•
Indonesian Army •
Indonesian Navy •
Indonesian Air Force GPST • Angkatan Udara Revolusioner (AUREV) • Pasukan Wanita Permesta (PWP)
Central Intelligence Agency Government source: • 2,499 soldier killed4,098 wounded488 missing • 247 police killed519 wounded320 missing • 956 member of the people's defense organization (OPR) killed611 wounded434 missingTotal: 3,702 killed, 5,228 wounded, 1,242 missing (include casualties in
Permesta and
PRRI rebellion)
Government source: • 22,174 killed • 4,360 wounded • 8,072 captured • 123,917 surrender • 39,000 weapons captured(include casualties of
PRRI member) }}
The bombing of Manado The central government carried out a bombing raid of Manado six days after Somba's statement. At 8:15 am on 22 February 1958, two
B-25 Mitchell bombers from the
Indonesian Air Force (AURI) targeted the radio station in the city. The bombing in Manado hastened the decisions of two Minahasan officers who were initially not enthusiastic about joining Permesta. They were Warouw who had joined Sumual to meet Sukarno in Tokyo and Col.
Alexander Evert (A. E.) Kawilarang who at that time was the military attaché in
Washington, D.C. Kawilarang was an experienced officer in the Indonesian Army who previously commanded three military territories:
TT-I/Bukit Barisan in
Medan,
TT-III/Siliwangi in
Bandung, and also TT-VII before Warouw and Sumual. The bombing also resulted in the people of North Sulawesi being more enthusiastic to the Permesta cause. Two days after the bombing, KDM-SUT announced and instructed former soldiers of the
Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL or
Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger) to report and join Permesta. It is estimated that around 2000 of them self-reported. Even though they were old because KNIL was formed during the
Dutch occupation, they could train younger inexperienced enlistees who joined Permesta. The training was held in Langowan near Tondano for three months, which resulted in the formation of seven
companies from the number of youth who were trained. In addition, a female unit was formed and was named the Permesta Women's Troops (PWP or
Pasukan Wanita Permesta).
Foreign involvement During 1957, the
United States became increasingly concerned that Indonesia was becoming vulnerable to communism due to the rising influence of the
Indonesian Communist Party. In January 1958, the
CIA began developing covert support networks to the PRRI and Permesta rebels. Meetings between the CIA and Sumual as well as Nun Pantouw, who was assigned by Sumual to manage the bartering of
copra sent directly from Sulawesi to abroad, took place several times in Singapore and Manila. After hearing about the AURI attack on Manado, Sumual rushed back to Manado with Pantouw on a chartered
Consolidated PBY Catalina. Sumual realized that the CIA were willing to provide assistance after he was greeted in front of the chartered plane by Brig. Gen.
Pelagio Cruz who was the coordinating director of national intelligence for the
Philippines. He said the cargo that had been loaded at the rear of the plane could be considered as "American goodwill". This goodwill consisted of six
M2 Browning .50 caliber machine guns. Afterwards, arms shipments carried out by sea included small arms, hand grenades, ammunition, and multi-crew weapons. Greater CIA support was seen with the dispatch aircraft that made up the Permesta air force called the Revolutionary Air Force (AUREV or
Angkatan Udara Revolusioner) based in Manado, an air force formed by Permesta in order to seize and control Indonesian airspace. The aircraft sent were 15
B-26 Invader bombers and some
P-51 Mustang fighters. In addition to the aircraft, the CIA sent pilots, mechanics, aircraft weaponry, and spare parts. Weapons also came from
Taiwan, but in the case of Taiwan, Permesta had to pay for the weapons. The first shipment by a PBY Catalina was in the form of 100 rifles and three
M20 recoilless rifles. Taiwan then sent a ship containing weapons the amount of which could be used by soldiers in several battalions and anti-aircraft guns. In addition, the agreement with Taiwan included two
Beech C-45 transport planes accompanied by three chartered pilots. In all, foreign personnel consisted of an international cast of CIA agents and mercenaries from Taiwan, the Philippines,
Poland, and the United States. Then on 16 April 1958, the C-45 aircraft purchased from Taiwan departed from Kalawiran airfield, an airfield constructed by the Dutch that was located near Langowan. The destination of the C-45 aircraft was the airfield in Balikpapan. Apart from the bombing of the runway, an AURI transport plane was also destroyed. On 20 April 1958, B-26 bombers from Mapanget attacked Palu. The next day, the bombers accompanied by two P-51 fighter planes attacked the air base located on
Morotai Island (now
Leo Wattimena Airport). In addition, the second target was the air base at
Jailolo on
Halmahera Island. Over the next several days, airstrikes were again carried out on these sites with the addition of Ternate. On 28 April 1958, ports in
Donggala (near Palu) and Balikpapan were again attacked. In Donggala, the foreign flagged commercial ships
SS Flying Lark,
SS Aquila, and
SS Armonia were sunk and in Balikpapan, the
SS San Flaviano was sunk. In addition, the
Indonesian Navy (ALRI) corvette
RI Hang Tuah was also sunk in which 18 crew members died and 28 were seriously injured. At the time of the attack, the warship had just left Balikpapan for East Java to join the fleet that was preparing to attack the Permesta stronghold in North Sulawesi. The Indonesian government alleged that on 15 May 1958, a marketplace was bombed in Ambon city that killed a large number of civilians.
Operasi Jakarta On 26 April 1958, Sumual led troops transported by several ships from Manado to Morotai with the aim of seizing the air base there. Sumual had instructed the AUREV to attack Morotai by air before Sumual and his troops arrived. The attack was carried out by a B-26 bomber piloted by
Allen Pope who had just arrived in Manado from the Philippines. A P-51 fighter also participated in the attack. After arriving in Morotai the night before, at 6:00 am the next day, the troops led by Sumual began their attack. The air base was guarded by only a few AURI soldiers and police who immediately surrendered without a fight.
The capture of Allen Pope B-26 Invader, similar to the aircraft piloted by Allen Pope During April and early May 1958, AUREV attacks continued including on Ambon and
Kendari. The AUREV had absolute control over the air in eastern Indonesia. Apart from the main airfield in Mapanget, Permesta controlled the airfields in Jailolo, Kalawiran, Morotai, Tasuka (a seaplane base on
Lake Tondano), and Tolotio (now
Jalaluddin Airport). However, Permesta's successes began to cease in mid-May 1958. On 18 May 1958, Pope and radio operator Harry Rantung departed on a B-26 bomber to Ambon to bomb its airfield. After bombing the runway, because there was still one more bomb left, Pope tried to find the ALRI fleet that had come to re-occupy the Halmahera islands. After the fleet was located, Pope focused his attack on the transport ship RI
Sewaga. He did not see the pursuit of a P-51 fighter piloted by Capt. Ignatius Dewanto. Dewanto shot at Pope's B-26 as Pope was preparing his plane for a bombing run. The shots damaged the plane's starboard wing. Meanwhile, shots from the ships hit the bottom of the plane. The plane then started to catch fire and Pope yelled at Rantung to jump out. When Pope jumped out his leg hit the tail of the plane. Pope and Rantung descended by parachute and landed on the edge of Hatata Island located west of Ambon. They were located by local residents who were accompanied by several marines from RI
Sewaga led by Lt. Col. Huhnholz. Two days later, CIA personnel in Mapanget received orders from the Philippines to leave Manado. It was not known if Pope was dead or had been captured. The official statement about Pope by the Indonesian government was only released on 27 May 1958. Before Pope's disappearance, the United States government had started to consider a change in policy towards the situation in Indonesia. They concluded that there were still high-ranking military officers in the TNI who opposed the communist movement, such as Lt. Gen.
Ahmad Yani, and hence support for the Indonesian government could still be justified. At a seminar on Permesta at the
University of Indonesia in 1991 that attended by the US Ambassador to Indonesia, Sumual commented that the United States helped Permesta to secure its own interests. When later it stopped supporting Permesta and in turn helped the generals in Jakarta, that was also to secure its own interests. Before the attack was carried out, the planes flew to several airfields around Ambon in the late afternoon to avoid the AUREV attacks that were usually carried out earlier in the day. At 4:00 am on 15 May 1958, the planes set out for their target. Some went to Mapanget, while the others went to Kalawiran. In Mapanget, they carried out an attack under command of Leo Wattimena in which the B-25s bombed the runway and P-51s fired and strike on parked AUREV aircraft. A rocket hit a PBY Catalina on the ground and it immediately caught on fire. After the attack, the remaining AUREV planes that were still functioning at Mapanget were only one B-26 bomber and one P-51 fighter. Meanwhile, the attack on the Kalawiran airfield destroyed the two C-45 transport planes originating from Taiwan. On 9 June 1958, AURI planes returned to attack Mapanget airfield. The P-51 fighter planes came from Morotai (which had fallen back into the hands of the TNI). However, this attack did not produce results like the previous attack. This time the defense at Mapanget with anti-aircraft guns was better prepared. Two AURI P-51s were shot down in which one pilot was killed.
Operation Mena Operation Mena was part of a joint operation called Operation Merdeka that was ordered by the central government to crush the Permesta rebellion. Operation Mena itself, which consisted of Operation Mena I and Operation Mena II, aimed to secure the Halmahera Islands. Operation Mena I was led by Pieters to recapture Jailolo, while Operation Mena II was led by Holnhulz to recapture Morotai. On 27 May 1958 in a press conference held in Jakarta, Pieters stated that around 400 Permesta soldiers had been surrounded in Jailolo and had received an ultimatum to surrender. Pieters was in Jakarta at the time to transport Allen Pope who was caught in Ambon. Meanwhile, Holnhulz retook Morotai on 20 May 1958. Holnhulz was part of the Amphibious Task Force 21 (ATG-21 or
Gugus Tugas Amphibi 21) that consisted of two troop transports RI
Sawega and RI
Baumasepe, and five minesweepers. The marines landed and attacked in the early hours of the morning, followed by Fast Action Troops (PGT or
Pasukan Gerak Cepat) that parachuted in from a transport plane.
Operation Sapta Marga Operation Sapta Marga was also part of Operation Merdeka. Operation Sapta Marga III was led by Lt. Col. Ernst Julius (E. J.) Mangenda to retake the
Sangihe and
Talaud islands north of Manado. Operation Sapta Marga IV was led by Lt. Col. Rukmito Hendraningrat to reclaim Permesta's main base in North Sulawesi. Operation Sapta Marga II succeeded in recapturing Gorontalo in mid-May 1958 with the help of Nani Wartabone after the area was previously captured by Permesta troops from Wartabone on 17 March 1958. On 19 February 1958, Somba had divided KDM-SUT into two regiments. Sector I/Black Snake covering Sangihe and Talaud, Minahasa, and
Bolaang-Mongondow that led by Maj. Dolf Runturambi and Sector II/Anoa covering Central Sulawesi led by Gerungan. In terms of troops, the number of troops involved in this operation was 16 battalions. These battalions came from, among others, TT-II/Siliwangi, TT-IV/Diponegoro, TT-V/Brawijaya, and TT-XIV/Hasanuddin. Ironically, the idea for the formation of the RPKAD came from Kawilarang (and fellow officer
Slamet Riyadi). Previously on 8 June 1958, Manado was bombarded by ALRI warships. Meanwhile, the AURI attacked Mapanget airfield as well as Tomohon and Tondano on 11 and 13 June 1958. Then on 16 June 1958, a larger landing force consisting of one marine and two infantry battalions was made at
Kema, which is about 30 kilometers southeast of Manado. Sumual had correctly anticipated that the landing would take place at Kema and led the defense there himself. However, he was injured when a mortar exploded nearby forcing him to retreat to Manado. The defense at Kema was quickly overcome by the landing TNI troops. In addition to heading to Manado, TNI troops also moved towards
Bitung, which had a port. Bitung was captured two days later. At the same time, RPKAD troops attacked Mapanget airfield to neutralize its air defenses. Permesta troops managed to hold back the RPKAD, but casualties fell on both sides. There were members of the RPKAD who defected to Permesta before the fighting started, hence many in both sides knew each other. Kawilarang himself personally knew one of the RPKAD soldiers, a sergeant major, who died during the attack. They had been on the same patrols in Java while searching for Muslim extremists.
Fierce fighting in Minahasa Although the defense of Permesta was overcome by TNI troops at the time of landing, the resistance on the road to Manado was fiercer. Permesta troops fought with heavy machine guns and field guns firing 60 mm mortars. This resistance slowed down the movement of the TNI to reach Manado. The same thing happened with the RPKAD troops and infantry moving to Manado from the north. It was almost a month before TNI troops were able to seize Tondano, which was the second largest city in Minahasa, on 21 July 1958. Then it took another month before Tomohon could be captured on 16 August 1958. The struggle for Tomohon was assisted by a local Permesta commander, Maj. Eddy Mongdong. He contacted the TNI troops in Tondano who were preparing to attack Tomohon and stated that he and the 1,500 soldiers in his sector were willing to surrender. A few days later Langowan and Kalawiran were occupied on 20 August 1958. The TNI had occupied towns and areas surrounding major transportation roads, while the remaining areas including the mountains were still controlled by Permesta. This situation remained for almost a year starting in September 1958. The resistance by the Permesta troops that followed were small scale guerrilla attacks. Several larger battles also took place. For example, between 17 and 19 February 1959, a large-scale attack was carried out by Permesta troops called Operation Jakarta Special. The attacks were carried out simultaneously in Amurang, Kawangkoan, Langowan, and Tondano. These attacks almost repelled the TNI in several places, but also claimed the lives of around 100 Permesta soldiers. Although unsuccessful, the attacks proved that Permesta's forces were still determined to resist.
Rifts in Permesta Although resistance continued, it could not be denied that the situation in the Permesta camp was getting worse. Because they had to carry out guerrillas, Sumual, Kawilarang, Warouw, and Somba were all based in different locations. Communication and coordination among them became increasingly difficult in addition to commanding their respective troops. Commanders in various sectors were becoming more difficult to control by their superiors and there were also clashes between units of the troops. Disagreements were also seen up to the top between Kawilarang and Sumual. Unfortunately, Warouw, who usually mediated between Kawilarang and Sumual, was captured by troops led by Jan Timbuleng in April 1960. Timbuleng had led a group that carried out a rebellion in South Minahasa even before the start of Permesta. Timbuleng surrendered in March 1957 and was subsequently merged into Permesta. After it was discovered that Warouw was held hostage by Timbuleng, Timbuleng himself was detained by Sumual. To anticipate this, Timbuleng ordered his men to execute Warouw if he was caught. The execution took place sometime in October 1960. The killing of Warouw was a black chapter in the Permesta struggle that caused mutual suspicion among fellow troops and the deterioration of cohesiveness within the Permesta camp. == Resolution ==