Korean Central Intelligence Agency The agency's origins can be traced back to the Korean Counterintelligence Corps (KCIC), formed during the
Korean War. The KCIA was founded on 13 June 1961 by
Kim Jong-pil, who drew much of the organization's initial 3,000-strong membership from the KCIC. Kim, a
Korean Military Academy graduate and nephew of
Park Chung Hee by marriage, is also credited with masterminding the
1961 coup d'État that installed Park before he was elected president of Korea. President Park's government extensively used the intelligence service to suppress and disrupt anti-government or pro–
North Korean or other pro-communist movements, including the widespread student protests on university campuses and the activities of overseas Koreans. The KCIA developed a reputation for interfering in domestic politics and international affairs beyond its jurisdiction. The KCIA's original charter, the Act Concerning Protection of Military Secrets, was designed to oversee the coordination of activities related to counterespionage and national security, but a majority of its activities and budget were devoted to things unrelated to its original charter. In 1968, KCIA agents kidnapped 17 Koreans living in
West Germany. They were transported back to Seoul, where they were tortured and brought up on charges of having violated the National Security Law by engaging in pro-Northern activities. The victims became a
cause célèbre as the kidnapping created a firestorm of international criticism that almost brought the West German government to break off diplomatic relations with South Korea. It further served as a harbinger when the much-publicised kidnapping of a dissident,
Kim Dae-jung—who would later become the president of Korea and the country's first
Nobel Peace Prize recipient, in 2000—took place in 1973 off the coast of a Japanese resort town. The KCIA's virtually unlimited and completely unchecked power to arrest and detain any person on any charge created a climate of extreme fear and repression. The frequent detention and torture of students,
dissidents, opposition figures, communists,
reporters, or anyone perceived to be critical of the government was symptomatic of the Park presidency and the subsequent administration. In another departure from its original charter, the KCIA's assumptive role as political machine extraordinaire and domination of the country's political life began to take on even more bizarre forms such as exercising a free hand in drafting the
South Korean constitution and acting as a political fundraiser for the incumbent party. In addition to its presumptive intelligence and
secret police role, which was ostensibly authorized by its original charter, it also became, by default, through a network of agents at home and abroad, the
de facto attorney general and
inspector general of the South Korean government. Domestically, the KCIA made itself the
philanthropical arm of the government by being an avid supporter of the
arts, promoter of tourism, and purveyor of national culture. The KCIA is known to have raised funds through
extortion and
stock market manipulation, which were in turn used to
bribe and cajole companies, individuals and even foreign governments, as happened during the
Koreagate scandal in the United States in 1976. Investigations by United States Congressman
Donald M. Fraser found the KCIA to have funneled bribes and favors through Korean businessman
Tongsun Park in an attempt to gain favor and influence in
Washington, D.C.; some 115
Members of Congress were implicated in the affair.
Agency for National Security Planning In 1979, the agency's
director,
Kim Jae-kyu,
assassinated President
Park Chung Hee during a dinner. In the aftermath, the KCIA was
purged, with Kim and five others being executed, and temporarily lost much of its power. The new director,
Chun Doo-hwan, used his tenure from April to July 1980 to expand his power base beyond the military, and the organization was renamed the
Agency for National Security Planning in 1981, with its powers redefined in presidential orders and legislation. In the presidential election held in December 2012, NIS committed a serious crime by secretly helping
Park Geun-hye's campaign, according to the Korean police investigation report. Korean prosecutors investigated the incident. in February 2015, Won was convicted on charges of instructing NIS officials to manipulate internet comments and was sentenced to three years in prison. After an appeal, the conviction was overturned. In a second trial in 2017, Won was sentenced to four years in prison. The Supreme Court upheld the sentence in April 2018. When Moon Jae-in won the 2017 election, his administration pursued nine additional charges of political interference against Won, resulting in a subsequent 7 year jail sentence in 2020. In August of 2017, the NIS formally acknowledged that it was involved in the election manipulation after an internal inquiry. In 2015, Hacking Team's breached data showed that NIS purchased spyware from Hacking Team. An agent related to the hack was found dead in an apparent suicide. In his note, he said that the agency didn't spy on civilians or on political reactions related to 2012's presidential election.
National Intelligence Service In 1999, it was officially renamed the National Intelligence Service. According to its official publications, the NIS is divided into three directorates:
International affairs,
Domestic affairs, and
North Korean affairs. Its current officially stated mission assigns the NIS responsibility for the: • ''Collection, coordination, and distribution of information on the nation's strategy and security.'' • ''Maintenance of documents, materials, and facilities related to the nation's classified information.'' •
Investigation of crimes affecting national security, such as the Military Secrecy Protection Law and the National Security Law. •
Investigation of crimes related to the missions of NIS staff. •
Planning and coordination of information and classified. The election of
Roh Moo-hyun to the
South Korean presidency in 2003 brought more concerted efforts to reform the agency. Roh appointed
Ko Young-koo, a former
human rights lawyer, to the position of
director, expressing a desire to find "someone who will set the agency straight". The anti-
communist bureau of the agency was slated to be eliminated, and many domestic intelligence and surveillance activities were either abandoned or transferred to national
police forces. In December 2008, it was alleged by the official media arm of North Korea, the
Korean Central News Agency, that a NIS-trained North Korean citizen had been apprehended as part of a plot to assassinate
Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader. Both the NIS and the South Korean government denied any involvement. The NIS officially admitted in 2011 that it wiretapped
Gmail accounts of South Korean citizens in the
South Korean Constitutional Court. The 2012 budget for the NIS could potentially get cut as it had shown its inefficiencies. In 2016, a prosecutors' investigation turned up evidence that the NIS has been effectively orchestrating the activities of conservative groups since the administration of former president
Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013). The evidence shows that the NIS has been involved not only in political advertisements that conservative groups have run in newspapers but also in their plans to hold one-person protests and to hand out pamphlets: "An agent surnamed Park who was on the NIS's psychological warfare team supported and supervised right-wing conservative organizations and right-wing youth organizations." On 13 December 2020, the
National Security Law was amended. This law, adopted in 1948, was designed to protect the country from North Korean threats. It stated that South Korean citizens could not praise, sympathise, correspond or aid North Koreans. However, this law has been said to have allowed the NIS to violate some important human rights, such as the forcing of confessions, as well as conducting "
anti-communist" investigations. This law allowed authorities to imprison someone for up to seven years for simply possessing a book relating to North Korean ideologies. The law also extended to punishing "anti-governmental organizations", allowing the NIS to punish civilians who spoke out against or had differing ideals to the government, breaching their right to the
freedom of speech. Due to the continuous threat from North Korea, there are concerns that amending this law would further exacerbate this issue. Despite this amendment, there are still major concerns that the NIS will continue to breach human rights. Even though the amendment forbids the NIS from conducting criminal investigations, it still allows the collection of information on anyone violating the National Security Law. In June 2018, three former NIS directors (Lee Byung-kee, Lee Byung-ho, and Nam Jae-joon) who served in the
Park administration were found guilty of bribery, related to the
2016 Park Geun-hye scandals. They illegally transferred money from the NIS budget to Park's presidential office without any approval or oversight from the National Assembly. This illegally obtained money was used by Park and her associates for private use and to pay bribes. On 14 December 2020, the National Assembly passed a bill that transferred investigation authority of the NIS into North Korean activities in South Korea to the Korean National Police Agency. On 2 February 2024, the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the
Defense Counterintelligence Command (DCC) are investigating whether Indonesian engineers dispatched to KAI violated the Defense Technology Security Act for allegedly attempting to leak
KF-21 jet fighter technical data outside after storing it on an unauthorized
USB drive. In July 2025, it was reported that NIS has stopped broadcasting five radio channels and one TV channel to North Korea. == Related South Korean legislative bodies ==