As USAF tactical air strikes began in Laos, it became apparent that, for the safety of noncombatants, some means of control was necessary. Beginning at least as early as July 1964, the absence of a close air support control system caused a variety of enterprising individuals to improvise procedures for marking ground targets. At various times, ground markers, including bamboo arrows and dropped smoke grenades, were used. Those marking targets often had little or no training in close air support (CAS). They varied in nationality, being Thai, Lao, or Hmong, as well as American. Another of the Butterflies was Major John J. Garrity, Jr., who in future would spend several years as the
éminence grise of the US Embassy in Laos. They, and their successors, controlled air strikes without notice or objection until General
William Momyer discovered that enlisted men were directing air strikes. At that point, he ordered their replacement with rated fighter pilots. By that time, the number of Butterflies had increased to six.
Ravens A successor operation, code-named
Palace Dog, began replacing the original Butterfly effort in 1966. The Ravens were fighter pilots in unarmed light aircraft who flew observation missions, marked enemy targets with smoke rockets, directed air strikes onto them, and observed and reported
bomb damage assessments post strike. Joined by a third Raven, they began 90-day
TDY tours flying support for the
Royal Lao Army. In December, 1966, they acquired the use of an
O-1 Bird Dog assigned to the Royal Lao Air Force at
Savannakhet. Unlike the borrowed Air America planes, the O-1 had additional radios and smoke rocket tubes for improved communications and target marking. A
de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver and a
Helio Courier were also acquired, but seemed not to be used for directing air strikes. By August 1967, the three Raven FACs on duty in Laos were augmented by three more Ravens stationed with Detachment 1,
606th Air Commando Squadron at Nakhon Phanom. At about the same time, the air attaché in Vientiane requested O-1s unmarked by national insignia be supplied by 7/13th Air Force, on the grounds that the Ravens needed their own airplanes instead of riding with civilian pilots. The O-1s were supplied. By November 1967, the Raven head count had increased to eight. The number of Ravens would increase in a futile attempt to keep up with the swelling tide of air strikes Laos, but they would never number more than 22 assigned at one time. The chronic shortage of Ravens meant that they often spent long stretches flying combat missions. Raven John Mansur recalled flying as long as 11 hours, 45 minutes in a day. Ron Rinehart exceeded that, logging a 14-hour flight day. Incoming air strikes arrived en masse, with as many as six flights of fighter-bombers stacked up at various altitudes awaiting their turn to bomb. Rinehart would remain on station until his marking rockets were expended, all windows on his O-1 slathered in grease-penciled notes of air strikes, and his fuel tank empty. On three occasions, he landed
dead stick back at base when he ran out of gas. In a single month, he directed over 1,000 tactical air strikes, flying over 280 combat hours. If President
Lyndon B. Johnson’s March 1968 partial bombing halt diverted a steady stream of air power from Vietnam into Laos, his 1 November 1968 moratorium flooded the kingdom with US air power and overwhelmed the four Ravens stationed in northeastern Laos. Tactical air power was allocated at a conference by 7/13th Air Force in Saigon.
Air Attaché Colonel Robert Tyrell came away from this with 60% of all tactical air strikes in Southeast Asia scheduled for attacks within Laos. The position of Head Raven was created to serve as a de facto Air Liaison Officer, and the number of Ravens in-country doubled to handle the new work load. General
Vang Pao, the ground commander of the CIA's clandestine army of Hmong hill tribesmen, used tactical air as airborne artillery. His combat operations became dependent upon it.
Operational hazards Both the O-1s and the later-supplied U-17s had severe maintenance problems in the beginning. Maintenance was spotty. It was performed by pilots, poorly trained Lao mechanics, or USAF technicians. The piston engines were tuned for optimum performance at
Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base's low elevation. They would run raggedly in the highlands of Laos. Adding to the woes were high power settings needed for maximum weight takeoffs, toting maximal loads, or short-field takeoffs. Engine life in O-1s fell from 1,800 hours to 400 hours flight time. Engine failures became epidemic. Eighteen engine failures occurred during the last quarter of 1968. Karl Polifka (call sign Raven 45) reported 26 in a month, apparently February 1969. The upcountry USAF technicians were then replaced by Air America mechanics. The chief mechanic at Pakse was Stan Wilson and at Long Tieng was Dan Williams. This led to all the O-1s being cycled through Udorn to have their fuel tanks cleaned out. Some of them had 18 years of crud and mud contaminating the tanks. Radio wiring, engine re-timing, and fuel system cleaning were accomplished on each aircraft and by May 1969 engine problems dropped drastically after that. Anti-aircraft fire could be intense and accurate. Some Raven aircraft were known to take up to 50 rounds in battle damage on a single sortie. Working as a Raven FAC was an exhausting, high-risk, high-stress job. The casualty rate among them ran about 50% wounded and killed; one calculation by a participating Raven at his end of tour was that 90% of the Raven planes had been hit by ground fire during their tours of duty; 60% had been downed by enemy action at some point; 30% had been
killed in action. Note: Craig Duehring, who made this calculation, later became an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. The roster of 161 Ravens includes the Butterfly FACs, none of whom were
killed in action, as well as an army attaché, who was. Twenty-three of the Air Force Ravens died during the Secret War; Army Attaché Joseph Bush was the 24th. Robbins lists all Ravens deceased prior to the publication of his book. USAF Ravens are not listed in the 1988 directory of names of the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, although they do appear on the wall. ==Legacy==