National Resistance Front

A mountainous region, Panjshir was a formidable base of operations for anti-Soviet fighters and later for the original Northern Alliance. In July 2021, during the 2021 Taliban offensive, the remnants of the Northern Alliance began mobilizing under an umbrella. On 9 September, the NRF announced that a parallel government will be created in response to the Taliban's formation of its government in Kabul. On 1 November, it was reported that the NRF has opened a liaison office in Washington, D.C. after being registered with the US Justice Department in order to carry out lobbying missions to various politicians working in the city. On 23 November, Sibghatullah Ahmadi was appointed as the new spokesman of the NRF. The position was previously held by Muhammad Fahim Dashti, who was killed during the Taliban offensive into Panjshir on 5 September. Ahmadi served in this capacity until his resignation in August 2023. Ali Nazary, the Head of Foreign Relations, subsequently became the most prominent and quoted spokesperson for the NRF in international forums, including the Vienna Process for a Democratic Afghanistan in 2025. On 1 September 2024, Ahmad Massoud claimed in an interview that the NRF has 5,000 fighters. Massoud also highlighted the NRF's operational shift to guerrilla warfare due to the Taliban seizing approximately $8 billion worth of sophisticated U.S. military equipment during the withdrawal. Political rifts within the broader opposition led to the NRF and Jamiat-e Islami suspending cooperation with the National Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan in 2024. On 6 September 2021, the Taliban claimed victory in controlling the province. The NRF, however, denied the Taliban victory, stating they continued to hold positions across the valley. Since then, the NRF has not controlled any territory but has continued to carry out hit and run guerrilla attacks. Although the NRF claimed over 380 successful operations in 2024, analysts confirm that these remain low-intensity attacks that have not yet achieved the ability to "change the balance of power" nationally. Baghlan and operational focus On 20 August 2021, a group of anti-Taliban forces was organised in Baghlan Province, headed by Abdul Hamid Dadgar. The NRF's operational focus has consistently shifted from Panjshir towards the Andarab valley in Baghlan and surrounding Northern provinces (Parwan, Takhar). NRF leaders emphasize that these areas, due to their mountainous terrain, are crucial for sustaining the long-term guerrilla insurgency against the Taliban's administrative control. Overseas work and geopolitics On 16 September 2022, Ahmad Massoud urged fellow Afghanstanis living overseas to work together to find a way to end Taliban rule and bring them back to negotiations. On 30 November – 1 December 2022, Karen Decker, charge d'affaires of the U.S. mission to Afghanistan, attended a meeting with anti-Taliban figures in Tajikistan. On 18 February 2025, NRF leadership attended the fifth Vienna Process Conference for a Democratic Afghanistan in Austria, which brought together over 90 participants from anti-Taliban factions. The conference emphasized the NRF's commitment to a political solution centered on a national dialogue and a political roadmap for Afghanistan. The NRF also employs a diplomatic strategy aimed at raising international concerns over Afghanistan becoming a "global terrorist haven" under the Taliban, thereby pressuring global powers to withdraw recognition and support from the de facto authorities. The Taliban's increased diplomatic activity and efforts to normalize relations with neighboring countries have complicated the NRF's ability to maintain secure "safe havens" and logistical routes in the region, particularly through Central Asian states such as Tajikistan. ==Presence==

As of late 2024, the National Resistance Front (NRF) asserts a widespread organizational and operational presence across approximately 20 provinces of Afghanistan. This presence is overwhelmingly characterized by a strategy of guerrilla (hit-and-run) attacks rather than sustained territorial control. The provinces where the NRF is reported to have fighters present include Panjshir, Baghlan, Parwan, Kapisa,Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunar, Kunduz, Kabul, Laghman, Nangahar, Nuristan, Samangan, Balkh, Badghis, Ghor, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, and Sar-i-Pul. However, analysts note that the operational tempo in the western and southern provinces (such as Farah and Nimroz) largely consists of low-intensity networking and infiltration rather than high-intensity combat. == Foreign support ==

Iran Since 2021, some sources have claimed that Iran has provided economic, military and other assistance to the NRF as a counterweight to the Islamic Emirate; for example, NRF commanders Ahmad Massoud and Amrullah Saleh have been hosted in Iran. Analysts at the Middle East Institute suggest that Tehran maintains covert logistical support and permits the political activity of NRF leaders as a strategic "leverage card" against the Taliban, particularly regarding border and water disputes, and shared concerns over IS-KP activity. Persian-language media accuses Iran of pursuing outdated interventionist policies and attempting to turn Afghanistan into a proxy battlefield for the so-called "Axis of Resistance". "This dual policy of ostensibly engaging with the Islamic Emirate while simultaneously reinforcing the opposition movement... reflects the Iranian government's confusion and strategic weaknesses". Pakistan Since 2024, following Pakistan's tensions with the Taliban, several sources have asserted that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) may have established covert relations with the NRF. Analysts asserted Pakistan may have been backing the NRF as payback for the Taliban backing the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This represented a significant strategic pivot where the two groups found temporary and tactical alignment against a shared enemy. On 23 January 2025, the Afghan Taliban claimed that "terrorists" (members of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan) were being deployed by Pakistan to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan in order to conduct attacks inside Afghanistan. On that same day, six Pakistan Taliban insurgents, who were attempting to infiltrate the border, were killed by Pakistani forces in Zhob District. NRF foreign relations head Ali Nazary strongly condemned the 2025 Jaffar Express hijacking and expressed condolences to the people of Pakistan and the families of the victims. He also held the Taliban responsible for harbouring the militants (referring to the Balochistan Liberation Army) responsible for the attack, accusing them of contributing to the growing instability in the region. In early 2025, NRF member Abdul Hafiz Mansoor stated that Pakistan had approached the NRF for negotiations and that the NRF welcomed the decision. During the 2025 Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict in October, the NRF released a statement in support of the Pakistani strikes against the Taliban on X (formerly Twitter). The NRF itself claimed responsibility for an attack on 15 October, assassinating Qari Bashir, the deputy head of the Taliban's Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in Kunduz. In midst of the 2026 Pakistan–Afghanistan war, the NRF released a statement on Twitter (now known as X) claiming responsibility for an attack on Taliban security forces saying: Tajikistan Tajikistan, which has officially designated the Taliban as a terrorist organization since 2021, has been accused to be the main supporter of the NRF. Tajikistan continues to be the NRF's most critical political sanctuary, allowing the former Afghanistan embassy in Dushanbe to remain in the hands of the previous government (closely aligned with the NRF) and hosting opposition political conferences. Since 2025, relations between the two sides have eased, and Tajikistani officials have issued statements saying they do not support the Taliban opposition. Despite pressure from both the Taliban and Russia, Tajikistan has resisted fully normalizing relations with the Islamic Emirate, maintaining the NRF as an ongoing, though undeclared, political asset. Other foreign support and funding In the absence of direct military aid from any major state, the NRF relies on a complex network of support for its survival and operations. The primary and most stable source of financial support for the NRF comes from the Afghanistani diaspora residing in the West (US, Canada, Europe). Funds are channeled through private networks and the traditional Hawala system to finance fighter necessities and logistics. The NRF's supply of arms depends largely on stockpiles from the previous government and purchases from the regional black market, often facilitated by corrupt Taliban personnel and smuggling networks near the Pakistan and Central Asian borders. The NRF has also formed an operational and political union with the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), aimed at consolidating military efforts and presenting a more unified opposition front in political forums. == Analysis ==

Early challenges Following the fall of Kabul, many international observers expressed skepticism regarding the long-term viability of the NRF. Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan Dmitry Zhirnov labelled the resistance as "doomed" and that the resistance would fail, adding that they have "no military prospects". According to The Economist, the resistance's cause looked "forlorn". Early concerns focused on the likelihood of NRF fighters being outmatched by the Taliban, who had captured Western-made military weapons. Analyst Bill Roggio argued that the Panjshir resistance's "prospects are bleak," while Afghani specialist Gilles Dorronsoro suggested the Taliban could easily enforce a lockdown, as the NRF was not a major threat. Survival and strategic shift Subsequent analysis in 2024–2025 challenged the initial predictions of the NRF's immediate failure. Despite the loss of territorial control, the NRF's survival demonstrated the viability of a permanent shift toward classic guerrilla warfare across multiple northern provinces. This has turned the NRF into a persistent, but not existential, security challenge for the Taliban. The move from holding territory to decentralized "hit-and-run" operations and reliance on small arms and IEDs has enabled longevity against the Taliban's heavier equipment. The vital need for the NRF to act as a broad coalition (as suggested by David Loyn) was confirmed by the AFF alliance and continued political engagement in forums such as the Vienna Process. Contrary to the ambassadorial dismissal, Russia's continued political tolerance for the NRF is now viewed as a calculated strategy, preserving the NRF as an "anti-ISIS leverage card" against the Taliban to serve Moscow's security interests. == Military structure and operations ==

Following the loss of Panjshir in 2021, the NRF restructured itself into a decentralized guerrilla force estimated to consist of 2,000 to 5,000 active fighters, mainly composed of former Afghanistan Army and police personnel. The NRF's logistics are entirely dependent on financial aid from the diaspora, used to purchase small arms and ammunition from the regional black market and through corrupt Taliban personnel. Reports also suggest NRF and allied forces generate limited internal funds through unofficial "taxes" or compulsory donations in their influence zones. == Political platform and ideology ==

The NRF's political platform is centered on reversing the Taliban's centralized governance model. The NRF advocates for a non-centralized political system, with a strong preference for a federal structure to ensure equitable power distribution among Afghanistan's diverse ethnic groups in order to prevent single-group dominance. The resistance insists on the establishment of a truly inclusive government that respects the democratic and civil rights of all citizens, particularly the rights of women and ethnic minorities. Abdullah Khenjani heads the NRF's political bureau, in concert with Ali Maisam Nazary who engages in diplomatic lobbying in Europe (such as Germany and France) and the United States, positioning the NRF as the main political alternative to the Taliban and attempting to prevent international recognition of the Islamic Emirate. == Human rights context and civilian impact ==

While the NRF benefits from strong support among the ethnic groups of the former Northern Alliance, particularly the diaspora, continued operations also pose a challenge: civilians face pressure both from Taliban reprisals and the logistical demands of the guerrilla fighters. == Notes ==