Development of the Nuremberg–Munich line The first continuous rail connection between Nuremberg and Munich was completed in 1849. The Nuremberg–Augsburg section ran over the
central section of the Ludwig South-North Railway built between 1843 and 1849 via
Gunzenhausen,
Nördlingen and
Donauwörth to
Augsburg (170 kilometres). The
Munich–Augsburg railway (62 kilometres) was completed by the
Munich–Augsburg Railway Company in 1840. The first route of over 232 kilometres between Nuremberg and Munich meant than the line was 82 kilometres longer than the straight-line distance of 149.6 kilometres between the two main stations. The line was determined by the costs, transport demand and political goals of the 19th century, with scarce capital and limited technical choices. For the steam locomotives, which were comparatively slow by modern standards, a route that adapted to the mostly hilly terrain with numerous curves was sufficient. As early as 14 May 1863, Ludwig Joseph Freiherr von Brück, Director General of the Royal Bavarian Transport Authorities (
Generaldirektor der Königlich Bayerischen Verkehrsanstalten), emphasised in a memorandum to
King Maximilian II the need for a direct connection between the two largest Bavarian cities as the "first and next need" and "the natural beginning of the entire railway system". The Munich–Ingolstadt railway was opened in 1867 and extended to Treuchtlingen in 1870. Between 1870 and 1906 long-distance trains between Munich and Nuremberg used this line, with a total length of 198 kilometres. With the commissioning of the
Donauwörth–Treuchtlingen railway, the line between Nuremberg and Augsburg was reduced to 137 kilometres in 1906, and between Nuremberg and Munich to 199 km. After this shortening, Augsburg was again served by north-south traffic.
Initial situation locomotive runs through a tight curve in a deep cutting on the
Donauwörth–Treuchtlingen line. In the 1980s, the options for expanding the existing routes had been exhausted in many places: Intercity services reached 200 km/h on upgraded lines. The Augsburg-Oberhausen – Bäumeheim – (Donauwörth) (32.8 kilometres) and Munich-Lochhausen – Augsburg-Hochzoll (42.7 kilometres) sections had already been upgraded for this speed. At the end of May 1981, a total of 256.3 kilometres of track sections could be operated at 200 km/h. This project was included in the 1977 Coordinated Investment Program (
Koordinierten Investitionsprogramm) as well as in the 1980 Federal Transport Plan (
Bundesverkehrswegeplan). On 3 August 1983, the Nuremberg
railway division of the then
Deutsche Bundesbahn presented the DB headquarters with an initial proposal for a new rail link between Nuremberg and Munich. The economic
cost–benefit ratio for the project was 1.2. • option 1 (via Ingolstadt): new line between Nuremberg and Ingolstadt, 75 kilometres with a maximum speed of 250 km/h, 59 kilometres at 200 km/h, addition of an additional track to the line between Munich-Obermenzing and Petershausen, location of the new line parallel to the autobahn to the south of Stammham, where it merges with the existing Munich–Treuchtlingen line. • option 2 (via Augsburg): from Nuremberg via Fischbach on existing tracks; from there with the so-called S-Bahn replacement route to Kornburg bundled with the Autobahn 6, then a bend to the south and a bundled course with the Rhein-Main-Danube Canal and the
B2. After crossing the
Rednitz valley, it merges with the existing Nuremberg line near Büchenbach–Treuchtlingen. Large-scale rerouting of the existing line was planned north of Georgensgmünd and north and south of Pleinfeld; minor extensions were planned for the Treuchtlingen–Donauwörth line; larger route shifts would take place at Otting and Mündling. For capacity reasons, a new section was to be built between Augsburg and Mering. Of a total of 207 kilometres, 140 kilometres were designed for 200 km/h. • option 3: Like option 2, but with a new line between Roth and Donauwörth. This NBS would have exited the Fischbach–Roth S-Bahn replacement route north of Roth and would have bypassed Roth to the west. From Georgensgmünd, this route would have run east of the existing line to Pleinfeld parallel to a high-voltage line. Weißenburg and Treuchtlingen would have been bypassed to the west. South of Treuchtlingen, from Möhren to north of Wörnitzstein, the existing line would have been affected, then line improvements in the Wörnitz valley. Longer sections of the existing route would have been abandoned after line improvements had been made. 203 kilometres total length, of which around 65 kilometres cleared for 250 km/h and 94 kilometres for 200 km/h. • option 4: Nuremberg–Roth as option 2. North of Georgensgmünd and north and south of Pleinfeld line rebuilding with large-scale departures from the existing line. New line from south of Weißenburg to the east. Confluence with the existing Munich–Treuchtlingen line southwest of Obereichstaett; extensive tunnelling of the new line. Upgrade of the line between Obereichstaett and Ingolstadt. Ingolstadt-Munich like option 1. Of the total of around 191 kilometres, 126 kilometres should be designed for at least 200 km/h. • option 5: Nuremberg–Treuchtlingen as for variant 2, then: Treuchtlingen–Ingolstadt acceleration and further retention of the existing route. Extensive conversion between Obereichstaett and Ingolstadt. Ingolstadt–Munich like variant 1. Of a total of 205 kilometers, 104 kilometers would have been designed for 200 km/h. • option 6: Nuremberg – Postbauer-Heng – Ingolstadt – Munich. In order to keep the section of the new line as short as possible, the existing line between Nuremberg and Postbauer-Heng was to be used and partially upgraded. The new line would start at Postbauer-Heng and run through the Sulz valley through an open area towards the Altmühl valley. To the east of Kinding, the line would have crossed the Altmühl valley and the section running parallel with the autobahn would have been reached at Buch. From here the route would have been as in option 1. 59 kilometres of the total 174 kilometres of the route would have been designed for 250 km/h and 59 kilometres for 200 km/h. This option was affected by numerous constraints (particularly buildings). • option 7: Nuremberg – Neumarkt – Ingolstadt – Munich. As with option 6, the Nuremberg–Regensburg line would have been used as far as Neumarkt. The new line should initially run along the existing
Neumarkt–Dietfurt railway. The new line was to run through the Sulz valley, touching on Mühlhausen and Berching. North of Beilngries, the new line would have turned west to leave the Sulz valley. The Altmühl valley would have been crossed east of Kinding (as in option 6) to then run parallel with the autobahn. The rest of the route would have been like option 1. 57 kilometres of the 180 kilometres would have been designed for 250 km/h and 59 kilometres for 200 km/h. • option 8 (Nuremberg – Sengenthal – Ingolstadt – Munich) would have run like option 6, but via Neumarkt to Sengenthal. South of Sengenthal, the line was to run east of the Sulz valley to the south through open ground. North of Beilngries the line would have run to the west. Further on, the line would have run like option 7 and would finally run parallel with the autobahn as in option 1. Of 180 kilometres, 51 kilometres would have been designed for 250 km/h and 59 kilometres for 200 km/h. Options 3 to 8 were discarded in 1987. Considerations for upgrading the route from Würzburg via Ansbach and Treuchtlingen to Augsburg had already been discarded in 1983 to avoid bypassing the Nuremberg metropolitan area as a transport and economic centre. The planned new line, on the other hand, was intended to improve the connection between the greater Nuremberg area and north-south traffic.
Route dispute While the need for a faster connection was generally undisputed, the planned route in particular, as well its effects on the ecosystem and landscape, caused intensive discussions. The proposed new and upgraded line met with broad approval from numerous social groups, especially in the Nuremberg area, but also in other parts of Bavaria. The new line in the
administrative district of Swabia was clearly rejected, in particular by the city of Augsburg and its chamber of commerce, as well as by the
Bund Naturschutz in Bayern ("Federation of Nature Conservation of Bavaria") and the citizens' initiative
Das bessere Bahnkonzept ("The Better Railway Concept"). They favoured an upgrade of the existing route via Augsburg, later also using tilting technology. The results were presented to the Bavarian government on 29 June 1987. The government forwarded the report to its subordinate authorities, chambers of industry and commerce and the Bund Naturschutz for comments. On 2 and 3 May 1988, the Bavarian Ministry of Economics and Transport organised a discussion between these groups and Deutsche Bundesbahn. In a decision of 19 July 1988, the Bavarian government gave preference to the route via Ingolstadt. and the spatial planning procedure was initiated. Six options were examined in the Nuremberg–Ingolstadt corridor, including a route to the west of the realised variant, via Pfahldorf, with a connection to the Munich–Treuchtlingen railway line near Gaimersheim. The traffic forecast for the Federal Transport Routes Plan 1992 provided for 44 long-distance passenger and 38 freight trains per day and direction in 2010 on the new line. In mid-1994, Deutsche Bahn calculated—now taking into account the segregation of fast and slow traffic—with 42 long-distance passenger trains and 20 freight trains. The route—via Ingolstadt—was included in the Federal Railways Expansion Act (BSchwAG) of 15 November 1993 in the version of 27 December 1993. Deutsche Bundesbahn repeatedly emphasized that the costs of such a solution would be underestimated, but the benefits would be overestimated. Furthermore, with the necessary construction during ongoing operations, long-term deterioration in operational quality was to be expected. The capacity of an upgrade only option was also not sufficient, the route length via Augsburg was at least 28 kilometres longer.
Construction of the high-speed line The design planning began after the conclusion of the spatial planning process on 19 May 1991. On 29 May 1992, the first planning approval process was initiated on the basis of the documents created by the Main Department for New Lines of the Federal Railway Directorate in Nuremberg. In mid-1994, the planning approval process for the new line was expected to be completed by 1995, while the process for the upgraded line was expected to be completed by 1996. The new line was divided into 14 planning approval sections and two for the long-distance traction power lines. Up to 300 objections were raised by citizens in the individual procedures for the planning approval sections. Of a total of around 40 lawsuits and summary proceedings against the administrative acts, none led to success. The
Bund Naturschutz in Bayern (BN) repeatedly opposed the line as a whole, in particular with reference to the upgrade option via Augsburg and the ecological impact of the new line. The environmental association stated, among other things, that the line was not objectively necessary for the public good. Among other things, the Bavarian Administrative Court dismissed complaints brought by the BN in a joint judgment and order dated 29 March 1996 and 10 January 1997. In the course of planning, the
ETCS According to DB information, karstification of this magnitude was not expected. A total of 746 pieces of land were purchased. The developed area was around 446 hectares, while the ecological compensation areas were 294 hectares. Seven buildings were demolished for the line (as of 1992). in 1997. A construction period of 53 months was planned for the new line to be completed, including around 15 months for the technical equipment. Commissioning was planned for the 2003 summer timetable. According to DB information, the short construction period forced construction to start quickly, which would have adversely affected preparation for the work. There was no time for cost optimisation, synergy effects would hardly have been achieved due to the many necessarily parallel work. This led to a shortage of experienced permanent staff at the construction companies. Three separate, smaller construction lots covered the connecting areas in Nuremberg (Reichswald junction) and Ingolstadt (Audi tunnel lots and Ingolstadt node). During the construction phase there were 157 plan change procedures (as of October 2005). To speed up and simplify the planning process, a uniform
EDP system was used by all those involved, which used electronic signatures, among other things. In July 2003, the contract for the line's safety technology was awarded to Siemens.
Planungsgesellschaft Bahnbau Deutsche Einheit ("German Unity Railway Construction Planning Company") was commissioned with the project management of the new and upgraded line in 1996, effective January 1997, and set up a project centre in Nuremberg for this purpose.
DB ProjektBau later took over this function.
Construction On 15 July 1994, the ground-breaking ceremony for the extension of the railway bridge over Breslauer Straße took place in the Altenfurt district of Nuremberg. Bavarian Minister-president
Edmund Stoiber, State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Transport Wilhelm Knittel and
Deutsche Bahn chairman
Heinz Dürr symbolically pressed a button. Planning and financing of the entire line had not yet been completed at this time. The access route in Nuremberg was rebuilt over a length of five kilometres and the Reichswald junction was built from 1997 to 1999. Large-scale construction work in the new section began after the contract was placed at the end of 1998, and by March 1999 clearing work and archaeological preliminary investigations were largely completed. When the large-scale construction work started, it was assumed that the construction work would end in February 2003. At the beginning of 2001, it was clear that the planned completion date of the end of 2003 would be delayed by a year or two. which was completed in May 2001. Numerous problems arose during the construction of the tunnels, which required extensive design changes and had a significant impact on construction time and costs. Due to unexpected hydrological problems, Offenbau tunnel had to be built using a compressed air process. Large parts of Euerwang Tunnel also had to be made water tight. Denkendorf Tunnel was built after massive landslides tripled its length and was built in groundwater. Karst formations in the area of the Altmühlalb were particularly noteworthy, which could not be bypassed on a large scale due to the width to build the line parallel with the autobahn. In the Irlahüll, Geisberg and Stammham tunnels, karst caves had to be backfilled. By the autumn of 2004, the shells of all tunnels were completed. The slab track was installed between April 2004 and April 2005; installation of rail track was completed in May and overhead line and signalling technology in November 2005. The first low-speed test and measurement runs were carried out between the end of May and October. The RAILab
track geometry car was used, among other things, to check the track position, examine rails for material defects using ultrasound and measure the tunnel walls. On 13 September 2005, an ICE (
ICE TD) ran over the line at low speed for the first time. Up to 1800 people were simultaneously employed on the construction sites along the line. The preparation and execution of the commissioning were controlled by the PXN working group set up by the DB board of directors in August 2000 and headed by DB Personenverkehr.
Commissioning The line's "gap closure" ceremony took place in Kinding station on 13 May 2005. An 11 metre-long piece of rail was cut out in the north-eastern area of the station that morning and brought into the adjacent Schellenberg tunnel by excavator. In the afternoon, in the presence of several hundred guests, it was ceremoniously welded back into place. On 25 November 2005 at 10 a.m., the overhead line was energised for the first time. The electronic interlockings in Nuremberg-Fischbach went into operation on 28 November. At the end of November, the first continuous journeys were made with an
ICE TD and
218 and
ER20 class locomotives. High-speed test runs began on 1 December 2005. Top speeds of over 330 km/h were reached during the test and acceptance runs. In addition to the
ICE S, which at times was running with one or seven intermediate cars, the locomotives
103 235 with a sound measurement train and
120 502 with the
RAILab from
DB Systemtechnik. During the first test runs at high speed, a
tunnel boom occurred repeatedly at the portals of the Irlahüll and Euerwang tunnels. and delayed preparations for the line's commissioning. In April 2006, the staff training trips began, during which the train drivers undertook route familiarisation trips with
ICE 3 sets and carried out towing exercises. On 6 May 2006, a rescue exercise took place in the Euerwang Tunnel. The evacuation of an ICE with about 250 passengers was rehearsed through two emergency exits. A trial operation with several vehicles was carried out from 2 to 27 May. The official opening took place on 13 May under the motto
Bahn frei! Nürnberg–Ingolstadt–München – Bayerns schnellste Bahnachse (Clear the line! Nuremberg–Ingolstadt–Munich—Bavaria's fastest rail axis"). In the late morning, Bavaria's Economics Minister
Erwin Huber, Interior Minister
Günther Beckstein, Minister-president Edmund Stoiber, Federal Transport Minister
Wolfgang Tiefensee and the then CEO of Deutsche Bahn AG
Hartmut Mehdorn symbolically switched the exit signal from
Munich Hauptbahnhof to green. Two ICE 3 trains, each in double sets, then ran (from 11:34 a.m.) to Nuremberg, parallel for part of the line. The federal government would have taken over the construction and financing costs incurred by Deutsche Bahn at the latest from the time the system was commissioned. In mid-1994, the planned costs (prices as of 1 January 1993) were around DM 4 billion. This figure was based on the cost estimate of over DM 3.1 billion (1 January 1989 prices), compensated for the price increase and a "balance sheet surcharge". At that time, an economic feasibility study by the Federal Audit Office had been running for four years. Around DM 2 billion was spent on the new line and around DM 1 billion on the upgraded line. The private pre-financing was included in the financing agreement that was concluded on 19 December 1996 between the Ministry of Transport and Finance and Deutsche Bahn for a fixed price The amount of DM 3,870 million includes planning and administration costs as well as expenses of around €170 million for construction, land acquisition and planning that were incurred prior to the signing of the agreement. Federal funding for the slab track was limited to DM 1,400 per meter (€715.8/m), and the share of planning costs incurred after December 1996 was limited to ten percent of the total. These project costs did not include around €265 million contributed by third parties. This was used to finance the Allersberg, Kinding and Ingolstadt Nord stations, the removal of 14 level crossings between Ingolstadt and Munich, the expansion of park-and-ride facilities and the upgrade of the S-Bahn between Obermenzing and Dachau. By exhausting all possibilities when awarding the contract, the originally estimated costs of DM 4.05 billion were reduced to DM 3.87 billion (including price increases). Of this, DM 2.75 billion went to the new line, the rest to the upgraded line. The commissioning of the new and upgraded line was planned for 2003; the expanded S-Bahn between Obermenzing and Dachau was to follow in 2004. The federal government's right to withdraw from private pre-financing was contractually stipulated in the financing agreement, While the figure of €3.573 billion includes implemented and outstanding measures, the figure of €3.268 billion includes all costs actually incurred up to the end of 2007. In 2008, €31.3 million were spent on the project. The total costs incurred up to that point added up to €3,299.86 million. The planned total costs were €3,592 million in 2011 and €3,676 million in 2012 (as of 2012). or €13.8 million per track kilometre (prices as of: 2010). In the 1996 financing agreement, costs of €8 million per kilometre of new track were calculated. It was foreseeable that the agreed cost framework would be exceeded from 1999 On 6 December 2000, DB submitted a report to its supervisory board in which additional costs of at least DM 799 million were expected. Shortly thereafter, auditors determined a value of DM 1.6 billion. Of the expected unavoidable additional costs, DM 289 million was attributable to project development, DM 124 million for geological risks of the tunnel construction (which could only be assessed in 2000), and DM 119 million for control and safety technology as well as DM 112 million for fire and disaster protection. Since the federal government's share was fixed at around €2 billion, Deutsche Bahn bore the majority of the additional costs incurred, in 2004 over €450 million. The main reasons for the cost increases include geological problems in tunnel construction, extensive plan changes (especially improvements to the safety concept), increased environmental regulations and general wage and price increases. Delays in planning approval procedures on the upgraded section also contributed to the cost increases. According to the Federal Railway Authority, between 1998 and April 2001 pre-financing amounts of €790 million were raised, which were taken over in 2000 and 2001 through financing from the federal budget. The total pre-financing costs amounted to around €30 million. In its 2003 annual report, the Federal Court of Auditors also criticised the fact that the federal government had granted additional grants and interest-free loans in excess of the fixed amount. There are also additional expenses, e.g. incurred due to the federal government covering funding gaps in the existing network that arose as a result of the additional expenditure for major projects at Deutsche Bahn. The repayment amounts saved by switching from loans to construction cost subsidies from DB AG were also not fully invested in the existing network. The resulting additional burden on the federal government led to the delay of other construction projects. Due to the fact that no upgrades were carried out, additional costs were incurred due to the necessary replacement investments. Overall more than €600 million was added to the federal budget, so the core target of the agreed maximum amount of financing was missed. The auditors also criticised the fact that the budget legislature had not been included in the measures taken by the Ministry of Transport and that it was not possible to precisely determine the additional burden "due to the lack of transparency in the financing commitments". In 2008, the Federal Court of Auditors criticised the fact that the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development had already paid out the entire subsidy amount to Deutsche Bahn AG, although services worth around €60 million were still outstanding on the upgraded line. the taxpayers' association criticised the cost increases and emphasised that every minute of travel time reduction was bought for €65.2 million. An estimate from 1985 assumed costs of DM 1.9 billion for a new line for 250 km/h between Nuremberg and Ingolstadt.
Preliminary operation Between the start of operation on 28 May 2006 and the timetable change on 10 December 2006, a preliminary service ran. The shortest scheduled travel time between Nuremberg and Munich fell by 27 to 78 minutes. Only long-distance passenger trains ran at regular two-hour intervals, in particular the
ICE 3 on
line 41 (Dortmund/Essen–Nuremberg–Munich). The
ICE T on
line 28 (Munich–Berlin–Hamburg) and the ICE 926/927 trains on line 31 also operated at off-peak times, during peak hour and on weekends. The IC train pair
Karwendel (IC 2410/2411) also ran over the line on Saturdays. Since June 2005, a year before the new line was commissioned, several pairs of ICE 3 trains have been running on the old line via Treuchtlingen/Ingolstadt between Munich and Nuremberg, with a journey time of around two hours. In July 2006, the TGV POS was used on the new line to complete trials runs at up to 330 km/h for approval in Germany. The line was fully commissioned when the timetable changed on 10 December 2006.
World record run on 2 September 2006 On 2 September 2006, a Siemens locomotive of the
EuroSprinter 64 U4 class set a new world speed record for conventional electric locomotives. The 6,400 kilowatt multi-system locomotive reached the new record of 357.0 km/h on the second attempt at 4:03 p.m. near Hilpoltstein (Allersberg–Kinding section). It beat the record set by a French SNCF BB 9004 locomotive at 331 km/h on 29 March 1955, making it the fastest locomotive in the world. The top speed of 343.9 km/h at kilometre 34.3 was reached in the first attempt at around 3:15 p.m. The locomotive was in a largely standard condition, although some parts had been dismantled to improve air resistance. The locomotive had attached a measuring car from
DB Systemtechnik. The train protection systems (
LZB and
PZB) of the locomotive were switched off for both record runs, which took place on the eastern track heading towards Nuremberg; encounters with trains could also be ruled out with certainty. Therefore, the entire line in front of the train (up to around 50 kilometres) had to be free of trains. Since there was only one ICE line running regularly on the high-speed route until the timetable change on 10 December 2006, these requirements could be met without any disruption to passenger traffic. In long tunnels and along a noise barrier at kilometre 45, the maximum permissible speed for the tests was limited to 250 km/h and 285 km/h respectively. Three locations along the line were considered for a planned Nuremberg ICE plant. Only at these three locations along the high-speed line can all desired works operations be run both on the line and to Nuremberg Hauptbahnhof. This is not the case for various other locations considered on other lines. Most recently, a location in the former army ammunition facility in Feucht was considered and rejected in April 2023.
Effects Route length The route length between the main stations fell from 199.1 kilometres (old route via Augsburg) or 198.3 kilometres (via Treuchtlingen/Ingolstadt) to 170.8 kilometres. The linear distance between the main stations is 149.6 kilometres, the road connection via the motorway is 167 kilometres. The travel time between Munich and Frankfurt/Cologne was reduced by around half an hour (compared to the route via Stuttgart). The regular travel times in regional traffic between the two main stations were reduced from two and a half to three hours to around one and a quarter (in the
Munich-Nuremberg Express).
Capacity, operations With the new line between Nuremberg and Munich, two to three independent routes are available, a total of at least four tracks. This has significantly improved capacity and operational flexibility in the event of a disruption. In the area of the new line, there is also extensive segregation, an operationally desirable separation between (fast) passenger and (slow) freight traffic. Furthermore, for long-distance trains running between Würzburg via Nuremberg to Munich, there is no need to change direction in Nuremberg.
Traffic shift between Augsburg and Ingolstadt routes While the majority of long-distance trains between Munich and Nuremberg or Würzburg previously ran via Augsburg, many ICE trains took the faster route via Ingolstadt after the route was fully operational. This shift of ICE traffic to the new line deteriorated the connections between Augsburg and Nuremberg or Würzburg and between northern Bavaria and Bavarian Swabia, Upper Swabia and the Lake Constance area and led to longer travel times. When the timetable changed in December 2006, Augsburg lost 30 of the previous 120 daily long-distance stops. At the same time, the range of services between Munich and Berlin was increased from a two-hour to an hourly frequency, with three to four daily pairs of trains running on this line via Augsburg. The Allgäu-Franken-Express regional express line was established to replace the ICE trains that were no longer used between Nuremberg and Augsburg. Until 2020, the trains ran between Nuremberg and Augsburg in a travel time similar to that of the ICE (around 70 minutes), sometimes with extensions to ,
Kempten, and
Lindau. Since 2013, long-distance trains have been running from Augsburg to Berlin and Hamburg almost every hour. On weekdays, regional express trains also run between Nuremberg and Augsburg (alternating hourly and with a change in Treuchtlingen) with a journey time of around 110 minutes. On Saturdays, Regional-Express trains run at two-hour intervals, on Sundays at two-hour intervals. Furthermore, since December 2006 there has been a two-hour service every weekday with a change in Ingolstadt (Munich-Nuremberg Express) with a travel time of around two hours. == Operations ==