SS El Faro

El Faro was built by the Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation in Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1975 as Puerto Rico. In 1992, the ship underwent a conversion at Atlantic Marine Shipyard in Mobile, Alabama. A 90-foot (27 meters) mid-body, which included an additional cargo hold and a spar deck, was added. Between 2005 and 2006 the ship was modified a second time, also at Atlantic Marine Shipyard, to carry lift-on/lift-off cranes. In February 2003, just before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the ship was chartered by the Military Sealift Command as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom; she ferried Marines and military equipment from San Diego, California, to Kuwait. On March 19, while in the Persian Gulf, the vessel came under fire from missiles. The nearby explosions rocked the ship but caused no damage or injuries. She completed the American Bureau of Shipping class and statutory surveys in February 2015. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that safety drills were conducted weekly and that the ship met stability criteria when she left Jacksonville, Florida, for her fateful voyage. Former crew members of El Faro expressed surprise and shock that the vessel had set sail with a major storm along its planned track. They said the vessel was "a rust bucket" that was not "supposed to be on the water" and that it suffered drainage problems and leaks in the galley compartment. They reported that the ship's decks were filled with holes as recently as two months before her sinking. Following the ship's disappearance, the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Center staff examined El Faros sister ship, El Yunque. The staff found that the condition of El Yunques cargo ventilation system was poor and likely would have been a source of intermittent flooding during rolling in 25–30 ft seas (7.6 - 9.1 meters). ==Final voyage==

On September 29, 2015, at 8:10 p.m., El Faro left Jacksonville for San Juan, Puerto Rico, carrying a cargo of 391 shipping containers, about 294 trailers and cars, and a crew of 33 people—28 Americans and 5 Poles. The vessel's voyage plan took it within of the storm, where seas in excess of were likely. Hurricane Joaquin Joaquin became a hurricane by 8:00 a.m. on September 30, then rapidly intensified. Throughout the rest of the day and into the morning of October 1, the storm continued to track southwest. By 11:00 pm, the storm had reached Category 3 intensity with maximum sustained winds of . Ten hours after departing from Jacksonville, El Faro had deviated from her charted course. Less than twenty hours later, at around 7:30 a.m. on October 1, the Coast Guard received a satellite notification that the vessel had lost propulsion, taken on water—though flooding was contained at the time of the message—and had a 15-degree list. The Coast Guard also received a single ping from the ship's Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon. Subsequent attempts to open communications with El Faro were unsuccessful. According to a different marine positioning database, relayed by Reuters, the final relayed position of El Faro was at 7:56 a.m., Voyage data recorder audio On December 13, 2016, the NTSB released a 500-page transcript of the conversations that occurred on the bridge in the ship's final twenty-six hours, as recorded by the vessel's voyage data recorder (VDR) and its six microphones. The transcript described a quickly deteriorating situation. At 5:43 a.m. on the morning of the sinking, Davidson took a phone call indicating suspected flooding in the no. 3 cargo hold and sent the chief mate to investigate. The crew began taking measures to try to assess and control the flooding. At 7:06 a.m., Davidson made a phone call, stating: • "I have a marine emergency and I would like to speak with a QI (Qualified Individual). We had a hull breach- a scuttle blew open during the storm. We have water down in three hold. We have a heavy list. We've lost the main propulsion unit. The engineers cannot get it goin'. Can I speak with a QI please?" On October 2, a Coast Guard HC-130H Hercules aircraft from Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater in Florida began a dedicated search for the ship. and an MH-60T Jayhawk helicopter from CGAS Clearwater joined search efforts later that day. MH-65C Dolphin helicopters from Coast Guard Air Station Miami in Florida and Coast Guard Air Station Borinquen in Puerto Rico, along with HC-144A Ocean Sentry fixed-wing patrol aircraft from Miami, were also present. Throughout October 3, aircraft flew in violent hurricane conditions, characterized by winds in excess of at an altitude of , waves up to , and visibility less than . Despite the hazardous conditions, a helicopter crew recovered a life ring from El Faro. Conditions markedly improved on October 4 as Joaquin moved northeast, away from the Bahamas; winds averaged and visibility was unlimited. Northland and Resolute continued operations overnight with engineers using night vision goggles to take part in the search. The United States Navy provided P-8A Poseidon fixed wing aircraft from Naval Air Station Jacksonville to assist on October 5; three Crowley Maritime tugboats also joined. Before the helicopter's crew could recover the corpse, they were called away to investigate a report of another immersion suit with a possible survivor inside, and left a self-locating datum marker buoy on the corpse to mark its position. However, when the helicopter returned its crew was unable to relocate the corpse due to the buoy failing. The vessel was declared lost at sea on this day, believed to have sunk in of water, and the search turned into a search and recovery effort. The U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard provided three additional HC-130P/J aircraft on October 6. A total of of water was covered in search of the vessel. Two debris fields were discovered: one covering situated near El Faros final position, and the other spanning located northeast of the first debris field. At sunset on October 7, the Coast Guard announced the cessation of search operations. ==Aftermath==

On October 7, a Navy salvage team was requested to search for the wreckage at the behest of the NTSB. Nelson also cited that El Faros lifeboats were "outdated and inadequate for the conditions the crew faced". The Coast Guard in its enforcement activity 5752773 report recommended to fine Tote a total of $5,350 for five code violations. On October 14, a $100 million lawsuit was filed against TOTE by a family member of one of the missing crew, citing negligence on the company's behalf in letting a non-seaworthy vessel sail into a hurricane. On October 28, another lawsuit was filed on behalf of the estate of a man who died in the sinking. The complaint stated that "without power, the M/V EL FARO was merely a cork in the sea as the Hurricane neared". By April 19, 2016, TOTE Maritime had settled with 18 of the 33 families for more than $7 million. was chosen to replace El Faros former operations. Writer William Langewiesche stated that the fact that El Faro was flagged to the United States, the fact that the ship sailed into a hurricane despite having the capacity to avoid it, and that the captain was "respected", all gave "immediate attention" to the incident. On January 3, 2016, the NTSB opened the public accident docket on the investigation into the sinking, initially releasing underwater images and video of the vessel. Second and third search effort for VDR On April 18, 2016, the NTSB launched a second search for the VDR, using the , a Navy-owned vessel operated by mariners of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. On April 26, the NTSB said the VDR was found about northeast of Acklins and Crooked Islands, Bahamas. The agency was unable to retrieve the recorder at that time because it was too close to the ship's mast and other obstructions. On August 5, 2016, USNS Apache returned to the site and, five days later, recovered the VDR. Ten months after the sinking, the VDR was delivered to the NTSB in Mayport, Florida to continue the investigation. The 199-page Marine Board's Report detailed facts, analysis, and conclusions and made safety, administrative and enforcement recommendations. Following the incident, Regional Commander of the Coast Guard Captain Jeff Dixon switched sides, despite Coast Guard lifetime ban rules on switching sides and became the President of TOTE Services. NTSB The NTSB met in Washington, D.C., on December 12, 2017, to discuss contributing factors to the sinking as well as to "vote on recommendations to address safety issues uncovered during the investigation". The board meeting was webcast live. • criticized Captain Davidson's decision to advance into the oncoming storm, despite numerous calls from the crew to alter course, and noted he had relied on outdated weather information from a commercial service, Bon Voyage System • criticized the Coast Guard's practices of grandfathering in vessels, exempting them from using closed lifeboats; the obsolete lifeboats were not properly maintained, were not launched, and in all probability would not have offered useful shelter • noted TOTE's failure to maintain a superannuated and deteriorating vessel In their final report, the NTSB determined Memorials Twin memorials remembering El Faro's crew were erected in Jacksonville and in San Juan. There is another memorial located in Rockland, Maine by artist Jay Sawyer. Five people from the Rockland-area died on the El Faro. A memorial plaque is also installed on the pier in Gdynia, Poland. Five of the El Faro crew were Polish nationals. An El Faro Memorial was dedicated at the Star Center (located on the American Maritime Officers Plans campus)on September 29th, 2018. Located in Dania Beach, Florida. ==See also==