The court's decision was unanimous, but four separate opinions were published. The majority opinion, by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, held that the courts may not review the impeachment and trial of a federal officer because the
Constitution reserves that function to a coordinate political branch.
Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution gives the
Senate the "sole power to try all impeachments." Because of the word
sole it is clear that the judicial branch was not to be included. Furthermore, because the word
try was originally understood to include factfinding committees, there was a textually demonstrable commitment to give broad discretion to the Senate in impeachments. Furthermore, the
Framers believed that representatives of the people should try impeachments, and the Court was too small to justly try impeachments. Also, the judicial branch is "
checked" by impeachments, so judicial involvement in impeachments might violate the doctrine of the
separation of powers. The Court further ruled that involving the judiciary would prevent finality without clear remedy and bias post-impeachment criminal or civil prosecutions, which the Constitution explicitly allows. Justices
Byron White,
Harry Blackmun, and
David Souter concurred, but voiced concern that the Court was foreclosing the area for review. While they found that the Senate had done all that was constitutionally required, they were concerned that the Court should have the power to review cases in which the Senate removed an impeached officer summarily without a hearing, or through some arbitrary process such as "a
coin toss." An important feature of this case is how it diverges from
Powell v. McCormack (1969). In
Powell, a grant of discretionary power to Congress was deemed to be
justiciable because it required a mere "interpretation" of the Constitution. ==See also==