Background & early 1970s , Colombia. Headquarters of Medellín Cartel and traditional hotspot for
narcotrafficking activity.
1960s cocaine trade in Latin America In the 1960s, Colombia was not yet viewed or stereotyped as being a conventional
geophysical, narcotrafficking corridor for the
world's cocaine trade like it seems to have been for
marijuana trafficking at this time. Reportedly when it came to the international cocaine trade during the 60s;
Argentina,
Brazil and
Chile were the countries with the biggest hand in the international transferring of cocaine.
Colombian smugglers & Chileans (1972–1976) In contrast to his law-abiding parents, Escobar began a life of crime early on;
stealing tombstones from cemeteries, sanding down the headstones to make them appear unused, reselling them, stealing cars, kidnapping people for
ransom; including a wealthy businessman at one point before eventually settling into the criminal occupation known as
contraband smuggling which characterized a large swath and subcultural domain of Colombia's criminal
underworld at this time. This is presumably around when his
gang-like organizational abilities and his criminal racketeering predilections seem to have come together in what was now the early 1970s in Medellín, Colombia. Escobar took advantage of Colombia's fertile and expanding marijuana trade as well as the apparent smuggling and illegal trade of cigarettes. There are several claims that he was allegedly a noteworthy figure in the region's supposed "
Marlboro wars"; a seemingly violent set of scrimmages or conflicts over the control of Colombia's illicit cigarette smuggling market. This implies that he was priming his sensibilities in street crime and violent black market schemes in what would come out in a much more organized and violent fashion not far down the line. In 1973, there was a
military coup in Chile which led to a strong crackdown on Chilean drug traffickers. This caused some drug traffickers to either flee the country and/or immediately start to use different trafficking routes. This frequently resulted in Chilean traffickers setting their eyes on Colombia to use as a trade route further north. Around the same time, the prevalence and social acceptance of contraband in Colombia was at an all-time high.
Late 1970searly 1980s Background In the mid to late 1970s, specifically around 1975 and 1976, the illegal cocaine trade started to become a growing and significant problem for American law enforcement as the drug's prevalence began to quickly takeoff in unanticipated ways. Initially, its first phase of substantial growth in popularity started out in the
entertainment industry in
Hollywood before quickly spreading to other major hotspots such as
Miami. Because of cocaine's socially prestigious reputation as a cultural symbol of high status especially as it related to wealth and glamour among Americans during the late 1970s (mainly due to its high cost), Colombian criminals who were already accomplished smugglers of various goods through
black market trade networks began to see cocaine as an irresistibly lucrative item for smuggling. A product like cocaine, which "
packs tighter" than other types of drugs or contraband, indicated a greater, more eased potential for logistical transportability, with less of a chance for interdiction or complications during the product's long journey across borders and to various regional markets around the globe. This further maximized the drug's profit potential, since its volume and weight relative to its final monetary value was now exponentially greater compared to trafficking the same or similar weight and volume of a less valuable product such as
marijuana. Also, unlike marijuana, which can be produced near to desirable North American drug markets,
cocaine production was almost exclusive to South America at this time and therefore easier for regional criminal groups to control and monopolize. During this era, many of the most well-established, entrepreneurial, and capable contraband smugglers or trafficking groups were composed of Colombian nationals. But even amongst them, the soon-to-be-massively-wealthy drug lord
Pablo Escobar stood out from the rest. Escobar became characterized by his strategy of providing protection to other smugglers who partnered with him and helped further distribute the organization's cocaine into markets of high
demand such as
New York City and eventually
Miami. Thus after forming a larger and more formidable web of suppliers and combined trade networks that continually empowered Escobar and his cousin's operations, enabled by a newly formed, mutually beneficial collaborative effort between different drug traffickers now working together (hence the term
cartel), the organization was able to, at its height, move around 2,500-3,500 kilos per day. Prior to this, Escobar's initial smuggling ring consisted of small gangs of hired gunmen on his payroll was just a precursor to the final and fully-fledged massive criminal organization that came to be known as the Medellín Cartel. Once these aforementioned drug lords stepped in to combine their trafficking power and capabilities, and after the ever-growing demand for their product in the North American market started to be recognized, the term
cartel came into play, even if they did not originally refer to themselves as such. The term
cartel, in reference to the mercantile nature of this now ever-expanding Colombian
drug trafficking oligopoly, seems to have been first coined by the
US State Department in order to distinguish these higher-level criminal organizations from the traditional, mid-sized gangs commonly associated with the drug trade. Eventually, with the
cartel label becoming a household name, it was later embraced by the organization during its later years. This economic control, resulting from the unification of power structures of once separate groups, gave way to a sort of financial
positive feedback loop, where further profits after the Medellín Cartel's initial expansion led to an even greater level of power and growth, leading to even more profits in the process.
Carlos Lehder and George Jung (1976–1978) Jung described the Danbury prison facility located in Connecticut as a "medium-low security prison" that was "full of mob guys". He goes on to point out the "irony" (likely due to his marijuana charges) of him being assigned Colombian Carlos Lehder as a bunkmate who was serving a sentence for stealing cars and shipping them to South America. They casually discussed their charges, Jung mentioning he was caught flying marijuana out of Mexico; Lehder responded by asking him if he "knew anything about cocaine". He did not at the time, but became immediately entranced when Lehder went on to say; "you know it costs $60,000 a kilo". A proclamation that functioned as a compelling sales pitch for Jung; they both waited until getting out before attempting to get involved in the cocaine business. While incarcerated together, Jung benefited Lehder by giving him valuable input and tips on how to smuggle drugs effectively. Jung was knowledgeable in this area due to his past experience flying shipments of marijuana across international borders—from Mexico into the US, and within the US, from California to
New England. Lehder, however, would also be of benefit to Jung, once they were both released from prison, by introducing him to Colombia's most powerful drug smuggler: Pablo Escobar. This would prove useful to Jung in the future, when later he and Lehder had a falling out and were no longer in business together. Around 1976, both men were out of prison (Jung being released slightly after Lehder). Lehder's behavior became increasingly erratic, supposedly "crazed" and "
megalomaniacal" in the last two or three years of the 1970s, spiraling even further during the early 1980s. By decade's end (around 1978), Lehder had betrayed Jung. Lehder did this by trying to push Jung out of the business and began setting up his own major cocaine
transshipment operation for Escobar and the Medellín organization on an island in the
Bahamas called
Norman's Cay. Here, Lehder would take up an unconventional, hedonistic, drug-fueled lifestyle after getting the island's residents to leave, either by force or by bribery. Jung from that point on just attempted to steer clear of Lehder, so he simply went back to Colombia to meet with Escobar directly, in order to establish a new, but now more modestly-sized, trafficking endeavor. This was to continue to operate under Escobar's network, since the two still had a good relationship, and Escobar could directly utilize Lehder as a reliable connection for acquiring sizable amounts of
South American powdered cocaine. Both Jung and Lehder made millions of dollars, not just for themselves, but for the cartel too, with their highly successful cocaine-distribution operation, that arguably may have been a factor in triggering America's cultural "cocaine era"; the take-off of this cultural phenomenon noticeably coincided with the beginning of Jung and Lehder's involvement in cocaine distribution. Despite their incredibly profitable smuggling operation, it only lasted from roughly 1976 to 1978. In this short period, however, they were able to achieve a historically unprecedented drug-trafficking operation that proved invaluable to Escobar's and the Medellín Cartel's overall initial rise to being
the preeminent cocaine enterprise. Both Jung and Lehder were in the unique position of not only having been around during the very earliest days of the Medellín trafficking conglomerate which later birthed the cartel, but were also both in many ways directly responsible for the accelerated growth during its beginnings. Although Escobar and the others were highly capable and ingenious smugglers, they technically still did not have a major market in the United States or a major transportation system for their product. It was Jung and Lehder who effectively provided this.
From independent smuggling ring to collaborative cartel (1976–1979) Pablo Escobar and his cousin Gustavo's mid-70s newly transformed trafficking operation aimed at moving cocaine powder into America after first fully ascertaining the indispensable distribution network capabilities and other logistical elements both Carlos Lehder and George Jung could facilitate for the sale of their product in the now major emerging markets was about to undergo another type of expansion. After carrying out their new cocaine operations with this augmented distribution system, this soon led the two cousins (Pablo and Gustavo) to amass a staggering amount of wealth in such a short timeframe (primarily due to Jung and Lehder), that their other fellow Colombian criminal acquaintances who were already noteworthy regional figures in the smuggling world, such as José Rodriguez Gacha and the Ochoas who were not yet part of the organization but began to more seriously consider getting involved with the two cousins and the cocaine business eventually came into the fold. At this point, Pablo and Gustavo converged the increasing power and wealth of their single "independent" smuggling-ring towards a conglomerate made up of the multiple aforementioned smuggling rings coupled together in a collaborative fashion so as to give the overall organization a stronger backbone and structural apparatus by allowing Gacha and the Ochoas to pair up and synergize the relative power-spheres of their own trafficking networks with Escobar's, so as to maximize and concentrate their power instead of keeping it divided. After seeing the results of Pablo and Gustavo's impressive rates of profit and success (which now surpassed the Ochoas), they all soon began to prioritize the smuggling of cocaine over virtually all other forms of 'goods' and contraband, such as the items of commerce that had already served to profit them in years past.
1980s cocaine boom This lucrative and newfound, expansive network of traffickers began to creatively utilize many novel methods of getting their cocaine product into the U.S. at that point; implementing increased ingenuity and novel strategies into the smuggling logistics. This ranged from cocaine-stuffed hollow
pellets, multilayered condoms, or balloons which are then swallowed by
mules s Deputy seizing smuggled cocaine during the 1980s By 1982, cocaine surpassed
coffee as the chief Colombian export (see:
Coffee production in Colombia). Around this time in the early 1980s, kidnappings made by
guerrilla groups led the State to collaborate with criminal groups like those formed by Escobar and the Ochoas. The abduction of
Carlos Lehder as well as the 1981 kidnapping of the sister of the Ochoas; Martha Ochoa which led to the creation of cartel-funded
private armies that were created to fight off guerrillas who were trying to either redistribute their lands to local peasants, kidnap them, or
extort the
gramaje money that the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) attempted to steal. By 1983, Colombian internal affairs had registered 240 political killings by MAS death squads, mostly community leaders, elected officials, and farmers. The following year, the
Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio ("Association of Middle Magdalena Ranchers and Farmers",
ACDEGAM) was created to handle both the logistics and the public relations of the organization, and to provide a legal front for various paramilitary groups. ACDEGAM worked to promote anti-labor policies, and threatened anyone involved with organizing for labor or peasants' rights. The threats were backed up by the MAS, which would attack or assassinate anyone who was suspected of being a "subversive". ACDEGAM also built schools whose stated purpose was the creation of a "patriotic and anti-Communist" educational environment, and built roads, bridges, and health clinics. Paramilitary recruiting, weapons storage, communications, propaganda, and medical services were all run out of ACDEGAM headquarters. By the mid-1980s, ACDEGAM and MAS had undergone significant growth. In 1985, Pablo Escobar began funneling large amounts of cash into the organization to pay for equipment, training, and weaponry. Money for social projects was cut off and redirected towards strengthening the MAS. Modern battle rifles, such as the
AKM,
FN FAL,
IMI Galil, and
HK G3, were purchased from the military, INDUMIL, and drug-funded private sales. The organization had computers and ran a communications center that worked in coordination with the state telecommunications office. They had 30 pilots, and an assortment of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. British, Israeli, and U.S. military instructors were hired to teach at paramilitary training centers.
Middlelate 1980s at
Tranquilandia, 1984. Following this time in the mid-80s, Escobar's hold on Medellín further increased when he founded a criminal debt collection service known as the "
Oficina de Envigado" (The Office), which was considered their first "oficina de cobro" (
collections service). This was an actual physical
office located in the town hall of
Envigado, a small municipality next to Medellín where Escobar grew up. Escobar used the municipal office to collect debts owed to him by other drug traffickers and set the "
sicarios" or hired killers on those who refused. Escobar was known to flaunt his wealth and went on to make
Forbes' Billionaires list for seven years straight, between 1987 and 1993. His luxurious multimillion-dollar "
Hacienda Nápoles" estate had its own zoo, and he reportedly ate from solid gold dinner sets. Escobar was known for investing profits from the drug trade in luxury goods, property, and works of art. He is also reported to have stashed his cash in "hidden coves", allegedly burying it on his farms and under floors in many of his houses. Additionally, his private estate,
Hacienda Nápoles was thereafter eventually transformed into a theme park. His life as a major cocaine trafficker and incredibly wealthy criminal (
bandido) has been dramatized widely in film and has served as inspiration for pop cultural references and the retelling of his gripping story as a prominent
drug lord in both television, books and music. ==Political relations==