Russian Navy

is famed for its gilded steeple topped by a golden weather-vane in the shape of a sailing ship. The 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a severe decline in the Russian Navy. Defence expenditures were severely reduced. Many ships were scrapped or laid up as accommodation ships at naval bases, and the building program was essentially stopped. Sergey Gorshkov's buildup during the Soviet period had emphasised ships over support facilities, but Gorshkov had also retained ships in service beyond their effective lifetimes, so a reduction had been inevitable in any event. The situation was exacerbated by the impractical range of vessel types which the Soviet military-industrial complex, with the support of the leadership, had forced on the navy—taking modifications into account, the Soviet Navy in the mid-1980s had nearly 250 different classes of ship. The Kiev-class aircraft carrying cruisers and many other ships were prematurely retired, and the incomplete second Admiral Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Varyag was eventually sold to the People's Republic of China by Ukraine. Funds were only allocated for the completion of ships ordered prior to the collapse of the USSR, as well as for refits and repairs on fleet ships taken out of service since. However, the construction times for these ships tended to stretch out extensively: in 2003 it was reported that the Akula-class submarine Nerpa had been under construction for fifteen years. Storage of decommissioned nuclear submarines in ports near Murmansk became a significant issue, with the Bellona Foundation reporting details of lowered readiness. Naval support bases outside Russia, such as Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, were gradually closed, with the exception of the modest technical support base in Tartus, Syria to support ships deployed to the Mediterranean. Naval Aviation declined as well from its height as Soviet Naval Aviation, dropping from an estimated 60,000 personnel with some 1,100 combat aircraft in 1992 to 35,000 personnel with around 270 combat aircraft in 2006. In 2002, out of 584 naval aviation crews only 156 were combat ready, and 77 ready for night flying. Average annual flying time was 21.7 hours, compared to 24 hours in 1999. Training and readiness also suffered severely. In 1995, only two missile submarines at a time were being maintained on station, from the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The decline culminated in the loss of the Oscar II-class submarine Kursk during the Northern Fleet summer exercise that was intended to back up the publication of a new naval doctrine. As of February 2008, the Russian Navy had 44 nuclear submarines with 24 operational; 19 diesel-electric submarines, 16 operational; and 56 first and second rank surface combatants, 37 operational. Despite this improvement, the November 2008 accident on board the attack boat Nerpa during sea trials before lease to India represented a concern for the future. The strength and quality of the Russian Navy started to improve during the 2010s. From 2010-2014 Russian officials negotiated the purchase of four s. On 3 September 2014, French President announced that due to Russia's "recent actions in Ukraine", the two ships would not be delivered. In November 2014, François Hollande placed a hold on the delivery of the first Mistral to Russia in view of the conflict in east Ukraine. Hollande set two conditions for delivery: the observation of a ceasefire in Ukraine and a political agreement between Moscow and Kiev. On 5 August 2015 it was announced that France was to pay back Russia's partial payments and keep the two ships initially produced for Russia. The ships eventually were sold to Egypt. In 2012, as part of an ambitious rebuilding effort, President Vladimir Putin announced a plan to build 51 modern ships and 24 submarines by 2020. Of the 24 submarines, 16 were to be nuclear-powered. On 10 January 2013, the Russian Navy finally accepted its first new Borei-class SSBN () for service. A second Borei (Aleksandr Nevskiy) was undergoing sea trials and entered service on 21 December 2013. A third Borei-class boat () was launched and began trials in early 2013, and was commissioned in late 2014. As of early 2025, eight Borei-class boats are in service, along with five nuclear attack/cruise missile submarines. More vessels of these classes are building along with additional and Improved-Kilo-class conventional attack submarines. The surface fleet is also being modernized, principally by introducing at least six new classes of corvette/offshore patrol vessels, a new class of frigate (the Admiral Gorshkov class), as well as new classes of amphibious ships and support vessels. In 2019, total tonnage of the Russian Navy stood at 1,216,547 tonnes. On 31 July 2022 during Russian Navy Day, Putin approved a new maritime doctrine for Russia. The new doctrine suggests an increased state focus on the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route, as well as an increased naval presence in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, both using already-established bases and establishing new bases on other territories in the area. Plans for the development of shipbuilding industries in Crimea were also mentioned, as well as the development of new LNG terminals and shipbuilding industries in the Far East. With the US and Allies identified as the major maritime threat, cooperation with India and Middle Eastern allies was also emphasised, as well as the necessity for increased foreign port visits by Russian Navy vessels. In 2023, Russian state media claimed that the Russian Navy received 3 submarines, 7 surface ships (including a modernized one), 33 multipurpose, raid and support vessels, 11 aircraft and helicopters, and also over 7,700 cruise, anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles. Invasion of Ukraine and losses Moskva, sunk in the Russian invasion of Ukraine In 2022, the Russian Navy took part in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, starting with the attack on Snake Island at the beginning of the war, at which the Ukrainian defenders told the , flagship of the Black Sea; "Russian warship, go fuck yourself", before subsequently being captured by Russian forces. Moskva sank on 14 April 2022 after a fire broke out and forced the crew to evacuate. The Ukrainian military reported that they hit the ship with Neptune anti-ship missiles, however the Russian military did not confirm this. The ship subsequently capsized and sank while the Russian Navy was attempting to tow her into port. The sinking of Moskva is the most significant Russian naval loss in action since World War II. In December 2023, the Russian landing ship Novocherkassk was also destroyed after being hit by Ukrainian cruise missiles. On 31 January 2024, Ukrainian sea drones struck the Russian Tarantul-class corvette Ivanovets in the Black Sea, causing the ship to sink. Two weeks later on 14 February, the same type of Ukrainian sea drones struck and sank the Russian Landing ship Tsezar Kunikov. On 5 March, the patrol boat Sergei Kotov was also lost to sea drones. While precise information on Russian ship losses during the war are not available, the fleet has lost at least four major warships (with others damaged), three major amphibious ships (with others damaged) and one submarine (Rostov-na-Donu), which was either seriously damaged or possibly destroyed while in dry dock. The fleet has continued to operate and attempted to adjust to Ukrainian tactics by integrating new defensive systems in ships and by redeploying vessels to the eastern Black Sea, or out of the region entirely, until sufficiently upgraded. By early 2026, it was reported that, despite no longer having a navy, Ukraine's surface, sub-surface and aerial drone capabilities had effectively driven the Russian fleet from open waters, forcing it to seek shelter in ports on the eastern Black Sea that themselves were no longer fully secure. ==Structure==

Since 2012 the headquarters of the Russian Navy (Russian Navy Main Staff) is once again located in The Admiralty in Saint Petersburg. Russian naval manpower is a mixture of conscripts serving one-year terms and volunteers (Officers and Ratings). In 2006 the IISS assessed there were 142,000 personnel in the Russian Navy. This personnel number includes the Naval Infantry (Marines) and the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops. As of 2008 the conscription term was reduced to one year and a major downsizing and reorganization were underway. In 2008, plans were announced to move the headquarters to the Admiralty building in St. Petersburg, the historic location of the headquarters of the Imperial Russian Navy. The Navy Staff finally relocated there in November 2012. The Russian Navy is organised into four combat services - the Surface Forces, the Submarine Forces, the Naval Aviation and the Coastal Troops. Additionally the navy also includes support units afloat and ashore. It does not include special forces. The Naval Spetsnaz brigades are part of the Main Intelligence Directorate attached to the respective fleets and the Counter-Diversionary Forces and Assets (ПДСС) (which are units, protecting the Navy from incursions of enemy special forces) fall within the Coastal Forces. During the Cold War the Soviet Armed Forces made the distinction between the various naval commands. The main fleets were the Northern and the Pacific Fleet. They were tasked with independent operations on the high seas and for that reason included strategic surface, submarine and air forces, including the country's naval nuclear deterrent. Due to the limited geography of the Baltic and the Black Seas the respective Baltic and Black Sea Fleets were given a more circumscribed role in support of adjacent ground formation (the Main Command of the Troops of the Western Direction in Legnica (Poland) and the Main Command of the Troops of the South-Western Direction in Chișinău). These two fleets were armed with shorter-range weapon systems than the main fleets (diesel-electric submarines, Sukhoi Su-24 fighter-bombers and a larger quantity of frigates and corvettes). Due to the closed nature of the Caspian Sea (still connected to the Baltic and Black Seas through the Volga River and the system of rivers and canals and navigable for ships of corvette size) its Caspian Flotilla had an even more limited role than the Fleets and played a defensive role supporting the Main Command of the Troops of the Southern Direction in Baku. With the end of the Cold War a significant reduction in forces followed. Before the 2008 Russian military reform, the four fleets were ranked as equal in status to the six Military Districts. With the reform measures going into force the number of Military Districts was reduced and became new Joint Strategic Commands and the four fleets and one flotilla were subordinated to them with status equal to the Ground Forces and the Air Forces armies. Due to Russia's increased interests in the Arctic region and the importance of Russia's western/northwestern maritime defence the Northern Fleet, originally part of the Joint Strategic Command West (Western Military District), on 12 December 2014 became the basis for the newly formed fifth Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command. In 2024, amid increasing tensions with NATO, and owing to a significantly weakened position for Russia in northern Europe, resulting from the Swedish and Finnish entry into NATO, both the Northern and Baltic Fleets were subordinated to the command of the Leningrad Military District. The Military District was now responsible for the command of all Russian ground, sea and air forces stretching from Kaliningrad to the Arctic Ocean. The Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla remained subordinate to the Southern Military District while the Pacific Fleet was subordinate to the Eastern Military District. Submarine and surface forces cruise missile submarine Tomsk The submarine and surface forces form the backbone of the Navy. Submarines can form part of dedicated submarine squadrons and flotillas or, alternatively, they can operate as part of squadrons and flotillas of mixed composition together with major and/or minor surface combatants. Over the past two decades there has been an attempt to modernize and update the fleet by emphasizing the production and introduction of modern light units to begin to replace large numbers of obsolescent corvettes, missile boats and mine counter-measures ships from the Soviet-era. In addition, there has been significant emphasis on submarine production with the introduction of nuclear-powered ballistic missile, nuclear-powered cruise missile as well as new classes of conventionally-powered attack submarines. This trend is continuing through the 2020s, particularly in relation to the submarine component of Russia's nuclear deterrent forces. Coastal troops area, 2010 Coastal Troops include the Naval Infantry and the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops. The Russian Naval Infantry are the amphibious force of the Russian Navy and can trace their origins back to 1705, when Peter the Great issued a decree for an infantry regiment "of naval equipage". Since its formation it has seen action in the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, the First and Second World Wars, and the Chechen and Georgian conflicts. Under the leadership of Admiral Gorshkov during the Cold War, the Soviet Navy expanded the reach of the Naval Infantry and deployed it worldwide on numerous occasions, but since the dissolution of the Soviet Union its role has been greatly reduced. The Soviet Naval Infantry and their Russian successors have a reputation as elite shock troops. For their black uniforms and ferocious performance in combat in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions during World War II they received the nickname "The Black Death" (German: der schwarze Tod). The Russian Naval Infantry is a mechanised force, organised in brigades, independent regiments and independent battalions. The 55th Naval Infantry Division of the Pacific Fleet has been disbanded in 2009 and replaced by two separate brigades. Each brigade has a tank battalion, a self-propelled artillery battalion, a self-propelled air defence battalion, mechanised marine infantry battalions, other support units and one Airborne Assault Naval Infantry Battalion (десантно-штурмовой батальон морской пехоты), parachute and air assault qualified, with the mission to spearhead amphibious landings. The coastal defence troops of the Russian Navy are conventional mechanised brigades with the main task to prevent enemy amphibious landings. An example of coastal defence troops are those of the Baltic Fleet. With Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania declaring independence at the end of the Soviet Union the Baltic Military District practically disintegrated. The massive ground forces formations left landlocked in the Kaliningrad Oblast were transferred from the ground forces to naval command and control. The integration of naval infantry and coastal defence troops is a relatively new tendency from the 2010s in order to simplify the naval command structure and the new Arctic infantry brigades in formation under the Northern Fleet fall within that process. As of 2022, there appeared to be a longer-term intent to expand all Russian naval infantry brigades into division-sized formations, coupled with the planned acquisition of both the new Ivan Rogov-class helicopter assault ships as well as upgraded Ivan Gren-class landing ships. However, full implementation of such a plan would likely have to await the conclusion of the Russo-Ukraine War. The coastal artillery troops also play a very important role for the Navy. The geography of the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk as well as the Caspian Sea makes the deployment of shore-based, anti-ship systems in an area-denying role very effective. They deploy K-300P Bastion-P supersonic ASCM, 3M-54 Kalibr cruise subsonic ASCM and A-222E Bereg-E 130mm coastal mobile artillery system as well as self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems. The Naval Infantry and Coastal Troops are led by the Deputy Commander for Naval Infantry/Commandant of the Naval Infantry of the Russian Navy, Lieutenant General (NI) Aleksandr Kolpatsenko. Their motto is: "Where We Are, There is Victory!" Naval aviation from the 279th Shipborne Fighter Aviation Regiment on Admiral Kuznetsov's flight deck The first naval aviation units in Russia were formed from 1912 through 1914 as a part of the Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet. Since its formation, it has participated in the Russian Civil War, World War II and in many other conflicts throughout Europe, the Middle East and Asia (statement requires source citation). During the Cold War the naval aviation pursued a policy of deploying large numbers of bombers in maritime strike roles to counter the U.S. Navy's extensive fleet of aircraft carriers, by 1989 it operated over 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft with the majority being bombers such as the Tu-22M "Backfire" and the Tu-16 "Badger". Since the fall of the Soviet Union Russia's naval aviation has been significantly reduced in size. The Tu-22Ms have been transferred to the Aerospace Forces and since then the combat arm of the Naval Aviation is built around Sukhoi Su-33s, Mikoyan MiG-29Ks, with Sukhoi Su-30s and Sukhoi Su-34s replacing the obsolete Sukhoi Su-24s. Russia's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov (063), has also been inactive since 2017 and, as of 2025, has been reported as unlikely to return to operational service. The carrier's fixed-wing aircraft were then re-deployed to a land-based role. As of 2025, the Russian Naval Aviation consists of the following components: • Naval missile-carrying aviation • Shore-based ASW aviation • Attack (Shturmovik) aviation • Shore-based fighter aviation • Reconnaissance aviation • Shipborne aviation (principally ASW helicopters) • Auxiliary air units As of 2025, aircraft losses during the Russo-Ukraine War, for both the Russian Aerospace Forces and shore-based Russian naval aviation, have included at least seven Sukhoi Su-30SMs and between 10 and 20 of the older Su-24MRs. Russia's total inventory of approximately 110 Su-30s, and reserve stocks of at least 100 Su-24s, may allow for some of these losses to be absorbed but they have not been insignificant. == Ranks, rates and insignia ==

Commissioned officer ranks The rank insignia of commissioned officers. Other ranks The rank insignia of non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. ==Equipment==

Ships and submarines See List of active Russian Navy ships Aircraft Bastion concept, sensor and radar systems Historically, the Russian navy has emphasized the creation of submarine bastions, both to protect the security of its submarine-based nuclear forces and to secure the Arctic and Pacific approaches to Russian territory. In order to strengthen its submarine bastion in the Barents Sea, in 2025 it was reported that Russia has likely deployed a network of sonar systems in that region in order to detect submarines. The network, known as "Harmony", is reported to be composed of detection devices arrayed in an arc stretching from Murmansk, via Novaya Zemlja to Franz Josef Land. The Russian Navy uses Podsolnukh over-the-horizon surface wave radar for detection of ships. As of 2019, four radars have been delivered to the coasts of Caspian Sea, Okhotsk Sea, Sea of Japan and Baltic Sea. == Military districts and fleets ==

The Russian Navy consists of four fleets and one flotilla with all of them subordinated to different Military Districts. Leningrad Military District Northern Fleet in a joint exercise of the Northern and Black Sea fleets The Russian Northern Fleet, dating to 1733 but established as a modern formation in 1933, is headquartered at Severomorsk and spread around various bases in the greater Murmansk area. It is the main fleet of the Russian Navy. Baltic Fleet The Baltic Fleet, established on 18 May 1703, is based in Baltiysk and Kronshtadt, with its headquarters in the city of Kaliningrad, Kaliningrad Oblast. Since 2024, the fleet has been subordinate to the Leningrad Military District. Southern Military District Black Sea Fleet (far left) and the Saratov'' (second right), in Sevastopol, August 2007 The Black Sea Fleet, established on 2 May 1783, is based at the Sevastopol, Karantinnaya, and Streletskaya Bays in Sevastopol which is also the location of its headquarters, and at Novorossiysk in Krasnodar Kray. The fleet also has various other facilities on the Crimean Peninsula and facilities in Krasnodar Kray. Since the start of the Russo-Ukraine War, the Black Sea Fleet has experienced serious losses in ships and materiel. In the initial stages of the war, the fleet's flagship, the cruiser Moskva, was sunk on 14 April 2022 during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Other losses, including the Tapir-class landing ship Saratov followed. Operational Command South - Tartus The Russian Navy has maintained a base under the command of the Southern Military District in Syria at Tartus. The Mediterranean squadron was disestablished soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but a small naval logistics support facility remained there. In January 2017 Russia and Syria signed an agreement, to be valid for 49 years, to expand the Tartus facility with a view to improving the support at Tartus. On 4 February 2022, naval detachments from the Northern Fleet and Baltic Fleet arrived at Tartus. Large amphibious assault ships Pyotr Morgunov, Georgy Pobedonosets, Olenegorsky Gornyak, Korolyov, Minsk and Kaliningrad were under the direction of Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Nikolay Yevmenov. In April 2022 there were around 20 Russian naval ships in the Mediterranean Sea. On 11 May it was reported that the flotilla had remained without change since early February. There were 13 ships and 5 support vessels of the four Russian fleets, including 9 attack missile ships. The formation of a "Mediterranean Squadron" of the Russian Navy in February 2022, using the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets' ships allowed the Russian Black Sea Fleet to return a large number of ships to the Black Sea some time prior to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. On 27 February three days after the commencement of the Russian invasion of Ukraine Turkey (who acts as guarantor of the Montreux Convention) decided to ban the passage through the straits of any warships whose homeport is not in the Black Sea. As of mid-2025, the loss of regular use of the Russian base at the port of Tartus in Syria, as a result of the Fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, has significantly impacted the ability of the Russian navy to maintain an effective presence in the Mediterranean region. As of mid-2025, Russia and Syria were reportedly engaged in negotiations about the future of Russian naval and air facilities in the country though it remained unclear how extensive Russia's military presence in Syria would be going forward. As of March 2026, the Russian navy appeared to be using the naval facility intermitently. However, Russia also seemed increasingly to be looking at the ports of Tobruk in Libya as well as Algiers as more consistent ports of call. Caspian Flotilla The Caspian Flotilla, established on 4 November 1722, is based in Astrakhan and Makhachkala with its headquarters in Astrakhan. ==Future and modernization==

diesel-electric submarine Sankt Petersburg Russia's military budget expanded from 1998 until 2015, but economic problems including a sharp decline in oil prices led to budget cuts in 2016. Higher expenditure led to an increase in numbers of ships under construction, initially focusing on submarines, such as the conventional Petersburg (Lada)-class and nuclear Severodvinsk (Yasen)-class. Some older vessels have been refitted as well. ''Jane's Fighting Ships'' commented in 2004 that the construction programme was too focused on Cold War scenarios, given the submarine emphasis. According to the Russian Defence Ministry, share of modern armament in the Navy has reached more than 50% in 2014. A report from December 2019 estimated the figure at 68%. However, in September 2020 it was reported that the defence budget was to be cut by 5% as part of a shift to social spending and in response the financial impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. The resulting impact of such a cut on Russian Navy modernization plans was not immediately apparent. Likely more significant is the impact of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation after 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2021, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev reportedly acknowledged that the Russian defence industry “is still dependent on foreign technologies.” The impact of international sanctions on naval procurement projects, given both reduced access to foreign technologies and significant pressure on the defence budget, had yet to be determined. guided missile frigate Admiral Gorshkov, commissioned in 2018 guided-missile corvette, capable of launching Kalibr or Oniks supersonic cruise missiles The Steregushchiy-class corvettes, the lead ship of which was laid down on 21 December 2001, is the first new surface construction since the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the new Admiral Sergei Gorshkov class frigates marks the first attempt of the Navy to return to the construction of large blue water capable vessels. The Russian Navy had been planning to procure a new class of destroyer, the general-purpose Project 21956. The Lider-class has been envisaged as a "green water" vessel and was anticipated to be nuclear-powered. As of mid-2025, the project remained under development. The project was reportedly suspended in 2020, apparently in favour of the less expensive Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates. The Gorshkov-class vessels have themselves experienced technical challenges and in 2020 it was initially suggested that the larger 22350M variant of that class would not be proceeding. However, it was later reported that design work on both the Lider and the 22350M variant of the Gorshkov-class was in fact moving forward. nuclear ballistic missile submarine Alexander Nevsky In keeping with the emphasis on strategic forces, the Navy's submarine fleet is being modernized by the acquisition of several classes of strategic and tactical submarines. Up to 12 Borei/Dolgorukiy-class SSBNs are planned to replace older classes in both the Northern and Pacific fleets. These are being complemented by new Yasen and Khabarovsk-class SSGNs, as well as conventional submarines of the Improved Kilo and Lada classes. However, in terms of the tactical nuclear submarine fleet, it is unclear whether the new Yasen-class, Khabarovsk-class, and potential follow-on models, can be produced in sufficient numbers, and on a timely basis, to replace aging older model nuclear submarines on a one-for-one basis. It has been reported that Russian third-generation nuclear submarines have not been modernized to a level to avoid block obsolescence before 2030. ==Main Naval Parade in St. Petersburg==

Since 2017, by the decree of the President of Russia dated 27 July 2017, the tradition of holding the "Main Naval Parade" in St. Petersburg on the Navy Day has been restored. Prior to 2017, in Soviet and Russian Federation times the previously held annual St. Petersburg Navy Day parade was not so specifically named. The parade is composed of ships and sailors representing the several fleets and the Caspian Flotilla with small ships and submarines in the Neva River and the larger ones arrayed off Kronshtadt in the Gulf of St. Petersburg. It is celebrated annually on the last Sunday of July during the Navy Day holiday. ==Deployments from 2018==

Ocean Shield In the years 2018–2021, the Russian Navy has been organizing central annual naval exercise called Ocean Shield. Between 1–8 September 2018, Ocean Shield exercise was held for the first time. Unlike 2019 and 2020 exercises, conducted in the Baltic Sea, the first exercise took place in the Mediterranean Sea. 26 ships, 2 submarines and 34 aircraft were included. Among participants were cruiser Marshal Ustinov, destroyers Smetlivy and Severomorsk, frigates Admiral Grigorovich, Admiral Essen, Admiral Makarov, Pytlivy and Yaroslav Mudry, corvettes Vishny Volochyok, Grad Sviyazhsk and Veliky Ustyug and conventional submarines Kolpino and Velikiy Novgorod. The aircraft present included Tu-160 bombers, Tu-142 and Il-38 anti-submarine aircraft and Su-33 and MiG-29K maritime fighters. This was the largest Russian naval exercise in the Mediterranean Sea of the post-Cold War era and the largest Russian post-Cold War naval exercise in the far sea zone. In terms of distant location and number of capital ships participating it's comparable only to June 2021 exercises of the Pacific Fleet off the Hawaii islands. Stoykiy, Boikiy, Passat, Geyzer, Serpukhov, Mitishchi, Chuvashiya, Morshansk, Liven, Urengoy, R-257 and LSTs Aleksandr Shabalin, Kaliningrad, Minsk and Korolyov, as well as nuclear submarine Smolensk. Other possible participants include ships, participating in the July Naval Parade in St. Petersburg, i.e. frigate Admiral Kasatonov, corvettes Gremyashchy and Sovetsk, submarine Kronshtadt and minesweepers Ivan Antonov, Aleksandr Obukhov and Pavel Khenov. On 3 August 2020, third Ocean Shield exercise started in the Baltic Sea and included Northern Fleet's destroyer Vice-Admiral Kulakov and LST Pyotr Morgunov and Baltic Fleet's corvettes Steregushchy, Boikiy and Stoikiy. Combined-fleet exercises June 2021 In 2021, no usual Ocean Shield exercise was conducted in August or September in the Baltic Sea. However, in June, the Pacific, Northern and Black Sea fleets conducted large-scale exercises. In mid June, four Russian cruisers and four destroyers were simultaneously at sea, or all operational large surface combatants except destroyer Severomorsk, which was probably the first time in the post-Cold war era. A complex large-scale exercise took place in the central Pacific Ocean, where the Russian Navy conducted possibly the strongest exercise of the post-Soviet era. It took place prior to the 2021 Putin-Biden summit, similarly to Aport and Atrina exercises that were held in 1985 and 1987 prior to the Geneva and Washington summits of Gorbachev and Reagan to improve Soviet negotiation position. Officially, however, it was stated that the exercise is an answer to the exercise Agile Dagger 2021 of the US Pacific Fleet, employing one third of the operational submarines of the US Pacific Fleet. In the Barents Sea, cruisers Marshal Ustinov and Pyotr Veliky, destroyer Vice-admiral Kulakov and submarines Kaluga, Gepard and Dmitry Donskoy were active. Between 7 and 24 June, a large-scale exercise was conducted by the Pacific Fleet in the central Pacific Ocean, being the first post-Cold war Russian naval exercise in that area (minor exceptions being destroyer Admiral Panteleev taking part in RIMPAC-2012 exercise and frigate Admiral Gorshkov sailing near Hawaii in 2019). It included cruiser Varyag, destroyers Marshal Shaposhnikov and Admiral Panteleyev, corvettes Sovershenny, Gromky and Aldar Tsydenzhapov, (a) nuclear submarine(s) (likely Omsk and Kuzbass) and intelligence ship Kareliya. The exercise started in the central Pacific Ocean on 10 June, and on 21 June the ships 2500 nautical miles southeast of the Kuril islands simulated an attack on the enemy carrier strike group. Prior to that, the ships operated in two groups, sailing at 300 nautical miles from each other, one of them playing the role of enemy. The largest auxiliary ship of the Russian Navy Marshal Krylov also took part in the exercise and acted as a command ship for the commander of the exercise, rear admiral Konstantin Kabantsev, commander of Primorskaya Flotilla, as well as hospital ship Irtysh and MiG-31 interceptors and Il-38 and Tu-142 anti-submarine aircraft. On 24 June, the final day of the exercise, three Tu-95 bombers, several Tu-22M bombers, escorted by interceptors MiG-31BM and two Il-78 tankers flew to the central Pacific Ocean as well. The Tu-95s delivered conditional strikes against enemy's critical infrastructure and Tu-22M delivered strikes against enemy's conditional carrier strike group together with Varyag and Marshal Shaposhnikov. An additional destroyer Admiral Tributs was deployed to the South China Sea, accompanying nuclear submarine Nerpa. On 18 June 2021, the Black Sea Fleet deployed cruiser Moskva to the Mediterranean Sea, which, amid deployment of Queen Elizabeth to the Eastern Mediterranean, took part in an unprecedented anti-ship exercise with bombers Tu-22M and interceptors MiG-31K both deployed to Syria for the first time in May and June. A MiG-31K reportedly fired a Kinzhal missile against a ground target in Syria, while a newest air defence system S-500 was reportedly tested at Khmeymim airbase and obtained a lock on F-35 fighter from Queen Elizabeth. The exercise included rocket fire 30 km away from Queen Elizabeth. January–February 2022 In January–February 2022 large-scale exercise of all Russian fleets took place with some 140 warships and support ships. In the Northern Fleet it included two task groups. First, cruiser Marshal Ustinov, destroyer Vice-Admiral Kulakov and frigate Admiral Kasatonov, as well as tanker Vyazma and tug SB-406 were deployed to the southwest of Ireland, conducting first Russian post-Cold war naval exercise west of British isles. Second, destroyer Severomorsk, frigate Admiral Gorshkov, LST Ivan Gren, nuclear submarine Severodvinsk, diesel-electric submarine Kaluga, corvettes Snezhnogorsk and Brest, as well as support ships operated in the Barents Sea. Additionally, three LSTs were deploying to the Black Sea (Olenogorsky Gornyak, Georgiy Pobedonosets and Pyotr Morgunov). In the Pacific Fleet, cruiser Varyag, destroyer Admiral Tributs and tanker Boris Butoma were deployed to the Indian Ocean, participating in the third Russo-Sino-Iranian naval exercise, first Russo-Chinese naval exercise away from Russian/Chinese coast that took place in the western Indian Ocean and will finally strengthen Mediterranean squadron. Additionally, submarine Volkhov fired a Kalibr missile in the Sea of Japan and two Tu-142 performed flight above the Okhotsk Sea. In the Baltic Fleet, corvettes Soobrazitelny and Stoykiy were deployed to the Northern Sea, while Zeleny Dol, Mytishchi, Odintsovo, Aleksin, Kabardino-Balkariya were active in the Baltic Sea. Additionally, three LSTs were deploying to the Black Sea: Korolyov, Minsk and Kaliningrad and intelligence ship Vasily Tatishchev to the Mediterranean Sea, where it will monitor three-carrier exercise with CVN Harry Truman, Cavour and Charles de Gaulle in February 2022. In the Black Sea Fleet, an exercise was conducted by frigates Admiral Essen, Ladnyy, corvettes Ingushetiya, Grayvoron, Naberezhnye Chelny, R-60, Yeysk, Suzdalets and other ships, totally around 20 ships. Annual exercise Russia organises a central military exercise for September each year. During Zapad 2021, in Northern Fleet two surface groups were active: Admiral Ushakov and Admiral Kasatonov in the Barents Sea (along with coastal systems Bal and Bastion-P) and Severomorsk in the Arctic (along with LST Georgiy Pobedonosets, tug Pamir and tanker Sergey Osipov), as well as submarines Orel and Verkhoturye (along with minesweepers Yelnya, Soloyevetskiy, Yunga, Yadrin and Kotelnich in two groups). In the Baltic Fleet, frigate Yaroslav Mudry, corvettes Steregushchy and Stoykiy and submarine Dmitrov were active (along with coastal system Bal). Barents Sea On 22 February 2021, the Northern Fleet conducted an exercise in which cruiser Marshal Ustinov sailed in Varanger Fjord in the area of the Russia–Norway maritime border, becoming the first Russian warship to do so in the post-Cold War era. Sailing was speculated to be response to the US bombers (B-1B) landing in Norway on the same day for the first time. Other ships active in the area in January–February 2021 included destroyer Severomorsk, frigate with the tug Altay, nuclear submarine Severodvinsk (that launched a Kalibr missile), corvettes Aysberg, Snezhnogorsk, Yunga and Brest, and salvage vessel Georgiy Titov with deep-submergence rescue vehicle AS-34. Atlantic South of Gibraltar, in September–October 2021 Russian Navy deployed destroyer Vice-Admiral Kulakov (along tanker Akademik Pashin and tug Altai) that visited Praia, Capo Verde and performed anti-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Guinea. It was the first deployment of a Russian warship south of Gibraltar since Admiral Gorshkov's 2019 world circumnavigation. North Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea In February 2008 a Russian Northern Fleet naval task force completed a two-month deployment in the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic which started on 4 December 2007. The operation was the first large-scale Russian Navy deployment to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean in 15 years. The task force included the Admiral Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, the Udaloy-class destroyers and , and the Slava-class guided missile cruiser Moskva, as well as auxiliary vessels. During the operation the navy practiced rescue and counter-terror operations, reconnaissance, and missile and bomb strikes on the (theoretical) enemy's naval task force. Over 40 Russian Air Force aircraft took part in joint exercises with the navy as well. • In October 2008, a naval task group from the Northern Fleet, comprising the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Velikiy, the large ASW ship Admiral Chabanenko, and support ships, left their homeport of Severomorsk in northern Russia on 22 September and sailed into the northern Atlantic, having covered a distance of in a week. Russian warships were scheduled to participate in joint naval exercises with the Venezuelan Navy in the Caribbean on 10–14 November, in line with the 2008 training program, and in order to expand military cooperation with foreign navies. These exercises actually took place on 1 December. • 11 October 2008, Russian warships bound for Venezuela, including the nuclear-powered cruiser Pyotr Velikiy, put in at the Libyan port of Tripoli for resupply. • From Venezuela Petr Velikiy proceeded alone to a port call in Cape Town, South Africa, then participated in the INDRA-2009 exercise off western India, briefly engaged in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and returned to its homeport of Severomorsk in March 2009. The other ships in company returned to their home base in the Northern Fleet. • A group of Pacific Fleet ships arrived in the Mediterranean Sea on 15 May 2013 having sailed from Vladivostok on 19 March 2013. , the Ropucha-class landing ships Peresvet and Admiral Nevelskoy, the tanker Pechenga and the rescue tug Fotiy Krylov augmented the Russian Navy's grouping there, and carried out tasks in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. The Pacific Fleet ships practiced activities jointly with forces from other Russian navy fleets and made a number of business calls at ports in the region, including a call at Limassol, Cyprus on 17 May 2013. • The Baltic Fleet Ropucha-class landing ships Kaliningrad, Aleksandr Shabalin and Azov arrived at Novorossiysk naval base on 14 May 2013 having completed their duties in the Mediterranean. The Baltic Fleet ships spent several weeks at Novorossiysk undergoing checks and maintenance and replenishing supplies before resuming their duties in the Mediterranean. • The Northern Fleet's Udaloy-class destroyer was reported to be heading for the Atlantic on 20 May 2013 after completing a visit to Norway. The ship had been taking part in the Russian-Norwegian Pomor-2013 exercise and is expected to take on supplies from the tanker Vyazma while at anchor in the North Sea before undertaking a lengthy voyage in the north eastern regions of the Atlantic Ocean. • On 1 June 2013, Navy Commander Adm Viktor Chirkov said that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov is "expected to put out and perform a number of missions in an offshore oceanic zone as part of a group. Northern Fleet naval pilots will perform a number of missions on board this cruiser during the long-range mission." He also stated that the ship's deployment might be as part of a permanent operational group in the Mediterranean. In preparing for the deployment the ships' airwing would not be using the NITKA pilot training facility located in Crimea, Ukraine. • On 17 February 2017, the Russian Navy surveillance vessel SSV-175 Viktor Leonov was cruising international waters off the East Coast of the United States. Viktor Leonov is outfitted with a variety of high-tech spying equipment designed to intercept signals intelligence. It first appeared off Delaware and, then moved south of the US submarine base at Groton, Connecticut collecting electronic signals. Syria • Sequentially having lost naval support facility access in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt, in 1971 the Soviet Navy began operating from a leased facility in Tartus, Syria. • In September 2008, it was reported that Russia and Syria conducted talks about permitting Russia to develop and enlarge its naval base in Syria in order to establish a stronger naval presence in the Mediterranean, and amidst the deteriorating Russia relations with the west in conjunction with the 2008 South Ossetia war and the plans to deploy US missile defence shield in Poland, it has even been asserted that President Assad has agreed to Tartus port's conversion into a permanent Middle East base for Russia's nuclear-armed warships. Moscow and Damascus additionally announced that it would be renovating the port, although there was no mention in the Syrian press. • On 22 September 2008, Russian Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo said the nuclear-powered Pyotr Velikiy cruiser, accompanied by three other ships, sailed from the Northern Fleet's base of Severomorsk. The ships will cover about to conduct joint maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy. Dygalo refused to comment on Monday's report in the daily Izvestia claiming that the ships were to make a stopover in the Syrian port of Tartus on their way to Venezuela. Russian officials said the Soviet-era base there was being renovated to serve as a foothold for a permanent Russian navy presence in the Mediterranean. • In late November 2011, Pravda and Reuters wrote that a naval flotilla led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov would sail to its naval base in Tartus as a show of support for the al-Assad regime. Such a visit is not possible because the lengths of all of Russia's current modern warships exceed the size of the two 100 meter piers located at the Russian leasehold in Tartus. (see next paragraph) • On 29 November 2011, Army General Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, said that sending ships of the Russian Navy to the Mediterranean Sea is linked to exercises and not to the situation in Syria. "In the event of necessity, namely to carry out repairs, to take water and food on board and to allow rest for the crews, Russian ships may visit Tartus but in this case this has not been included in the plan of the trip," the Interfax source said. He also noted that the size of Admiral Kuznetsov does not allow it to moor in Tartus because the port does not have suitable infrastructure, i.e., large enough mooring. Sudan • On 23 July 2019, Russia and Sudan signed an agreement on establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan in Khartoum and, on 1 December 2020, in Moscow. On 25 June 2021, Russian prime minister Mishustin submitted the agreement for ratification. On 12 July, Sudan was preparing for ratification too. • Between 28 February and 2 May 2021, a number of Russian ships called at Port Sudan, beginning with frigate Admiral Grigorovich in what was the first visit of a Russian warship to Sudan in the modern history. This was followed by corvette Stoikiy and tug Kola on 19 March, signals intelligence ship Ivan Khurs on 10 April, signals intelligence ship Vasily Tatishchev and its accompanying repair ship PM-138 on 2 May. Algeria Russia and Algeria hold annual naval exercise at the end of the year. • Between 16 and 17 November 2021, Russo-Algerian naval exercise was conducted. Russian Black Sea Fleet's frigate Admiral Grigorovich, patrol ship Vasily Bykov and seagoing tug SB-742 took part, as well as Algerian frigate Harrad, training vessel La Sammam and rescue vessel El Munjid. Egypt Russia and Egypt have held an annual naval exercise at the end of the year since 2015. Usually, the exercise is conducted in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, an exception being 2020, when the exercise took place in the Black Sea. From 3–10 December 2021, another Russo-Egyptian naval exercise, Bridge of Friendship, took place in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Russian task force comprised frigate Admiral Grigorovich, patrol ship Dmitry Rogachev and sea-going tug SB-742. Caribbean Sea On 8 September 2008, it was announced that the Pyotr Velikiy would sail to the Caribbean Sea in order to participate in naval exercises with the Venezuelan Navy. This represented the first major Russian show of force in that sea since the end of the Cold War. On 22 September the Kirov-class nuclear missile cruiser Pyotr Velikiy and the Udaloy class large anti-submarine ship Admiral Chabanenko, accompanied by support vessels, left their home port of Severomorsk for naval exercises with Venezuela scheduled for early November 2008. On 25 November 2008, a group of warships from Russia's Northern Fleet arrived at the Venezuelan port of La Guaira. East Africa: Somali Coast • On 24 September 2008, the Russian frigate Neustrashimy left its home base at Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia, for counter-piracy operations near the Somali coast. • From 11 January to 17 March 2009, the Admiral Vinogradov took up the counter-piracy mission from the Neustrashimy and upon completion took a course home to Vladivostok by way of a port visit to Jakarta, Indonesia 24–28 March 2009. • From 26 April to 7 June 2009, the Pacific Fleet destroyer Admiral Panteleyev took up counter-piracy duties in the Gulf of Aden, having left Vladivostok at the end of March 2009 to relieve the Admiral Vinogradov. It returned to Vladivostok on 1 July. Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea Main article: Cam Ranh Air Base • On 11 January 2009, Army General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, announced that the Kirov-class nuclear-powered cruiser Pyotr Velikiy and five other ships would take part in exercises with the Indian Navy in late January 2009. • In 2021, Black Sea Fleet's intelligence ship Kildin entered port Oman on 1 November. Besides, in summer, the newly built frigate Gremyashchy and Kilo (Varshavanka) class diesel-electric submarines Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and Volkhov transited Indian Ocean on their way from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. East Asia Since 2012, Russia and China have conducted an annual naval exercise. In even years, they take place off Chinese coast (usually in the Yellow Sea), and in odd years off Russian coast (usually in the Sea of Japan). In 2015 and 2017, in addition to the exercises in the Sea of Japan, additional exercises in the Mediterranean and Baltic Sea, respectively, were held. In 2021, for the first time the exercise surpassed the defensive character as Russian and Chinese warships passed through the Tsugaru Strait between Japanese islands Hokkaido and Honshu. • On 23 October 2021, Russian and Chinese Navies conducted first ever joint patrol. Five warships of each navy participated, including two destroyers, two corvettes and a command ship. Russian Navy was represented by destroyers Admiral Panteleyev and Admiral Tributs, corvettes Gromky and Geroy Rossiyskoy federatsii Aldar Tsydenzhapov and tracking ship Marshal Krylov. The patrol group passed through the Tsugaru Strait. Joint Russo-Chinese operations imply readiness of both superpowers to cooperate to limit the power of the American-led order in the Asia-Pacific region. • From 1–3 December 2021, the first naval exercise between Russia and ASEAN occurred in the Indonesian territorial waters. Russia was represented by destroyer Admiral Panteleyev, Vietnam by frigate Ly Thai To, Indonesia by frigate Raden Eddy Martadinata, Malaysia by frigate Lekiu, Singapore by corvette Vigour, Brunei by off-shore patrol vessel Daruttaqwa, Thailand by frigate Kraburi and Myanmar by frigate Kyansittha, while Philippines joined as an observer. ==See also==