The office of the
federal Attorney General (FGR), along with its Mexico City counterpart (FGJCDMX) led by
Ernestina Godoy Ramos, and the Norwegian risk management firm
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) were appointed to investigate the collapse.
DNV report On 5 May 2021, the city government contracted DNV to conduct an investigation into the collapse. The investigation was divided into three parts: the first part, costing , addressed the preliminary causes of the accident; the second part, which included the immediate cause, was set at ; and the final part, costing , focused on the root cause and provided recommendations for the line's reopening. According to the contract, DNV was authorized to "collect information for documentary analyses, covering design, construction, rehabilitation, intervention, operation, maintenance, and supervision" of the line up to the date of the collapse. DNV published the first part of the report on 16 June 2021, which identified structural faults associated with six construction deficiencies: • Poor welding process of
Nelson studs • Porosity and lack of fusion in the stud–beam joint • Insufficient Nelson studs in the beams spanning the bridge assembly • Use of different types of concrete in the girder • Unfinished or improperly executed welds • Inadequate supervision and dimensional control in
fillet welds DNV investigated the adequacy of the design and materials, assessed whether the structure's performance met the design requirements, and evaluated how operations, repairs, and renovations had affected the bridge. It found an alert issued by supervisors in August 2010 regarding the construction of the overpass, which said that only ten
reinforcement bars were to be used in the bridge, despite the original project plans specifying 20. According to
El Financiero, the final report omitted four additional lines of inquiry that were previously included in a draft report: "lateral-torsional buckling of the steel beams", "crushing of the concrete slab", "influence of loads from the railroad system", and "lack of infrastructure maintenance". DNV was initially expected to deliver the second part of the report on 14 July 2021; however, the group postponed it until 7 September of that year. In the investigation, DNV concluded that the collapse was caused by a lack of functional Nelson studs in the affected section, which resulted in the buckling of the north and south beams. Insufficient functioning studs caused the girders to function independently in conditions for which they were not designed, leading to distortion in the central transverse frame and
fatigue in the support. Additionally, poor distribution of the existing bolts and inadequate welds in the area contributed to the collapse. The third part of the report was initially expected in August 2021 but was delivered on 28 February of the following year. The city government rejected the report's conclusions and withheld its publication. On 4 May 2022, when she was asked about its existence, Sheinbaum described the report as a "deficient, poorly produced, [...] tendentious and false" document that presented "technical issues". She said that it served the interests of opposition parties, that DNV had unilaterally altered the methodology originally presented when the firm was hired, and that the company had a
conflict of interest because one of DNV's lawyers had previously litigated against López Obrador. She announced a civil lawsuit against DNV and indicated that the firm would not receive payment for the final part of the report. Andrés Lajous, the city's Secretary of Mobility, explained that what the government referred to as a change in the report's methodology pertained to DNV's decision to "plant maintenance" as a cause of the collapse. DNV maintained that its report was delivered "in accordance with the agreed [root cause analysis] methodology and to strict internal quality and revision procedures". The firm added that Héctor Salomón Galindo Alvarado, the referred lawyer, was hired in July 2019 and had no authority over the reports or investigations conducted by the company or being contracted by DNV México. On 9 May 2022, the Spanish newspaper
El País published part of the third report, in which DNV concluded that the root cause of the accident was the bridge's design not complying with construction standards. Key factors included the lack of certification by an independent entity, inadequate supervision, changes to the original design, misplaced, poorly welded, or missing studs throughout the girders, and a lack of maintenance inspections from 2012 to 2019, despite recommendations for annual inspections in the ICA–Carso–Alstom manual. During the 2019 inspection, the hired company stated that they were not given sufficient time to conduct a thorough review. The city government gave a conference two days later and explained the discrepancies they identified, including: • DNV did not compare the collapsed section with similar segments • DNV relied on
Google tools, including
Google Street View, despite a disclaimer indicating that the data may not reflect actual conditions • DNV initially claimed that the deformations were not visible to the naked eye but later contradicted this using Google Street View images • The ICA–Carso–Alstom maintenance manual did not specify methodologies for assessing deformation criteria • The report initially stated that no maintenance reports were provided but later acknowledged that reports for 2019 and 2020 did exist • DNV did not follow the requested methodology. Sheinbaum announced that the contract with DNV would be terminated and that a group of engineers would be hired to "present the complete truth".
Other investigations —the president's political platform. Ebrard stated that the collapse resulted from a lack of maintenance rather than structural faults. The FGJCDMX investigation found results similar to DNV's initial report. It revealed that shear bolts connecting the concrete slabs to the beams were misaligned, and in some cases, the studs were not fused with the beams, causing distortion-related fatigue. The report concluded that the collapse occurred when the eastbound beam suddenly failed, dragging the westbound beam down within 1.9 seconds. Additionally, a study by specialists for the FGR indicated that the collapsed section had only 65 percent of the necessary bolts. They noted a lack of inspection reports addressing bridge issues, stating that existing deformities and defects could have been identified with proper maintenance and specialized examinations. The College of Civil Engineers of Mexico (; CICM) conducted independent studies of Line 12, excluding the collapsed area. They found that the bridge features two types of girders: concrete girders built by ICA from Culhuacán to Calle 11 stations, and steel girders built by Carso from Calle 11 to Zapotitlán stations. The institution recommended a reinforcement and rehabilitation project before any reopening, and cautioned against reopening the underground section, as the
railway workshops necessary for train maintenance are situated after
Tláhuac metro station, the line's terminus. ==Reconstruction and reopening==