In the original case (1966), the court did not raise the issue as to whether capital punishment was unconstitutional. In the second hearing, which also took place in 1968, the court did raise the issue but decided that it was neither cruel nor unusual. However, in view of
Witherspoon, the court found that the defendant's death sentence was unconstitutionally decided. In this third hearing, the court changed its mind and decided that capital punishment itself
was cruel or unusual. The court ruled that the use of
capital punishment was considered impermissibly
cruel or unusual as it degraded and dehumanized the parties involved. It held that the penalty is "unnecessary to any legitimate goal of the state and [is] incompatible with the dignity of man and the judicial process". Furthermore, the court also cited the view of capital punishment in American society as one of the most important reasons for its acceptability, contending that a growing population and a decreasing number of executions was persuasive evidence that such a punishment was no longer condoned by the general public. The case also turned on a difference in wording between the U.S. Constitution's
8th Amendment argument against
cruel and unusual punishment and Article 1, Section 6 of the California Constitution (the provision has since moved to Article 1, Section 17), which read (emphasis added): Since the State Constitution prohibits a punishment which is
either of the two conditions (as opposed to prohibiting ones that violate both conditions), the court found the penalty unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds since if it violated either provision it was unconstitutional at the state level. The court even went so far as to decline to even consider if the death penalty violates the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution since it had already found it to be in violation of the state constitution. The court decided it on April 24, 1972. The state contended that while the use of capital punishment served no rehabilitating purposes, it was a legitimate punishment for retribution in serious offenses, in that it served to isolate the offender, and was a useful deterrent to crime. The court rejected the state's defense citing that there were far less onerous means of isolating the offender, and the lack of proof that capital punishment is an effective deterrent.
Dissent Justice
Marshall F. McComb wrote a brief dissent on the basis that the landmark case,
Furman v. Georgia was currently on the docket of the
Supreme Court of the United States and that the court should await its decision before ruling. (The U.S. Supreme Court later ruled in
Furman that the death penalty—as then practiced in almost all of the states that used it—was unconstitutional.) As it turned out, the U.S. Supreme Court would set aside the question whether the death penalty was
per se unconstitutional (later in
Gregg v. Georgia it ruled that the death penalty was constitutional). McComb also argued that the death penalty deterred crime, noting numerous Supreme Court precedents upholding the death penalty's constitutionality, and stating that the legislative and
initiative processes were the only appropriate avenues to determine whether the death penalty should be allowed. McComb was so upset about the
Anderson decision that he walked out of the courtroom. == Aftermath ==