The FCC's authority stemmed from its organic statute, the
Communications Act of 1934. The Act provided that: It is the purpose of this Act, among other things, to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license. The Act also provided that the criterion governing the exercise of the Commission's license power is the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." NBC argued that the FCC's power was limited to the technical aspects of radio transmission. The Court found that it was not, but instead "we are asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other." NBC argued that the Act did not explicitly allow the Commission to develop regulations for chain broadcasting. The Court admitted this, but held that an explicit grant of power was not necessary in this context, because the field was new and dynamic, and that by granting power to the FCC, it intended "not niggardly but expansive powers." NBC argued that the grant of power to the FCC was unconstitutionally vague, because it did not provide definite guidelines. The Court found that the guidelines were the service of "public interest, convenience, or necessity," and that those guidelines were constitutionally sufficient. The Court concluded that the Chain Broadcasting Regulations were simply the particularization of the Commission's conception of the "public interest" sought to be safeguarded by Congress in enacting the Communications Act. ==Context==