Androcentrism A critique of Kohlberg's theory is that it emphasizes justice to the exclusion of other values and so may not adequately address the arguments of those who value other moral aspects of actions.
Carol Gilligan, in her book
In a Different Voice, has argued that Kohlberg's theory is excessively
androcentric. Kohlberg stated that women tend to get stuck at level 3, being primarily concerned with details of how to maintain relationships and promote the welfare of family and friends. Men are likely to move on to the abstract principles and thus have less concern with the particulars of who is involved. Consistent with this observation, Gilligan's theory of moral development does not value justice above other considerations. She developed an alternative theory of moral reasoning based on the
ethics of caring.
Cross-cultural generalizability Kohlberg's stages are not culturally neutral, as demonstrated by its use for several cultures (particularly in the case of the highest developmental stages). Although they progress through the stages in the same order, individuals in different cultures seem to do so at different rates. Kohlberg has responded by saying that although cultures inculcate different beliefs, his stages correspond to underlying modes of reasoning, rather than to beliefs. Most cultures do place some value of life, truth, and law, but to assert that these values are virtually universal requires more research. According to Snarey and Kelio, Kohlberg's theory of moral development is not represented in ideas like
Gemeinschaft of the communitive feeling. While there had been criticism directed towards the cross-cultural universality of Kohlberg's theory, Carolyn Edwards argued that the dilemma interview method, the standard scoring system, and the cognitive-development theory are all valid and productive in teaching and understanding of moral reasoning across all cultures.
Inconsistency in moral judgments Another criticism of Kohlberg's theory is that people frequently demonstrate significant inconsistency in their moral judgements. This often occurs in moral dilemmas involving drinking and driving and business situations where participants have been shown to reason at a subpar stage, typically using more self-interested reasoning (stage two) than authority and social order obedience reasoning (stage four). Kohlberg's theory is generally considered to be incompatible with inconsistencies in moral reasoning.
Immanuel Kant "predicted" and rebutted that argument when he considered such actions as opening an exception for ourselves in the
categorical imperative.
Reasoning vs. intuition Other psychologists have questioned the assumption that moral action is primarily a result of
formal reasoning. Social intuitionists such as
Jonathan Haidt argue that individuals often make moral judgments without weighing concerns such as fairness, law,
human rights or ethical values. Thus the arguments analyzed by Kohlberg and other
rationalist psychologists could be considered
post hoc rationalizations of intuitive decisions; moral reasoning may be less relevant to moral action than Kohlberg's theory suggests. The researchers utilized the moral judgement interview (MJI) and two standard dilemmas to compare the 23 exemplars with a more ordinary group of people. The intention was to learn more about moral exemplars and to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the Kohlberg measure. They found that the MJI scores were not clustered at the high end of Kohlberg's scale; they ranged from stage 3 to stage 5. Half landed at the conventional level (stages 3, 3/4, and 4) and the other half landed at the postconventional level (stages 4/5 and 5). Apart from their scores, it was found that the 23 participating moral exemplars described three similar themes within all of their moral developments: certainty, positivity, and the unity of self and moral goals. The unity between self and moral goals was highlighted as the most important theme as it is what truly sets the exemplars apart from the 'ordinary' people. It was discovered that the moral exemplars see their morality as a part of their sense of identity and sense of self, not as a conscious choice or chore. Also, the moral exemplars showed a much broader range of moral concern than did the ordinary people and go beyond the normal acts of daily moral engagements. Rather than confirm the existence of a single highest stage, Larry Walker's
cluster analysis of a wide variety of interview and survey variables for moral exemplars found three types: the "caring" or "communal" cluster was strongly relational and generative, the "deliberative" cluster had sophisticated
epistemic and moral reasoning, and the "brave" or "ordinary" cluster was less distinguished by personality. ==Continued relevance==