Moldaver,
Karakatsanis and
Brown JJ., speaking for the majority, found that the framework set out in
R v Morin caused significant complications and contributed to a culture of delay and complacency. They pointed out that the application of the framework was unpredictable, relied on the notion of prejudice, which is "confusing, hard to prove, and highly subjective", didn't encourage the courts and parties to prevent delays, and was unduly complex. They proposed a new framework, based on a ceiling beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable: 18 months for cases tried in provincial courts without preliminary inquiry, and 30 months for cases tried in provincial courts after a preliminary inquiry or in superior courts. Delays attributable to the defence are however subtracted from the ceiling (ex.: requesting unnecessary postponements, or an insufficient effort to accommodate the scheduling of court appearances), so an accused cannot slow the judicial process to their advantage. Since the delay in trying Jordan had been of 49.5 months, of which 44 were imputable to the Crown or to systemic delays, his appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was entered. ==Concurrence==