main fear was that Beneš might reject the British peace plan. Much to Massey's relief, Beneš accepted the British plan. On 24 September 1938, all of the Dominion high commissioners met with MacDonald. As was usually the case, te Water acted as their spokesman and he sharply criticised Chamberlain for rejecting Hitler's Bad Godesberg ultimatum, saying that Chamberlain should try to modify Hitler's terms, but if matters came to
in extremis, it was better to yield to Hitler's terms than go to war. Shortly afterwards, a split emerged with the Dominion high commissioners with Bruce arguing that Chamberlain was correct after all to reject the Bad Godesberg ultimatum, saying it was a matter of British "honour" that the United Kingdom not be allowed to be seen to be bullied, and that a referendum should be held in the Sudetenland to determine what districts wanted to "go home to the
Reich" and what districts wanted to remain part of Czechoslovakia. By contrast, Massey, te Water and the Irish high commissioner
John Dulanty all supported accepting Hitler's demand that the
Reich be allowed to occupy the Sudetenland prior to 1 October 1938. On 28 September 1938, both Bruce and Massey supported te Water's statement that it was "psychologically wrong" to blame Hitler for the crisis and with te Water's demand that Chamberlain find a way to silence the "bellicose" MPs like Winston Churchill who were criticizing his government's policies in the House of Commons. At another meeting with MacDonald on 29 September, both te Water and Massey protested against the British appeal to Beneš to "not tie" Chamberlain's hands, complaining that it implied that Beneš had the power to do so. When Chamberlain left Heston airport to attend the Munich conference on 29 September 1938, both te Water and Massey were there to offer him their best wishes to save the peace at Munich. In March 1939, Europe was plunged into a new crisis, this time concerning the city-state of the
Free City of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) as Hitler now announced that he wanted the Free City to "go home to the
Reich", a demand that was felt certain to cause a war with Poland, which had certain rights in Danzig and always taken the position that any attempt to return to Danzig to Germany would be a
casus belli. Massey was greatly influenced by te Water, and usually followed whatever line te Water was taking with regard to the British. Following the German occupation of the Czech half of Czecho-Slovakia on 15 March 1939, the policy of the Chamberlain government notably altered. In a speech in Birmingham on 17 March 1939, Chamberlain announced that if Hitler was seeking world domination, Britain would go to war. At a meeting with the Dominions Secretary Sir
Thomas Inskip, te Water, supported by Massey, assailed the change of policy, saying that Germany still deserved "one more chance of saving face". On 31 March 1939, Chamberlain in a speech in the House of Commons announced the famous British "guarantee" of Poland, stating that Britain would go to war to defend Polish independence, through Chamberlain notably left out Polish territory from the "guarantee", thereby implying that Britain was still open to having the Polish corridor and Upper Silesia returned to Germany. Later that same day in a meeting at 10 Downing Street, te Water and Massey both told Chamberlain that Germany "had a genuine claim to Danzig", which made it an "extremely bad reason" to risk a war over. For Massey, his main concern in the spring of 1939 was not the Danzig visit, but rather organizing the royal visit of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to Canada, which took place in June–July 1939. Massey had been planning the visit ever since the coronation, and spent much time corresponding with the Governor-General,
Lord Tweedsmuir about the preparations for the visit, as the impeding royal visit had less interest for Mackenzie King. Much to Massey's delight, he found himself regularly having dinner with the royal family at
Windsor Castle to discuss details for the visit. The royal visit was a great success with the king being cheered whatever he went as he visited all nine provinces, leading Massey to write: "The Royal visit to Canada was an event so happy in its conception, so gloriously successful in its achievement, and so fragrant in its memory, that any comment seems both inadequate and superfluous". Over the course of the summer of 1939, Massey came to break away from te Water's influence, helped by the fact that te Water had taken a holiday in Ireland for much of the summer. Through Massey was not enthusiastic about the possibility of Britain going to war, he came to increasingly accept that it might be inevitable unless Hitler could be persuaded to back down in the Danzig crisis. An additional pressure for a change in views came from Lord Lothian, who had a
volte-face in his thinking about Nazi Germany, and was by the spring of 1939 was now convinced that Hitler was seeking world domination. Over the course of the summer of 1939, Lothian sought to convince Massey that Hitler's aims went beyond revising the Treaty of Versailles towards the domination of the entire world, an effort that Lothian was successful in. ==Second World War==