A search for the flight's black boxes was immediately conducted. The search was initially hampered due to the ground conditions at the crash site. Both the flight data recorder (FDR) and the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were eventually found by the search and rescue team, and were taken from the crash site for further investigation. Both recorders were sent to the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the United States for readout analysis. The investigation further revealed that the airport's
non-directional beacon (NDB) had also been turned off. At the time of the accident, several lights at the runway end were unlit due to a renovation at the airport. This caused the distance between the lights to change to a distance of between each other rather than the usual . The approach lights were also not turned on. The inclement weather and the unlit condition of the runway would make it harder for the pilots to see the runway and to land at the airport.
Factors leading to stall In all of the flight crew's attempts to approach Surat Thani, the pilots always saw the runway to their right rather than ahead. This was caused by the placement of the
VOR (used as an approach aid by the airport), which was located at the left side of the runway (track 225 degree). Flight 261 was on a 215 degree track with visibility less than . As such, the pilots were able to see the runway only if they had passed the runway centreline. In all of their attempts to land, they were too far left of the runway. It was a difficult approach for the pilots and this might explain why the flight had gone through multiple go-around attempts. Additionally, the pilots were not familiar with this non-precision approach. During the first attempt, the wind was calm and the visibility was . The co-pilot sighted the runway and the pilot tried to land. However, the pilot announced that they were unable to land and decided to go-around. As they initiated the go-around, the pilot noticed the high rate of climb of the aircraft. The co-pilot stated that it might have been caused by the light weight of the aircraft (Flight 261 was 102 tonnes while its maximum permissible landing weight was 122 tonnes). The engines gradually increased and there was a low pitching up moment. Investigators noted that no signs of pilot fatigue were found in the first go-around attempt. In the second attempt, the pilots decided to use the autopilot but were again unable to see the runway, possibly due to the unlit condition of several runway lights. The pilots then decided to go-around with the autopilot and autothrottle. In the third attempt, the controller in Surat Thani informed the flight crew that the visibility had deteriorated to 1,000 metres; both pilots were worried about this. The co-pilot then reported "final approach fix", the controller cleared Flight 261 to land and the pilots disengaged autopilot. The flight crew of Flight 261 had attempted to land at the airport at least twice. At the time of the accident, the flight crew were attempting their third attempt. If they failed all three attempts, then the flight would have to return to Bangkok, even though they had arrived at the destination airport. The low visibility, unsuccessful landing attempts in Surat Thani, and the possibility of going back to Bangkok caused a heavy workload with the pilots of Flight 261. The flight crew's attention was channeled due to the stress, causing them to lose situational awareness. The aircraft involved in the accident was an Airbus A310, a medium range airliner equipped with two large turbo fan engines, both of which were located under swept wings. According to investigators, if the pilots decided to trigger the go-around using go-around mode, the autothrottle system would move the throttle forward at a rate of 8 degrees per second, causing the aircraft's nose to pitch up. If autopilot was used, the pitch attitude would be automatically regulated. However, if manual controls were used, the plane's attitude would be difficult to determine, increasing the likelihood of a stall. The pilots were manually flying the aircraft in their third landing attempt and were unable to see the runway until they were too close. The flight crew then declared "cannot land, cannot land" and decided to go-around. The go-around button (autothrottle) was engaged and the engines spun from 59% to 102% in a span of 8 seconds, causing the aircraft to quickly pitch up, which was described by a surviving flight attendant as "the pilots pulling up the aircraft harshly". The pitch continued to increase and the pilots tried to level out with the aircraft's elevator, but only managed to decrease the pitch rate a small amount. It then increased again, reaching as high as 40 degrees. The elevator was again engaged and the pitch decreased to 32-33 degrees for approximately 6 seconds. The pilots then suddenly did not apply the elevator anymore, causing the pitch to increase to 47-48 degrees. By this time, the speed had decayed to . The aircraft then entered a stall and crashed into the swamp.
Management oversight In the same year, Thai Airways International began reducing the number of its foreign pilots. Vice-president of the company, Chamlong Poompuang, stated that pilots were trained to exercise high caution. At the same time, he recognized that the airline had undertaken fuel-saving measures due to the economic downturn, but that flight operations should not be performed if safety was compromised. Thai Airways International chairman Thamnoon Wanglee emphasized, "Safety is our highest priority. What our policy is, and what happened, are two different things."
Conclusion Thailand's Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee concluded the cause of the crash as follows: ==Aftermath==