As US officials began to see the inefficiencies in secrecy over nuclear information sharing in the early 1950s, they began initiatives for law, policy and system changes that broadened
nuclear sharing capacity. The
National Security Council developed NSC 151/2 which included policy to share information on nuclear weapons with particular NATO members. Towards the end of 1953, President
Eisenhower called for an increase in sharing of nuclear technology for civilian purposes during his speech "
Atoms for Peace" addressing the
United Nations. The speech directly led to changes to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 , a major advocate for the development of the Nuclear Planning Group. In addition to these policy changes, even more initiatives were taken to advance nuclear sharing. After the end of the Eisenhower administration in 1961, the idea of the
Multilateral Force (MLF) was proposed by US officials which called for the sharing of nuclear weapons that would be assigned to NATO and controlled by NATO nations. The hope of this proposal was to combat the fear of shortfalls in
medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe. During this period,
West Germany was interested in the alliance's nuclear affairs and wanted to gain greater influence, but other NATO members feared that West Germany's complete control of nuclear weapons would antagonize European nations and the Soviet Union. The MLF would have provided nuclear weapons jointly controlled by all NATO members, and addressing this issue. Much of
John F. Kennedy's administration advocated for the MLF and by December 1962, the groundwork for the system was established. Despite the Kennedy administration's advocacy for the MLF, this system was also met with much skepticism. The French president,
Charles de Gaulle, rejected the proposal of the idea in January 1963 as he felt that France would not benefit from depending on the United States to supply them with nuclear weapons nor relying on the United States to control nuclear weapons. Britain also felt that it would not be beneficial to incur the extra cost of the new system for such insignificant benefits. Finally, West Germany's chancellor,
Konrad Adenauer also doubted the effectiveness of the MLF. With such opposition, the MLF was never adopted. The demise of the MLF proposal gave rise to the Nuclear Planning Group. US Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara saw the need for a different approach to nuclear sharing and supported a committee made up of NATO members. This would help with improving communication, consultation, and involvement among NATO members with the sharing of nuclear information instead of nuclear weapons as the MLF had proposed. McNamara helped to create a "select committee" of alliance members that would be set up at the ministerial level with the goal of facilitating more consultation and increasing member involvement on matters related to nuclear policy. This committee eventually grew into the "Special Committee on Nuclear Consultation" containing 10 Allied members. This committee was made up of a committee on crisis management, communication, and nuclear planning with the nuclear planning committee being the only committee organized at the ministerial level. The Nuclear Planning Committee consisted of the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and one representative from the other members. The first meeting of this committee in Washington, D.C., in February 1966 saw success in informing members of US nuclear plans, deterrence policies, and understanding of Soviet nuclear capabilities. Later that year, the Nuclear Planning Committee was further split into two sections. One section was the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and the other section was the Nuclear Planning Group. == Structure ==