"
Contempt of court" is a generic term descriptive of conduct in relation to particular proceedings in a court of law which tends to undermine that system or to inhibit citizens from availing themselves of it for the settlement of their disputes. Despite the many forms it may take, contempt of court can be divided into two broad categories, contempt by interference and contempt by disobedience. Scandalizing the court is an example of the first category. It comprises matters such as disrupting the court process itself (contempt
in facie curiae – in the face of the court), publications or acts which risk prejudicing or interfering with particular legal proceedings, and publications or acts which interfere with the course of justice as a continuing process (for example, publications which "scandalize" the court). The second category comprises disobeying court orders and breaching undertakings given to the court. The
criminal offence of scandalizing the court is committed by any act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt, or to lower his authority. Any publication which alleges bias, lack of impartiality, impropriety or any wrongdoing concerning a judge in the exercise of his judicial function falls within the offence of scandalizing the court in Singapore.
Source of power to punish contempt Fundamentally, the power to punish contempt is not derived from statute or from the
common law per se but instead flows from the very ''
raison d'être'' for a court of law: to uphold the proper administration of justice. All courts have an
inherent jurisdiction to punish contempt committed when the court is in session by invoking a "
summary process", meaning that the judge in front of whom the contemptuous act is committed may speedily order the
contemnor to be punished. However, inherent jurisdiction to punish contempt committed outside court resides exclusively in the
superior courts. The
High Court and the
Court of Appeal are empowered by section 7(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act to punish for contempt of court. In a 1991 case, the High Court held that this was statutory recognition of the common law
misdemeanour of contempt of court. The
Subordinate Courts' power to punish acts of contempt can be found principally in two statutes, section 8 of the Subordinate Courts Act, and section 410 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010.
Constitutionality Article 14(1)(a) of the
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore protects every
citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression. This fundamental liberty was derived from the
Federal Constitution of Malaysia when Singapore separated from
Malaysia with effect from 9 August 1965. The
Reid Constitutional Commission of 1957, which recommended that this provision be included in Malaysia's independence constitution, thought that this freedom was an "essential condition for a free and democratic way of life". However, as such a freedom cannot be unfettered, Article 14(2)(a) of the Singapore Constitution states,
inter alia, that
Parliament may by law impose on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a) restrictions designed to provide against contempt of court. In 2006, the High Court held in
Attorney-General v. Chee Soon Juan that the offence of scandalizing the court falls within the category of exceptions from the right to free speech expressly stipulated in Article 14(2)(a), and that the Article clearly confers on Parliament the power to restrict a person's right of free speech to punish acts of contempt. As a democratic society, Singapore has always recognized the need to ensure the
independence of the judiciary. As the judiciary acts as a
check and balance on the Cabinet and the Parliament, its integrity is of utmost concern in ensuring legitimacy of the
Westminster model of governance. It is within this context that, in a 1991 decision, the Court expressed the view that freedom of speech "must be balanced against the needs of the administration of justice, one of which is to protect the integrity of the courts". The rationale for the law of contempt is rooted firmly in the public interest. It aims to protect the administration of justice as well as public confidence in it, which is crucial for the
rule of law and the maintenance of law and order in any democratic society. It is not intended to protect the dignity of the courts or judges. When such interference is suppressed, it is because the structure of ordered life is at risk if the judiciary are so flouted and their authority wanes and is supplanted. Though the right to freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed under the Constitution, it does not mean that anyone is entitled under the guise of that freedom to make irresponsible accusations against the judiciary so as to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. Some commentators have expressed the view that excessive value has been placed by the courts on protecting the
independence of the judiciary, and that insufficient weight has been given to the right to freedom of speech. One assumption said to be incorrect is that undermining public confidence in the administration of justice is in all circumstances harmful to the public interest. Arguably, if the scandalizing allegation is true or is an opinion honestly and reasonably held, then it is in the public interest that such speech be heard precisely because of the importance of the judiciary to society. However, common law rules of contempt do not recognize the defence of either
justification or
fair comment which are available to the
tort of
defamation. Secondly, the claim that scandalizing the court may undermine public confidence in the judiciary represents an unduly pessimistic view of the maturity and ability of the Singapore public to assess for itself whether or not the scandalizing speech is true, and is perhaps a sweeping statement as to general public awareness. Lastly, it is also assumed that public confidence in the judiciary can be preserved by the suppression of scandalizing speech. However, it is unlikely that such speech can ever be completely suppressed. It would be impossible to monitor speech that goes on in homes, coffee shops and
hawker centres. Through these informal channels, suspicions of the judiciary may fester and grow. ==Test for the offence==