Origins Today's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) traces its roots back to September 1924 when a small group of nine cadets from the still-young
Chinese Communist Party graduated from
Sun Yat-sen's military flight school in
Guangzhou. Having only been founded three years prior in July 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formed a
united front with the nationalist
Kuomintang (KMT) party against competing
warlords in a bid to reunite a fractionalized China. The eighteen graduate pilots of the military flight school, under Sun's Guangzhou Revolutionary Government Aviation Bureau, included nine
nationalist and nine
communist pilots who were sent to the
Soviet Union for two years of advanced flight training under the tutelage of the more experienced
Soviet Air Force. Two of the CCP's graduates, Chang Qiankun and Wang Bi, continued to serve in the Soviet Air Force for fourteen years until, in September 1938, they returned to
Dihua (now
Ürümqi) as instructors. Chang and Wang would play instrumental roles in the founding of the PLAAF. The squadron had acquired these Western-made aircraft by capturing planes that had been once donated to the KMT for use against the Japanese. In March 1949, the CMC elevated its Aviation Section to the short-lived Aviation Bureau with Chang Qiankun and Wang Bi appointed as the bureau's director and political commissar, respectively. On 1 October 1949, the victorious communist forces established the People's Republic of China and, on 11 November 1949, the CMC dissolved its Aviation Section, instead founding the People's Liberation Army Air Force. Initially manned by a variety of units taken from the ground forces, the new PLAAF organized its headquarters (PLAAF HQ) in Beijing and organized administrative aviation divisions for each of the PLA's six military regions, later to be named Military Region Air Forces (MRAFs). The new organization, which was not yet seen as a service separate from the army, was headed by ground force commander
Liu Yalou with
Xiao Hua (formerly a ground force commander and political commissar) as the PLAAF's first political commissar.
Korean War to the Sino-Soviet Split The PLAAF expanded rapidly during the
Korean War. Two brigades were created in 1950, but they were disbanded in the early 1950s and replaced by
divisions; both unit types had subordinate regiments. During the war, 26 divisions and a smaller number of independent regiments and schools were created by personnel transfers from the army; the air force inherited the army's organization and was commanded by army officers. By early 1954, there were 28 divisions, with 70 regiments, and five independent regiments operating 3,000 aircraft. The PLAAF emerged from the war as an air defense force. Its main role was to support the army by achieving air superiority using fighters, radar, and ground-based weapons. This was reinforced through the 1950s and 1960s when the PLAAF's main activities were skirmishing with the
Republic of China Air Force near the
Taiwan Strait, and intercepting American aircraft. The PLAAF was passive in applying offensive airpower due to the limited range of capabilities and political considerations. PLAAF was used as a deterrent due to the political culture at the time. The Chinese leadership, in many instances, would cancel offensive bombing missions to prevent escalation, affecting the decision-making autonomy of the PLAAF. In 1960, Soviet engineers and advisors left China due to the
Sino-Soviet split; although the Soviet Union granted licensed rights to MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, Il-28, and Tu-16, China didn't retain either the technical materials or the machinery as the Soviet advisors withdrew. China had to reverse-engineer aircraft and missile systems to set up production lines. The prioritization of the
missile and nuclear weapon programs also removed necessary resources from the aviation industry, which markedly declined through 1963. Between January 1954 and 1971, 22 new divisions were created for a total of 50. In peacetime the Air Force Directorate, under the supervision of the
PLA General Staff Department, controlled the Air Force through headquarters located with, or in communication with, each of the seven
military region headquarters. In war, control of the Air Force probably reverted to the regional commanders. In 1987 it was not clear how the reorganization and the incorporation of air support elements into the group armies affected air force organization. The largest Air Force organizational unit was the
division, which consisted of 17,000 personnel in three
regiments. A typical air defense regiment had three
squadrons of three flights; each flight had three or four aircraft. The Air Force also had 220,000 air defense personnel who controlled about 100
surface-to-air missile sites and over 16,000
AA guns. In addition, it had a large number of
early-warning,
ground-control-intercept, and air-base radars operated by specialized troops organized into at least twenty-two independent regiments. In the 1980s, the Air Force made serious efforts to raise the educational level and improve the training of its pilots. which replaced training regiments in operational divisions. In 1987 the Air Force had serious technological deficiencies — especially when compared with its principal threat, the
Soviet Armed Forces — and had many needs that it could not satisfy. It needed more advanced aircraft, better
avionics,
electronic countermeasures equipment, more powerful
aircraft weaponry, a low-altitude
surface-to-air missile, and better controlled
antiaircraft artillery guns. Some progress was made in aircraft design with the incorporation of Western avionics into the
Chengdu J-7 and
Shenyang J-8, the development of refueling capabilities for the
H-6D bomber and the
Nanchang Q-5 attack fighter, increased aircraft all-weather capabilities, and started production of the
HQ-2J high-altitude surface-to-air missile and the
C-601 air-to-ship missile. Although the PLAAF received significant support from Western nations in the 1980s when China was seen as a counterweight to Soviet power, this support ended in 1989 as a result of the Chinese crackdown on the
Tiananmen protests of 1989 and the later collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
1990s to 2000s In the late 1980s and early 1990s, PLAAF still remained a large yet antiqued force. As of 1995, the air force consisted of approximately 4,500 combat aircraft based on 50s and 60s technologies, which were approaching the end of their service life. The overall force strategy is defensive, with the primary objectives limited to protecting cities, airbases, economic and industrial centers, and important institutions and facilities. The air fleet continued to shrink, with
RAND Corporation predicting PLAAF would be halved by the early 2000s. PLAAF leadership also lacked strategic options, given the severe constraints in China's budgets, manpower, and technology at the time. The force lacked joint operation capabilities, had no combat experience since 1979, and lacked command and control infrastructure to support offensive operations beyond the Chinese borders. The Chinese aviation industrial base was inadequate and weak, and China lacked the capacity to produce modern avionics, composites, turbofan engines, and integrated systems. Israel, which allowed Chinese access to many state-of-the-art technologies. However, the concerns over the US possible intervention during a
Taiwan independence scenario in 1992 to 1993 pressurized PLAAF to build near-term combat capability by prioritizing
procurement of foreign platforms, which led to the further induction of platforms such as the
Sukhoi Su-30 and the
S-300 PMU-1. At the same time, PLAAF leadership advocated for more active roles in the Chinese military, but was sidelined by the PLA headquarters due to concerns over political reliability and a general lack of capabilities. PLAAF continued persuasive efforts, and their plans were eventually endorsed by the PLA leadership in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 2004 reform included changes in doctrine, equipment, training, education, organizational structure, and strategic thinking. acquired 76
Sukhoi Su-30MKK and 24
Su-30MK2 from Russia with improved composite material, weapons, and avionics akin to the
Sukhoi Su-35, and negotiated the purchase of 38
Ilyushin Il-76 and
Ilyushin Il-78 transport/tanker aircraft. To replace the antiquated
Nanchang Q-5 attack plane, PLAAF introduced fighter-bomber
Xi'an JH-7A with precision-strike capabilities. the
Shenyang J-11B air superiority fighter in 2006,
Shaanxi Y-9 medium airlifter and
Shenyang J-15 carrier-born fighter in 2009, and most notably, the
Chengdu J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter in 2010.
2010s in 2018 In the 2010s, PLAAF began to transform expeditiously and emerged as one of the most significant global competitors in airpower. According to the US Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center, PLAAF was projected to become one of the most capable air forces by 2020. PLAAF improved capabilities in several areas, including fighters, advanced missiles, early warning systems, and air defense systems; the force also started major reforms in training and doctrines. PLAAF leadership realized the current force was insufficient to counter US intervention in a Taiwan strait confrontation, thus invested heavily in a wider range of conventional capabilities to transition the PLAAF from a large, technologically inferior force to a force able to hold advantageous positions in both quality and quantity in its own geopolitical theater. projecting a majority fourth-generation force structure in the near future. The PLAAF also focused on developing long-range strike options with improved bomber platforms based on the
Xian H-6K, In 2014, the Pentagon noted PLAAF was rapidly closing the gap in its training, equipment, and power projection capabilities with the United States. From 2014 to 2016, PLAAF intensified its joint operations efforts with the
PLA Navy, building up power projection and expeditionary strike capabilities with other service branches, and engaged in joint patrol missions with the PLA Navy in the
East and
South China Sea. In 2015, the PLA separated
PLA Ground Force headquarters from the senior position, putting all service branches in the same echelon, thus ending the tradition of Army domination in PLA's command structure. A joint command structure under the newly reformed
theater commands was established, improving inter-service support, command, and control efficiency, and cross-service warfighting capability. In 2016, PLA established the
People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, which stripped PLAAF's responsibilities in space and information domain, leaving the air force focused on air operations, air defense, electronic warfare, airborne early warning, and air-to-ground surface strike missions. In the same year, PLAAF general
Ma Xiaotian announced that China was developing a new type of long-range bomber on the air force's open day, which was later named the
Xian H-20 stealth bomber. After the reform, analysts noted PLAAF's joint operation and integrated fighting capabilities were considerably improved. In March 2017, PLAAF incorporated
Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter into service and formed the first combat unit in February 2018, Around the same time, PLAAF introduced the
PL-10 and
PL-15 missiles, which noticeably improved the PLAAF's air combat capability. By 2019, aviation researchers believed that Chinese weapon platforms have reached approximate parity with Western equivalents, and surpassed Russia in most aspects of aviation technology development and implementation. In 2019 and 2020, PLAAF began to reform its pilot curriculum and transitional training programs, inducting advanced jet trainers and active-service fighters at dedicated training academies, ending the traditional practice of training pilot at operational units. The measure improved training efficiency and prevented distraction to the defense responsibilities of the active units. According to International Institute for Strategic Studies, PLAAF had an unprecedented military build-up between 2016 and 2022. The force successfully closed the gap with the West due to improved domestic production, introducing indigenously developed airframes, composite materials, turbofan engines, advanced avionics, and weapon systems. In six years, PLAAF incorporated over 600 fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft in more than 19 frontline combat brigades. The modern
Chengdu J-10C,
Shenyang J-16, and
Chengdu J-20 are all equipped with
AESA radar systems, domestic
WS-10 engines,
standoff weapons, and long-range air-to-air missiles. PLAAF also made substantial progress with larger aircraft design and production in the form of
Xian Y-20 and
WS-20 engines. According to an
Air University assessment in 2022, PLAAF was adjudged a strategic air force with the capabilities of long-distance
power projection, maintaining combat readiness, and conducting global operations to protect Chinese interests. In 2023, PLAAF planned to decommission all older
Chengdu J-7 and
Shenyang J-8 platforms, which completed the PLAAF's transition to an air fleet composed of only fourth-generation and fifth-generation combat aircraft.
2020s In 2020, the PLAAF started to replace training aircraft with newer designs, such as the
Hongdu JL-10. New aircraft and revised flight training programs improved training efficiency. PLAAF also emphasized gaining combat experience and tactical insights through sending pilots to foreign independent flight schools or recruiting foreign nationals to Chinese training bases. Pilots from across multiple Western militaries were reportedly recruited to help the Chinese military understand and counter Western aircraft and tactics. Since 2021, China has also rapidly expanded its ability to assemble and deliver aircraft. Major expansions and infrastructure improvements of
Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) manufacturing facilities were observed across China. By 2027, the AVIC was capable of delivering at least 250 aircraft per year to the PLAAF, while the whole AVIC would have the capacity to produce 300-400 fourth- and
fifth-generation fighters annually. With the expanded industrial base, the PLAAF aircraft fleet saw extraordinary qualitative and quantitative increases between 2020 and 2026. The premier aircraft
Chengdu J-20 grew from 50 airframes in 2020 to 300 in mid-2025, with additional variants (J-20A and J-20S) entering service. Similarly, the
Shenyang J-16 number grew to 450 in 2025, while all variants of the J-10 grew to 550. Besides the quantitative edge in the fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, the PLAAF also saw diverse new capabilities added. The force introduced a new electronic warfare aircraft (
J-16D), a new stealth fighter (
Shenyang J-35A), improved quality of aircrew and exercise programme, large-scale deployment of competitive missile systems such as PL-15 and PL-17 with notable combat performance, enhanced surface-to-air missile capability (including
HQ-9B/C,
HQ-19,
HQ-22, and
HQ-26), and a thorough improvement in airborne sensor nodes (
KJ-500) backed by orbital ISR and communication capabilities. ==Personnel==