Applicability Despite its problems, the one-time-pad retains some practical interest. In some hypothetical espionage situations, the one-time pad might be useful because encryption and decryption can be computed by hand with only pencil and paper. Nearly all other high quality ciphers are entirely impractical without computers. In the modern world, however, computers (such as those embedded in
mobile phones) are so ubiquitous that possessing a computer suitable for performing conventional encryption (for example, a phone that can run concealed cryptographic software) will usually not attract suspicion. • The one-time-pad is the optimum cryptosystem with theoretically perfect secrecy. • The algorithm most commonly associated with
quantum key distribution is the one-time pad. However, this result depends on the QKD scheme being implemented correctly in practice. Attacks on real-world QKD systems exist. For instance, many systems do not send a single photon (or other object in the desired quantum state) per bit of the key because of practical limitations, and an attacker could intercept and measure some of the photons associated with a message, gaining information about the key (i.e. leaking information about the pad), while passing along unmeasured photons corresponding to the same bit of the key. Combining QKD with a one-time pad can also loosen the requirements for key reuse. In 1982,
Bennett and
Brassard showed that if a QKD protocol does not detect that an adversary was trying to intercept an exchanged key, then the key can safely be reused while preserving perfect secrecy. The one-time pad is an example of post-quantum cryptography, because perfect secrecy is a definition of security that does not depend on the computational resources of the adversary. Consequently, an adversary with a quantum computer would still not be able to gain any more information about a message encrypted with a one time pad than an adversary with just a classical computer.
Historical uses One-time pads have been used in special circumstances since the early 1900s. In 1923, they were employed for diplomatic communications by the German diplomatic establishment. The
Weimar Republic Diplomatic Service began using the method in about 1920. The breaking of poor
Soviet cryptography by the
British, with messages made public for political reasons in two instances in the 1920s (
ARCOS case), appear to have caused the Soviet Union to adopt one-time pads for some purposes by around 1930.
KGB spies are also known to have used pencil and paper one-time pads more recently. Examples include Colonel
Rudolf Abel, who was arrested and convicted in
New York City in the 1950s, and the 'Krogers' (i.e.,
Morris and
Lona Cohen), who were arrested and convicted of espionage in the
United Kingdom in the early 1960s. Both were found with physical one-time pads in their possession. A number of nations have used one-time pad systems for their sensitive traffic.
Leo Marks reports that the British
Special Operations Executive used one-time pads in World War II to encode traffic between its offices. One-time pads for use with its overseas agents were introduced late in the war. The
World War II voice
scrambler SIGSALY was also a form of one-time system. It added noise to the signal at one end and removed it at the other end. The noise was distributed to the channel ends in the form of large shellac records that were manufactured in unique pairs. There were both starting synchronization and longer-term phase drift problems that arose and had to be solved before the system could be used. The
hotline between
Moscow and
Washington, D.C., established in 1963 after the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, used
teleprinters protected by a commercial one-time tape system. Each country prepared the keying tapes used to encode its messages and delivered them via their embassy in the other country. A unique advantage of the OTP in this case was that neither country had to reveal more sensitive encryption methods to the other. U.S. Army Special Forces used one-time pads in Vietnam. By using Morse code with one-time pads and continuous wave radio transmission (the carrier for Morse code), they achieved both secrecy and reliable communications. Starting in 1988, the
African National Congress (ANC) used disk-based one-time pads as part of a
secure communication system between ANC leaders outside
South Africa and in-country operatives as part of
Operation Vula, a successful effort to build a resistance network inside South Africa. Random numbers on the disk were erased after use. A Belgian flight attendant acted as courier to bring in the pad disks. A regular resupply of new disks was needed as they were used up fairly quickly. One problem with the system was that it could not be used for secure data storage. Later Vula added a stream cipher keyed by book codes to solve this problem. A related notion is the
one-time code—a signal, used only once; e.g., "Alpha" for "mission completed", "Bravo" for "mission failed" or even "Torch" for "
Allied invasion of French Northern Africa" General purpose pads were produced in several formats, a simple list of random letters (DIANA) or just numbers (CALYPSO), tiny pads for covert agents (MICKEY MOUSE), and pads designed for more rapid encoding of short messages, at the cost of lower density. One example, ORION, had 50 rows of plaintext alphabets on one side and the corresponding random cipher text letters on the other side. By placing a sheet on top of a piece of
carbon paper with the carbon face up, one could circle one letter in each row on one side and the corresponding letter on the other side would be circled by the carbon paper. Thus one ORION sheet could quickly encode or decode a message up to 50 characters long. Production of ORION pads required printing both sides in exact registration, a difficult process, so NSA switched to another pad format, MEDEA, with 25 rows of paired alphabets and random characters. (
See Commons:Category:NSA one-time pads for illustrations.) The NSA also built automated systems for the "centralized headquarters of CIA and Special Forces units so that they can efficiently process the many separate one-time pad messages to and from individual pad holders in the field".
Exploits While one-time pads provide perfect secrecy if generated and used properly, small mistakes can lead to successful cryptanalysis: • In 1944–1945, the
U.S. Army's
Signals Intelligence Service was able to solve a one-time pad system used by the German Foreign Office for its high-level traffic, codenamed GEE. GEE was insecure because the pads were not sufficiently random—the machine used to generate the pads produced predictable output. • In 1945, the US discovered that
Canberra–
Moscow messages were being encrypted first using a code-book and then using a one-time pad. However, the one-time pad used was the same one used by Moscow for
Washington, D.C.–Moscow messages. Combined with the fact that some of the Canberra–Moscow messages included known British government documents, this allowed some of the encrypted messages to be broken. • One-time pads were employed by
Soviet espionage agencies for covert communications with agents and agent controllers. Analysis has shown that these pads were generated by typists using actual typewriters. This method is not truly random, as it makes the pads more likely to contain certain convenient key sequences more frequently. This proved to be generally effective because the pads were still somewhat unpredictable because the typists were not following rules, and different typists produced different patterns of pads. Without copies of the key material used, only some defect in the generation method or reuse of keys offered much hope of cryptanalysis. Beginning in the late 1940s, US and UK intelligence agencies were able to break some of the Soviet one-time pad traffic to
Moscow during WWII as a result of errors made in generating and distributing the key material. One suggestion is that Moscow Centre personnel were somewhat rushed by the presence of German troops just outside Moscow in late 1941 and early 1942, and they produced more than one copy of the same key material during that period. This decades-long effort was finally codenamed
VENONA (BRIDE had been an earlier name); it produced a considerable amount of information. Even so, only a small percentage of the intercepted messages were either fully or partially decrypted (a few thousand out of several hundred thousand). == See also ==