The decision was understood, from that time to the 1960s, as reflecting a validation of state anti-miscegenation laws. However, the Supreme Court had not confronted the question of whether, given that Pace and Cox could not become husband and wife, they would inevitably be liable to prosecution for "adultery or fornication" if they lived as such. Only by implication had the ban against interracial marriage been addressed. Moreover, only by indirection did the Court address the question of whether, since it was a first offense, the sentence should have been for no more than six months. However, the later case
Plessy v. Ferguson (joined by all Supreme Court Justices other than
John Marshall Harlan), the Supreme Court in
dicta stated that "Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet have been universally recognized as within the police power of the State." In any event, the Court had upheld the Alabama laws, and no southern state, for the next 80 years, displayed any inclination to repeal such laws. The Supreme Court's decision in
Pace v. Alabama would prove to have an even more durable career in the American law of interracial sex and, by extension, marriage than
Plessy v. Ferguson would have on segregated transportation and, by extension, education. After
Pace v. Alabama, the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws banning marriage and sex between whites and non-whites remained unchallenged until the 1940s. In 1967, these laws were ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
Loving v. Virginia (1967). == References ==