1st day Following nightfall the next day, 18 July, a Pakistani battalion discreetly entered the Indian sector, when they went across the stream. The unpreventable sounds were masked by the rain, but also set back further progress. The Pakistani troops established their concealed forward position and Communication was maintained with the headquarters as the troops advanced with the use of telephone lines with addition to wireless communication sets, however they were to be used in urgent situation.
2nd day On the second day of the operation the Pakistani troops next advance was planned for the evening hours. To maintain radio silence, Pakistani artillery remained silent, avoiding any indication of imminent activity and took cover within their base until twilight. Meanwhile at multiple locations at that morning, Scouts, Azad forces, and tribesmen were deployed by Brigadier Akbar Khan to carry out small harassing raids. Due to cloudy skies and rain throughout the day, Indian aircraft were absent from the area. These operations were intended to be low-key and not arouse suspicion. The harassing parties would successfully engage with the Indian troops without complications, with only one near miss. However a mishap occurred, when the Pakistani forces local guide slipped in the mud and was captured by Indian troops. The Pakistani troops quickly withdrew from the area. The guide was taken to the Indian headquarters in Pandu, he was interrogated extensively but revealed no information. While tensions ran high, the Indian forces eventually stood down by evening. Meanwhile, the Pakistani forces prepared to execute their next move that night.
3rd day At dawn the following day, the right column successfully secured their objective, a 9,300-foot mountain overlooking Pandu Lake. The Indian forces responded quickly with a counter-attack, but it was unsuccessful. By afternoon, the right column had advanced to within 500 yards of Pandu, awaiting the left column's progress. The operation unfolded according to plan, exceeding Brigadier Khan's expectations. With the right column in position, the scene was set for the assault on Pandu. The left column's advance was delayed. The path proved to be extremely challenging, and their telephone wire drums had rolled down the slope in the darkness, severing communication after midnight. Subsequently, they suffered thirty casualties after inadvertently entering an Indian position called Kewa and engaging in a close-quarters battle at night. The Pakistani command remained unaware of the setbacks they had encountered. By daybreak, they were still a considerable distance from their objective and faced heavy shelling as their movements were no longer concealed. Despite these difficulties, they continued their arduous advance until they were further disrupted by a group of fleeing Indian soldiers who ran through their midst. The Left Column encountered difficulties during its advance, leading to a breakdown in unit cohesion during the night. Discouraged and fatigued, soldiers lost contact with their officers. Despite attempts to halt it, the entire Left Column disengaged around midnight and returned to their starting position near Bib-Dori by 4:00 am. Individual soldiers began to withdraw without orders, and this grew into a larger unauthorized retreat. Observing the Left Column's withdrawal at dawn, the harassing parties, Azads, Scouts, and tribesmen, also retreated, assuming the operation had been called off.
4th day On the morning of the fourth day, the right-most column, almost half a battalion, remained the only Pakistani force in the forward position. Who were isolated on a 9,300-foot peak within indian territory, faced hostile artillery and aircraft attacks. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, Major Akbar Khan began reevaluating his strategy.
5th day On the morning of the fifth day, reinforcements arrived and joined the right-most column. An imminent military operation was planned near Pandu. The objective involved encountering a reduced Indian force stationed there, with only half a battalion present. This strategy aimed to exploit a temporary numerical advantage by deploying a full battalion from the opposing side, creating a potential two-to-one advantage at a crucial point in the conflict. However, this plan ultimately went unrealized. As a result, the Pakistani forces no longer held the anticipated numerical advantage over the Indian defenders. Indian troops withdrew from their positions and reinforced the garrison at Pandu, which gave them a numerical advantage over the Pakistani forces. Recognizing the disparity in strength, the Right Column Commander anticipated the attack being called off. Determined to act, Akbar khan ordered a bayonet charge led by officers on (Dehli) to leave no room for doubt or hesitation, he based this decision on his belief that the Indian forces were now confused, a state of mind unknown to him at the time. During earlier operations, harassing parties advancing under the cover of darkness mistakenly believed Indian forces were retreating. One tribal lashkar engaged in a nighttime skirmish after mistakenly entering Pandu itself. The resulting gunfire prompted another lashkar to approach from the opposite direction, leading to another clash. These minor skirmishes, however, appeared to be interpreted by the Indian forces as full-scale attacks. Anticipating the right column's attack the following day, Pakistani troops disregarded usual caution and lit fires for warmth within the jungle. These fires were soon spotted by Indian troops, who perceived them as a surrounding ring. According to a local witness, the Indian forces, believing themselves encircled, spent a tense night and decided to withdraw at daybreak, seeing it as their only option. Major Akbar Khan believed they had instilled fear in the Indian forces by minor skrimishes. Despite their numerical superiority, equipment, and air support, the Indian forces opted to withdraw. The indian forces launched a sustained and heavy shelling barrage to obscure their movement as they abandoned Pandu and retreated into the dense jungle. When the right column advanced for the assault, Indian troops had already gone.
Fall of Pandu Upon hearing that the Indian force had given up, Akbar Khan dispatched another lashkar in pursuit across the Indian force's who retreated. Other tribesmen in the vicinity of Pandu also joined the chase. The Indian troops had been routed in confusion and fled down the slopes into the dense jungle. The tribesmen pursued them for twenty-four hours, primarily engaging in close-quarter combat with daggers. The Indian forces suffered significant casualties, estimated at three hundred. When the tribesmen returned, many were clad in captured Indian uniforms and carrying a substantial amount of enemy weapons, ammunition, and other equipment. The Pakistani forces captured a significant amount of Indian supplies, including approximately 130 rifles and their ammunition. Additionally, they seized stockpiles containing roughly half a million rounds of ammunition, two large mortars, fourteen mortars of various sizes, a machine gun, and around one thousand mortar and artillery shells. A large ration depot was also secured. With the capture of Pandu, a critical strategic point, the remaining Indian defenses crumbled rapidly. As Pakistani forces advanced towards the remaining two companies defending Sing (10,500 feet), those forces also withdrew from the position. Scouts and Azads operating in the area pursued them. A general advance then commenced, and after twelve hours, Pakistani troops reached a position just 200 yards from Chota Kazi Nag (10,000 feet), the final and highest peak in this range. This peak overlooks the Indian communication lines between Baramula and Uri (General Headquarters), at this point, Pakistani forces received orders to halt their advance.
Action of 3 October 1948 In early July 1948, Pakistani forces in Chinari received their first two 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns. These guns fired lightweight shells and had a limited effective range, along with a restricted field of view. Consequently, Indian aircraft initially enjoyed a significant advantage in the airspace. However, the effectiveness of these anti-aircraft guns in engaging aircraft is not well documented. General Akbar Khan would prepare a trap for the Indian aircraft to be shot down. Khan directed the deployment of the anti-aircraft guns in locations that would maximize their range against Indian aircraft. A medium gun, firing 90-pound shells, was positioned furthest forward under the Chakoti ridge. Additionally, twelve machine guns and sixteen
Bren light machine guns were placed on the highest points, around 9,000 feet, to provide supporting fire. An artillery officer was stationed on the peak of the Pandu feature, at an elevation of 9,300 feet, offering a clear view of the
Uri camp to monitor weather conditions to assess potential Indian aircraft activity and to signal the presence of aircraft to the troops. The Indian force's aircraft flew overhead but remained beyond the effective range of the Pakistani anti-aircraft defenses. On the following day, 3 October, three aircraft appeared in the area, seemingly intent on attacking Pandu, Pakistani troops began shelling the camp. As they approached, the aircraft maneuvered by diving and circling. One aircraft sustained damage from machine gun fire and crashed. The pilot ejected safely using a parachute and was subsequently rescued by Indian forces. == Aftermath ==