Question Does a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, subsequently rendering property used for the purposes described of little economic value, deprive the owner of that property in conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Arguments Mugler's attorney posited two arguments: • A
substantive due process argument that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Kansas lacked any authority to prohibit the manufacture of intoxicating liquors for personal use or for the purpose of export. • A
takings argument citing the devaluation of Mugler's property from $10,000 to $2500 by the statute, the building's brewery-specific design, and the difficulty of employing the building in other lawful trades. Mugler's attorney backed this argument with the holding of
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., which found the damming of a nearby river in order to improve navigation and had flooded the plaintiff's land, rendering it useless and without value, was a taking requiring compensation. The attorney for Ziebold and Hagelin echoed Mugler's two arguments but posited an additional argument attacking the nuisance statute, which allowed for the destruction of all property used in keeping and maintaining the nuisance without a trial by jury, as a denial of
due process. The state, according to Ziebold and Hagelin's attorney, was using the nuisance provision out of order; instead of trying and convicting the defendants first, and then subsequently declaring the property a nuisance on the fact of their conviction and enabling authorities to destroy the liquors, the state was instead using the nuisance statutes to convict the defendants without trial. The statute removed the
presumption of innocence once the state had proved the owners of the alleged nuisance did not have a permit.
Decision On December 5, 1887, the US Supreme Court upheld 7–1 the ruling of the Supreme Court of Kansas, thus affirming Mugler's convictions.
Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan, writing for the majority, held that a state's legislation prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquor within its jurisdiction does not infringe on any right or privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States. Addressing Mugler's first argument, the Court stated its belief that the principle requiring property holders not to use their property so as to be injurious to the community was compatible with the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court decided that it possessed the power to inquire into the intentions of the legislature behind police power regulations to settle disputes over the relatedness of the regulation to a state's use of the police power: The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty—indeed, are under a solemn duty—to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of the rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Turning to Mugler's second argument, the Court found the authority for the statute in this case strictly relied upon Kansas's
police power. Since the statute dealt with the health, the safety, and the morals of the population, the Court rejected Mugler's reliance on
Pumpelly, distinguishing the
Pumpelly case as a use solely of the state's power of eminent domain; the Court reasoned that a prohibition on the use of property, by valid legislation, for purposes of protecting the health and safety of the community cannot be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for public benefit. Since the legislation did not restrict the owners control, right to dispose, or ability to use for lawful purposes, no taking had occurred: "No one may rightfully do that which the law-making power, upon reasonable grounds, declares to be prejudicial to the welfare." Further, the Court held that states cannot be burdened with the condition that they must compensate individual owners for incidental losses suffered as a result of a prohibition on the use of property. Additionally, property values which depreciate as a result of the state's exercise of the police power is different from taking property for public use. In one case a nuisance is abated; in the other, property is taken away from the owner completely. If public safety requires certain action be taken by the legislature, lawmakers cannot be persuaded from discontinuing such activity because individuals will suffer incidental inconveniences. ==See also==