Sepehr Energy Jahan

Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars is officially registered in Tehran (established 21 November 2022) and has the features of a state-controlled oil. Its executive team is deeply connected to Iran's oil ministry and military apparatus. The company's deputy chairman and managing director is Majid Rashidi, an Iranian Oil Ministry official. Seyyed Abdoljavad Alavi was explicitly designated by the U.S. in November 2023 as a leader and official of Sepehr Energy under counter-terrorism sanctions. and Farshad Ghazi, Managing Director of Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars. Mohammad Ali Riazi Kolahdozmahaleh has chaired the boards of several Sepehr-linked companies. Reports also identify Brigadier General Jamshid Eshaghi, head of the AFGS Office of Budget and Financial Affairs and a former Sepehr Energy official, as an overseer of Sepehr's operations. Sepehr Energy controls or acts as the parent to multiple affiliated entities in Iran's oil industry. Notably, Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Taban, and Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan are all described as sister companies that "share many of the same company officials" with Sepehr Energy. These affiliates facilitate commodity deals and oil shipments for the AFGS. For example, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Taban arranged the delivery of nearly two million barrels of crude to China in January 2025. All of these Sepehr-linked companies were sanctioned in early 2025 as entities "owned, controlled, or directed by" Sepehr Energy. == Connections to Iran's armed forces ==

Sepehr Energy is explicitly tied to Iran's military command structure. U.S. officials note that the company "oversees [oil] activity for the AFGS" (Armed Forces General Staff). == Sanctions designation and legal status ==

U.S. authorities have sanctioned Sepehr Energy and dozens of related individuals and entities under counterterrorism and Iran sanctions authorities. On November 29, 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Sepehr Energy as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224. The Sanctions List Search (SDN List) entry confirms that Sepehr Energy is listed under the Iran sanctions regime (IFSR) and that it is "linked to" Iran's military logistics. == Sanctions evasion tactics and oil export methods ==

To evade sanctions, Sepehr Energy employs a sophisticated array of deceptive practices. The company orchestrates clandestine shipments using a "shadow fleet" of vessels, falsified documentation, and ship-to-ship transfers at sea, all designed to obscure the origin of Iranian oil. For example, the U.S. Treasury reported that Sepehr-affiliated tankers routinely turn off AIS transponders, change names or flags, and carry falsified certificates of origin. In one case, the Comoros-flagged tanker ANTHEA (IMO 9281683), renamed SIRI, was loaded with millions of barrels of Iranian crude bound for China. Sepehr's master of that vessel, Iranian national Arash Lavian, had the ship literally repainted and renamed mid-voyage to conceal its identity from authorities home.treasury.govdocs.house.gov. Similarly, Dubai-based traders such as Unique Performance General Trading LLC and OPG Global (acting for Sepehr) brokered sales of Iranian crude to buyers in China and Europe, re-labeling shipments en route. A recent example illustrates the scale of these tactics. In December 2024, Sepehr Energy and its executive Elyas Niroomand Toomaj loaded nearly two million barrels of Iranian heavy crude onto the Cameroon-flagged tanker OXIS (IMO 9224805), owned by Seychelles-based Miletus Line Ltd. Simultaneously, Sepehr used the Panama-flagged tanker GIOIOSA (IMO 9198082), owned by Hong Kong's Gozoso Group Ltd, to move over 700,000 barrels for delivery to China home.treasury.gov. To further obscure these links, the network reportedly used a Hong Kong-based proxy firm, Xin Rui Ji, which engaged in ship-to-ship transfers in Singaporean waters. Communications indicate that Xin Rui Ji sought buyers across Europe, China, and the Persian Gulf, including the Netherlands-based Gemini Group. Emails between Gemini and Sepehr representatives reveal awareness of the Iranian government's involvement and concerns over sanctions, yet also highlight ongoing collaboration and financial arrangements. == Chinese oil trade and export routes ==

China is Sepehr Energy's primary market. Under the "maximum pressure" policy, the U.S. has singled out the China shipments as key targets. The Iranian military allocates a large share of its crude output to sales in Asia, with most of it going to China at steep discounts reuters.com. that had taken dozens of shipments of Iranian oil worth over $1 billion. That and similar buyers have stored Iranian crude and/or paid the required fees to the tank operators in Dalian and Zhoushan. Notably, China holds roughly 25 million barrels of Iranian oil in leased storage tanks from pre-2019 transactions. Analysts note that this whole process requires transfers and document alterations to disguise the Iranian origin iranintl.comreuters.com. Sepehr Energy's China trade combines on-shore storage transfers (from facilities in Dalian/Zhoushan) with the shadow fleet at sea. The sanctioned network has explicitly targeted both aspects: Treasury actions have named the vessels and their owners (e.g. Miletus Line, Gozoso Group, Ocean Dolphin, Umbra Navi) involved in recent China-bound shipments. Moreover, U.S. sanctions have hit key service providers, including the BESTLA Company Limited (owner of the BESTLA tanker) and management firms like Dexiang Shipping (HK) , all because these ships carried Iranian oil toward China. == Affiliates, front companies, and network partners ==

Beyond its own subsidiaries, Sepehr Energy depends on a wide array of front companies and brokers. These include Iranian firms, regional trading companies, and shipping firms, many now sanctioned. Key Sepehr-affiliated entities include: • Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars: An Iranian oil trading affiliate (Managing Director: Farshad Ghazi) active in petroleum sales. • Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Taban: Anaffiliate that arranged major oil shipments (e.g. the ~2 million barrel January 2025 consignment). • Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan: Affiliate (Chairman: Farbod Mohseni Ahari) with similar functions in arranging exports. Other Iran-based partners include Pishro Tejarat Sana Co., which works on behalf of Sepehr to "facilitate the sale and shipment of commodities to overseas buyers" and shares profits. Its chairman, Seyyed Abdoljavad Alavi, was sanctioned alongside Sepehr in 2023 for providing material support to Iran's military. Additionally, a network of Iranian currency exchange houses is used to funnel petro-revenues to military-controlled bank accounts, effectively acting as a shadow banking network for Sepehr Energy. Internationally, numerous middlemen enable Sepehr's trades. U.S. sanction documents list dozens of broker-traders and service providers: for example, Hong Kong-based Puyuan Trade Co. Ltd. and HK Sihang Haochen Trading Ltd., which handled tens of millions of dollars of condensate sales for Sepehr. In the UAE, Dubai companies like Unique Performance General Trading L.L.C., OPG Global General Trading Co. L.L.C., JEP Petrochemical Trading L.L.C., and Future Energy Trading L.L.C. were identified as Sepehr's purchasers of oil (amounting to millions of barrels) for delivery to China and Europe. Warehousing these deals, Sharjah-based brokers Tetis Global FZE, Royal Shell Goods Wholesalers L.L.C., and Dubai's A Three Energy FZE were named as enablers of Sepehr's commodity sales. All of these commercial intermediaries were sanctioned in early 2024-2025 as having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided goods or services to" Sepehr Energy. On the maritime side, Sepehr's network relies on foreign shipping lines and managers. U.S. sanctions list includes: • Gozoso Group Ltd. (Hong Kong): Owner of the Panama-flagged tanker GIOIOSA home.treasury.gov. • Miletus Line Ltd. (Seychelles): Owner of the Cameroon-flagged tanker OXIShome.treasury.gov. • Ocean Dolphin Ship Management Ltd. (China/Hong Kong) – Provided management services for GIOIOSA. • Umbra Navi Ship Management Corp. (Kazakhstan): Technical manager of OXIS. • Marshal Ship Management Pvt. Ltd. (India): Provided crew for Sepehr's vessels (including SIRI, ELSA, HEBE, BOREAS) and is thus accused of facilitating document falsification. Additional transport-related entities include Lucky Ocean Shipping Ltd. (Marshall Islands) and Young Folks International Trading Co. Ltd. (Hong Kong), both designated for involvement in Iran's petroleum tradereuters.com. Oceanic Orbit Inc. (Panama), Dexiang Shipping Co. (Hong Kong), Bestla Company Limited (Marshall Islands), and Civic Capital Shipping Inc. (Panama) have been identified as owning or operating specific tankers used in these operations. Sepehr Energy's network extends to numerous people. In addition to the corporate leaders noted earlier, the U.S. has sanctioned several individuals for working on Sepehr's behalf. These include Elyas Niroomand Toomaj, a Sepehr executive who arranged oil trades and shipments (he orchestrated the December 2024 dispatch of OXIS to China), and Arash Lavian, who captained the tanker SIRI and actively concealed its identity. Ryan Xavier Aranha, an Indian national serving as a director of Marshal Ship Management, was designated for facilitating Sepehr's operations. Several Sepehr board members and officials ( Alavi, Ahari, Riazi Kolahdozmahaleh) were also added to sanctions lists as supporters of Iran's military. On the foreign side, key partners include the Chinese "teapot" refinery Shandong Shengxing (sanctioned for buying over $1 billion of Iranian crude). India-based crew managers like Marshal Ship are pivotal enablers (as noted), and even shell companies in jurisdictions like Seychelles, Hong Kong, and the UAE serve as financial conduits. For example, Oceanic Orbit Inc. (Panama) and Pro Mission Sdn Bhd (Malaysia) were designated in the same cycle as having provided technical support via their control of certain tanker operations. Each of these actors, whether crew managers, shipping firms, or trading partners, is now under sanctions for its role in the Sepehr network. == Global sanctions enforcement and impact ==

The international response to Sepehr Energy's network has been multi-faceted. Besides U.S. actions, other governments and entities have taken notice. The Treasury's coordinated sanctions in 2023–2025 represent the most targeted pressure yet on Iran's military oil trade. They effectively place every major conduit into the U.S. SDN regime. This includes not only Sepehr Energy itself, but also its parent (MODAFL), its subsidiary companies, trading houses, brokerage firms, and the vessels they use. For instance, at least seven tankers linked to Sepehr (ELSA, HEBE, BOREAS, OXIS, GIOIOSA, SIRI/ANTHEA, BESTLA) have been sanctioned. Each sanction carries a provision to "block" the vessel (designating it as blocked property). U.S. officials explicitly warned Chinese importers of risk, and intelligence reports (e.g. UANI testimony) make clear that Sepehr's methods, such as mid-voyage repainting, have become standard practice for Iran's export "ghost fleet". == See also ==