Operation Scherhorn

According to Pavel Sudoplatov, NKVD officers Victor Ilyin and Mikhail Maklyarsky conceived Operation Berezino as an extension of Operation Monastyr ("Operation Monastery") (1941–1944). In 1941, NKVD operative (, Soviet codename Heyne), who disguised himself as a disgruntled bohemian socialite, established contact with the German resident in Moscow. The NKVD used this opportunity to expose the Abwehr undercover network in the Soviet Union. In December 1941, Demyanov "defected" to the Germans and showed up at the Abwehr field office in Smolensk, a city in western Russia near the border with present-day Belarus. Three months later, he returned to Moscow as a trusted German agent. His apartment became a death trap for scores of genuine German agents, but he retained the trust of his German superiors. In the middle of 1942, Demyanov's control officer, Willie Fischer, expanded the operation into a strategic level disinformation campaign. For more than two years, Demyanov supplied Reinhard Gehlen, the head of Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East) department with carefully-scripted "military plans." According to Sudoplatov, the German success in repelling Operation Mars was, in part, influenced by "correct" information fed to Gehlen through Demyanov. According to Sudoplatov, Joseph Stalin personally monitored the progress of Operation Monastyr. The NKVD men who engaged in it were highly rewarded, but Stalin was dissatisfied with the limited scope of the operation. Shortly before the beginning of Operation Bagration, he summoned Victor Abakumov, Vsevolod Merkulov, Fyodor Fedotovich Kuznetsov, and Sudoplatov and ordered a new disinformation campaign. Stalin's instructions, recorded by Sergei Shtemenko, shifted the objective toward methodical physical destruction of German special forces and their intelligence capability. Sudoplatov had to set up a believable "German camp" behind the advancing Soviet troops and call the German command for help. Stalin reasoned that the Germans would expend their best commandos in futile rescue missions. The fake "camp" would also divert German airlift resources from supporting the real pockets of resistance. ==Planning==

The new operation, codenamed Berezino, was drafted by Colonel Mikhail Maklyarsky and approved by Stalin, NKVD Chief Lavrenty Beria and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. NKVD officers Nahum Eitingon, Willie Fischer, Mikhail Maklyarsky, Alexander Demyanov and Yakov Serebryansky departed to Belarus with a group of ethnic German antifascists. More pro-Soviet Germans, who earlier engaged in mopping up Polish and Lithuanian forest brothers, joined them at the base camp some east of Minsk. Scherhorn and his radio operator agreed to play the Soviet game. German communist Gustav Rebele assumed the role of Scherhorn's aide, watching his "commander" day and night. Max reported that Scherhorn's detachment of 2,500 men was encircled by the Soviets in the swamps near the Berezina River. According to German sources, Colonel Hans-Heinrich Worgitzky of OKH Counter-intelligence suspected a Soviet Funkspiel and refused to commit his men to rescue "Scherhorn". Gehlen intervened and demanded full support to "Scherhorn" which he thought would ideally fit Otto Skorzeny's plan of guerilla action behind the front line. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, High Command of the Armed Forces) Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl instructed Skorzeny to begin the rescue operation. ==First casualties==

According to the German communist , in early September, Eitingon announced the first success; the German command confirmed departure of a group of four or five commandos. The Soviets mustered a "welcome party" dressed in battered Nazi field uniforms. Some, like Kleinjung, were ethnic Germans, but others were NKVD men who did not speak the language. Between 01:00 and 02:00 on September 16, a Heinkel He 111 made two runs over the drop zone, releasing supply containers and paratroopers. According to the official site of the SVR there were three radio operators. According to Kleinjung, there were two SS commandos, with one of them a radio operator and two agents of Baltic descent. The last two were quietly subdued by NKVD, and the two SS men were cordially welcomed and escorted to Scherhorn's tent. After the meeting, the guests were arrested by the NKVD and forced to cooperate in the Funkspiel. They reported their safe landing over their wireless set, which persuaded the German command that the operation was proceeding as planned. They were followed by three more commando teams. According to Kleinjung, the NKVD intercepted all three without arousing suspicion. ==Spy games==

"Scherhorn" reported that a rapid breakthrough was made impossible by a large number of wounded, and the German command suggested airlifting the wounded to the German rear, which, according to Kleinjung, would have exposed the Soviet ploy. Skorzeny sent an engineer to manage construction of the runway. The Soviets responded with staging a believable night fight between "Group Scherhorn" and "Soviet troops" at the very same moment that two transport planes arrived over the properly-illuminated airfield. One of the pilots attempted to land despite the commotion on the ground, but immediately before the touchdown, the NKVD men extinguished the runway lights, forcing both planes to abandon their mission. According to Russian sources, the execution of the air raid was indeed planned by Colonel of the 4th Air Army. Before the night attack could materialise, the NKVD changed its mind and decided to use Fyodorov as a pawn in their game with Skorzeny. Fyodorov had to defect to "Scherhorn", fly to Germany with one of Skorzeny's planes and operate there as a double agent. Fyodorov, one of the few Soviet recipients of the Nazi Iron Cross, was well known to the Luftwaffe, and the Abwehr and could have indeed been a perfect double agent had it not been for his explosive outspoken personality. Instead of openly approaching Fyodorov, the NKVD set up a mock ambush. NKVD men impersonating Belarusian nationalists and Russian monarchists kidnapped Fyodorov, took him to their camp in the forest and pressed him to change sides. The recruiters soon realised that Fyodorov was not fit for the job. Major Kopirovsky, the author of the failed proposal, suggested liquidating him, but Demyanov overruled him, and Fyodorov was allowed to "flee" from the camp and return to the Air Force. ==Agony==

Skorzeny and Gehlen remained confident in the existence and combat worthiness of the 2,000-strong group. According to Kleinjung, they instructed Scherhorn to split it: half had to march north to the Latvian–Lithuanian border, the rest to the south. According to Skorzeny, both detachments were to march north, with the smaller SS vanguard clearing the way for Scherhorn's main force. Scherhorn suggested that the march might bring them in contact with Polish population, and Skorzeny sent him his agents. They also fell into Sudoplatov's hands and exposed the German network in Poland. The Germans continuously supplied "Scherhorn" with food and equipment, which absorbed the scarce resources of Kampfgeschwader 200. According to the official site of the SVR, the Germans sent 39 flights and dropped 22 commandos with 13 wireless sets. In March, Skorzeny spoke against Gehlen's single-handed management, and Gehlen reluctantly backed off. According to the official site of the SVR, the German command communicated with "Scherhorn" until May 5, 1945. According to Kleinjung and Skorzeny, "Scherhorn" remained in contact with the command until May 8. ==Aftermath==

After the end of the war, Sudoplatov used Scherhorn to recruit captive Admiral Erich Raeder and his wife. The attempt failed: according to Sudoplatov, Scherhorn and Raeder were "incompatible with each other". Scherhorn and his group were held prisoners in a camp near Moscow and repatriated in the early 1950s. Sudoplatov was arrested in the wake of the execution of Lavrenty Beria and served 15 years in prison; he was cleared of criminal charges in 1992. Reinhard Gehlen founded the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the West German secret service, and headed it until 1968. Karl Kleinjung, one of the ethnic Germans attendants at Camp Scherhorn, quickly rose through the East German bureaucracy and became the head of the Stasi's First Chief Directorate (HA I), responsible for foreign intelligence. In 1997, he was indicted in the murders of civilians on the Inner German border but was acquitted in court. Willie Fischer served as a KGB spy in the United States from 1948 until his arrest in 1957, under the alias Rudolf Abel, in what became known as the Hollow Nickel Case. In 1962, he was exchanged for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers. ==Sources==