Like other
disruptive innovations, neurotechnologies have the potential for profound social and legal repercussions, and as such their development and introduction to society raise a series of ethical questions.
Identity Identity in this context refers to
personal continuity, described as
bodily and mental integrity and their persistence over time. In other words, it is the individual's
self-narrative and concept of self. While disruption of identity is not a common goal for neurotechnologies, some techniques can create unwanted shifts that range in severity. For instance, deep brain stimulation is commonly used as treatment for
Parkinson's disease but can have side effects that touch on the concept of identity, such as loss of voice modulation, increased impulsivity or feelings of self-estrangement. In the case of neural prostheses and brain-computer interfaces, the shift may take the form of an extension of one's sense of self, potentially incorporating the device as an integral part of oneself or expanding the range of sensory and cognitive channels available to the user beyond the traditional
senses. Part of the difficulty in determining which changes constitute a threat to identity is rooted in its dynamic nature: since one's personality and concept of self is expected to change with time as a result of emotional development and lived experience, it is not easy to identify clear criteria and draw a line between acceptable shifts and problematic changes. This becomes even harder when dealing with neurotechnologies aimed at influencing psychological processes—such as those designed to recude the symptoms of depression or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by modulating emotional states or saliency of memories to ease a patient's pain. Even helping a patient remember, which would seemingly help preserve identity, can be a delicate question: "Forgetting is also important to how a person navigates the world, since it allows the opportunity for both losing track of embarrassing or difficult memories, and focusing on future-oriented activity. Efforts to enhance identity through memory preservation thus run the risk of inadvertently damaging a valuable, if less consciously-driven cognitive process." agency is commonly understood as the individual's ability to consciously make and communicate a decision or choice. While identity and agency are distinct, an impairment in agency can in turn undermine personal identity: the subject may no longer be able to substantially modify their own self-narrative, and may therefore lose their ability to contribute to the dynamic process of identity formation. This can also be the case, paradoxically, for those neurotechnologies designed to restore agency to patients, such as neural prostheses and BCI-mediated
assistive technology like wheelchairs or
computer accessibility tools. Because these devices often operate by interpreting sensory inputs or the user's neural data in order to estimate the individual's intention and respond according to it, estimation margins can lead to inaccurate or undesired responses that may threaten agency: "If the agent's intent and the device's output can come apart (think of how the auto-correct function in texting sometimes misinterprets the user's intent and sends problematic text messages), the user's sense of agency may be undermined." This term is important in many ethical circles concerned with the state and goals of progress in the field of neurotechnology (see
neuroethics). Current improvements such as "brain fingerprinting" or lie detection using EEG or fMRI could give rise to a set fixture of loci/emotional relationships in the brain, although these technologies are still years away from full application. It is important to consider how all these neurotechnologies might affect the future of society, and it is suggested that political, scientific, and civil debates are heard about the implementation of these newer technologies that potentially offer a new wealth of once-private information. Some ethicists are also concerned with the use of TMS and fear that the technique could be used to alter patients in ways that are undesired by the patient.
Cognitive liberty Cognitive liberty refers to a suggested right to
self-determination of individuals to control their own mental processes, cognition, and consciousness including by the use of various neurotechnologies and psychoactive substances. This perceived right is relevant for reformation and development of associated laws. == See also ==