In
Catholic theology, merit is a property of a good work which entitles the doer to receive a reward: it is a
salutary act (i.e., "Human action that is performed under the influence of grace and that positively leads a person to a heavenly destiny") to which God, in whose service the work is done, in consequence of his
infallible promise may give a reward (
prœmium,
merces). It is treasure "laid up in heaven". Just as God is just to punish demerits, he is just to reward merits. is, according to historian
Thomas P. Scheck, "God's loving promise to reward human effort, even that carried out by a man outside the state of grace." • Congruous merit attracts a reward only on the ground of
fairness or appropriateness not obligation. • The reward for congruous merit is not salvation, but may be supernatural grace, which may lead to justification and salvation. "The doors of divine mercy are closed against none who sincerely ask for mercy." is, according to Scheck, "God's
obligation to reward man's efforts." • Condign merit supposes an equality between service and return; it is measured by commutative justice (
justitia commutativa), and thus gives a real claim to a reward. Philosopher
Richard Cross notes "Underlying it is the claim that the reward for condign merit is everlasting life, and that the reward for congruous merit is the gift of sanctifying grace ... "
Conditions of merit In Catholic teaching, for all true merit, there are seven conditions, of which four regard the meritorious work (
viz. a work must be morally good, morally free, done with the assistance of
actual grace, and inspired by a supernatural motive), two regard the agent who merits (
viz. they must be in the state of
pilgrimage and in the state of grace), and one regards God who rewards. • In order to be meritorious, a work must be morally good. • As to the second requisite, i. e., moral liberty, it is clear from ethics that actions, due to external force or internal compulsion, can deserve neither reward nor punishment. It is an axiom of
criminal jurisprudence that no one shall be punished for a misdeed done without free will; similarly, a good work can only then be meritorious and deserving of reward when it proceeds from a free determination of the will. This is the teaching of Christ (Matt., xix, 21): "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give it to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven." • The necessity of the third condition, i. e., of the influence of
actual grace, is clear from the fact that every act meriting heaven must evidently be supernatural just as heaven itself is supernatural, and that consequently it cannot be performed without the help of prevenient and assisting grace, which is necessary even for the just. The strictly supernatural destiny of the Beatific Vision, for which the Christian must strive, necessitates ways and means which lie altogether beyond what is purely natural (see
Grace). • Finally, a supernatural motive is required because good works must be
supernatural, not only as regards their object and circumstances, but also as regards the end for which they are performed (ex fine). But, in assigning the necessary qualities of this motive, theologians differ widely. While some require the motive of faith (
motivum fidei) in order to have merit, others demand in addition the motive of charity (
motivum caritatis), and thus, by rendering the conditions more difficult, considerably restrict the extent of meritorious works (as distinguished from merely good works). Others again set down as the only condition of merit that the good work of the just man or woman, who already has habitual faith and charity, be in conformity with the
Divine law, and require no other special motive. • The agent who merits must both be in the state of
pilgrimage (
status viœ). By the state of pilgrimage is to be understood our earthly life; death as a natural (although not an essentially necessary) limit, closes the time of meriting. The time of sowing is confined to this life; the reaping is reserved for the next, when no man or woman will be able to sow either wheat or cockle. The opinion proposed by a few theologians (Hirscher, Schell), that for certain classes of men there may still be a possibility of conversion after death, is contrary to the revealed truth that the
particular judgment (
judicium particulare) determines instantly and definitively whether the future is to be one of eternal happiness or of eternal misery (cf.
Kleutgen, "Theologie der Vorzeit", II, 2nd ed., Münster, 1872, pp. 427 sqq.).
Baptized children, who die before attaining the
age of reason, are admitted to heaven without merits on the sole title of
inheritance (
titulus hœreditatis); in the case of adults, however, there is the additional title of reward (
titulus mercedis), and for that reason they will enjoy a greater measure of eternal happiness. • In addition to the state of pilgrimage, the state of grace (
status gratiœ) (i. e., the possession of sanctifying grace) is required for meriting, because only the just can be "sons of God" and "heirs of heaven" (cf. Rom., viii, 17). In the parable of the vine Christ expressly declares the "abiding in him" a necessary condition for "bearing fruit": "He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit" (John, xv, 5); and this constant union with Christ is effected only by sanctifying grace. In opposition to Vasquez, most theologians are of opinion that one who is holier will gain greater merit for a given work than one who is less holy, although the latter perform the same work under exactly the same circumstances and in the same way. The reason is that a higher degree of grace enhances the godlike dignity of the agent, and this dignity increases the value of the merit. • Merit requires on the part of God that he accept (
in actu secundo) the good work as meritorious, even though the work in itself (
in actu primo) and previous to its acceptance by God, be already truly meritorious. Theologians, however, are not agreed as to the necessity of this condition. The
Scotists hold that the entire condignity of the good work rests exclusively on the gratuitous promise of God and his free acceptance, without which even the most heroic act is devoid of merit, and with which even mere naturally good works may become meritorious.
Church teaching Apart from earlier dogmatic declarations given in the
Second Synod of Orange of 529 and in the
Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 (see Denzinger, 191, 430), the
Council of Trent upheld the traditional doctrine of merit by insisting that life everlasting is both a grace and a reward (Sess. VI, cap. xvi, in Denzinger, n. 809). It condemned as heretical Luther's doctrine of the sinfulness of good works (Sess. VI, can. xxv), and declared as a
dogma that the just, in return for their good works done in God through the merits of
Jesus, should expect an eternal reward (loc. cit., can. xxvi). == Lutheranism ==