Project National Glory

In 1949, the ROC retreated from the mainland to Taiwan. The ROC took steps to stabilize its position and prepare for the future war. The armed forces (ROCAF) undertook reforms. The conscription system was modified to produce a reserve. Former Japanese soldiers, the White Group, contributed to planning and personnel training. The provision of military aid from the US was formalized with the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. By the end of the 1950s, the ROCAF was an effective defensive force. In March 1956, plans envisioned the mobilization of 730,000 men from the ages of 21 to 35. The ROC also planned and sought opportunities to attack the PRC. The PRC was suffering internal unrest from the Great Leap Forward and the ongoing Sino-Soviet split was also considered to be advantageous. ==Invasion planning and postponement==

Project Guoguang was established on 1 April 1961. it was led by a lieutenant general and reported directly to Chiang Kai-shek. In April 1964, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the construction of a headquarters, including air raid shelters, behind his residence at Cihu. The war plan was divided into multiple phases, with Phase I being the initial surprise amphibious assault of Xiamen in Fujian province. The ROC island of Jinmen would be the forward operating base. PRC reinforcements were expected to arrive five days before the landing, so any landing would meet an immediate counterattack. It was estimated the landing would require 270,000 troops — about a third of mobilized strength — and suffer 50,000 casualties. After the landing, the ROC would advance by covertly fomenting, or taking advantage of unrest in the PRC. However, this was too vague for planning purposes, and so detailed planning did not proceed beyond Phase I. Planners recognized that even Phase I was a difficult proposition; it stretched available manpower and exceeded available sea and airlift for troops and logistics. The ROC also sought US support as a necessary precondition for war, and which could make up for the transport and logistics shortfalls. However, the US opposed the resumption of warfare in China; it communicated this through diplomatic channels, and by overtly surveilling the ROC's preparations through the Military Assistance Advisory Group. This prompted the ROC to put the invasion on hold. ==Second attempt==

Chiang Kai-shek decided to proceed without US approval following the PRC's first successful nuclear weapon test in October 1964; on 17 June 1965, he notified officers at a meeting at the ROC Military Academy that the invasion was imminent. Ultimately, no invasion was launched but the year was marred by accidents and defeats. On 24 June, an amphibious landing exercise in southern Taiwan caused the deaths of over ten soldiers when strong waves overturned five amphibious assault vehicles. On 6 August at the Battle of Dongshan, two ROC Navy (ROCN) warships carrying troops to conduct a reconnaissance of the mainland were intercepted and sunk by People's Liberation Army Navy torpedo boats near Dongshan Island, Fujian; 200 ROC personnel were killed. The warships lacked air support; the ROC Air Force had been unaware of the mission due to a communication error. In November at the Battle of East Chongwu, the ROCN warships Shan Hai and Lin Huai were intercepted by the PLAN while en route the islands of Magong and Wuqiu to pick up wounded troops. Lin Huai was sunk by two torpedoes, and 90 ROC personnel were killed. ==Further proposals to the US==

In September 1965, the ROC offered to aid the US in the Vietnam War by invading Guangdong province. The offer was rejected as the US was then attempting to limit the war and did not want to expand the conflict (at this time intervention in Cambodia and Laos was not US policy). The Guoguang Operation Office was renamed as the Operation Planning Office in 1966. ==Reassessing strategy==

The acceptance of US non-involvement and the replacement of US military aid by Foreign Military Sales forced the ROC to reassess its strategy. Economic development — upon which military preparedness would depend — now had to be considered. Chiang Ching-kuo believed that success required a popular and armed anti-Communist revolution ("Hungary-style") in the PRC — which an ROC invasion could then support — and significant changes to the international environment. The new strategy was to build an economy to support offensive operations while encouraging revolution in the PRC with psychological warfare and propaganda. and announcement of the withdrawal of US troops from Taiwan in the Shanghai Communiqué Chiang Ching-kuo appreciated this, although he continued to support — at least in principle — an eventual offensive. For a time, the ROC may have abandoned the expectation of mounting a large scale attack on the PRC; the Operation Planning Office was abolished on 20 July 1972. Attention shifted to the "Wang-shih" plan, The ROCAF remained organized as an offensive force, and paratroops were trained to support an offensive. ==Aftermath==

Lee Teng-hui served as acting president after Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, In April 2009 it was announced that secret documentation for Project Guoguang would be declassified and displayed at the Cihu Mausoleum starting in May 2009. ==See also==