Justification (epistemology)

"Justification" involves the reasons why someone holds a belief that one should hold based on one's current evidence.. It is particularly associated with a theory discussed in his dialogues Meno and Theaetetus. While in fact Plato seems to disavow justified true belief as constituting knowledge at the end of Theaetetus, the claim that Plato unquestioningly accepted this view of knowledge stuck until the proposal of the Gettier problem. The subject of justification has played a major role in the value of knowledge as "justified true belief". Some contemporary epistemologists, such as Jonathan Kvanvig, assert that justification isn't necessary in getting to the truth and avoiding errors. Kvanvig attempts to show that knowledge is no more valuable than true belief, and in the process dismissed the necessity of justification due to justification not being connected to the truth. ==Conceptions of justification==

William P. Alston identifies two conceptions of justification. One conception is "deontological" justification, which holds that justification evaluates the obligation and responsibility of a person having only true beliefs. This conception implies, for instance, that a person who has made his best effort but is incapable of concluding the correct belief from his evidence is still justified. The deontological conception of justification corresponds to epistemic internalism. Another conception is "truth-conducive" justification, which holds that justification is based on having sufficient evidence or reasons that entails that the belief is at least likely to be true. The truth-conductive conception of justification corresponds to epistemic externalism. ==Theories of justification==

There are several different views as to what entails justification, mostly focusing on the question "How beliefs are justified?". Different theories of justification require different conditions before a belief can be considered justified. Theories of justification generally include other aspects of epistemology, such as defining knowledge. Notable theories of justification include: • FoundationalismBasic beliefs justify other, non-basic beliefs. • Epistemic coherentismBeliefs are justified if they cohere with other beliefs a person holds, each belief is justified if it coheres with the overall system of beliefs. • InfinitismBeliefs are justified by infinite chains of reasons. • FoundherentismBoth fallible foundations and coherence are components of justification—proposed by Susan Haack. • Internalism and externalismThe believer must be able to justify a belief through internal knowledge (internalism), or outside sources of knowledge (externalism). • Reformed epistemologyBeliefs are warranted by proper cognitive function—proposed by Alvin Plantinga. • EvidentialismBeliefs depend solely on the evidence for them. • ReliabilismA belief is justified if it is the result of a reliable process. • InfallibilismKnowledge is incompatible with the possibility of being wrong. • FallibilismClaims can be accepted even though they cannot be conclusively proven or justified. • Non-justificationismKnowledge is produced by attacking claims and refuting them instead of justifying them. • SkepticismKnowledge is impossible or undecidable. == Criticism of theories of justification ==

Robert Fogelin claims to detect a suspicious resemblance between the theories of justification and Agrippa's five modes leading to the suspension of belief. He concludes that the modern proponents have made no significant progress in responding to the ancient modes of Pyrrhonian skepticism. William P. Alston criticizes the very idea of a theory of justification. He claims: "There isn't any unique, epistemically crucial property of beliefs picked out by 'justified'. Epistemologists who suppose the contrary have been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. What has really been happening is this. Different epistemologists have been emphasizing, concentrating on, "pushing" different epistemic desiderata, different features of belief that are positively valuable from the standpoint of the aims of cognition." ==See also==