The
partidas realistas began their operations in the earliest days of the constitutional regime, with the first known groups emerging in
Galicia as early as April 1820. Organized by absolutist exiles in France and closely tied to the royal palace, these militias employed tactics reminiscent of the
guerrilla warfare used during Spain's
War of Independence against
Napoleon Bonaparte (1808–1814)—some of their members were even veterans of that earlier conflict, now fighting for the royalist cause. Historians Pedro Rújula and Manuel Chust argue that this continuity with past guerrilla efforts explains their rapid and effective mobilization: "Many who fought the French had not only grown accustomed to wielding arms and rallying to defend local interests but had also internalized discourses legitimizing their actions in the name of king, religion, and homeland." The
Marquis de Mataflorida, a key agent of Ferdinand VII and a leading figure among royalist exiles, wrote in a December 1821 manifesto published in France: "Due to [this] oppression, armed militias have sprung up everywhere, burdening localities but aiding them in maintaining their independence and defiance of any constitutional authority, whose legitimacy they cannot accept." Leadership of the
partidas typically came from clerics (50% in
Navarre), nobles (45% in
Galicia), landowners, and peasants, supplemented in
Catalonia by the ''
Mossos d'Esquadra''. Ramon Arnabat points that the majority of its members, however, consisted largely of propertyless individuals from the poorest strata of society—
day laborers,
tenant farmers, and, to a lesser extent, artisans, manual workers, and weavers from mid-sized towns—forming the social backbone of royalism. Initially limited in scope, the
partidas expanded significantly from spring 1821. Their operations gradually shifted northward from southern (
Andalusia) and central (
La Mancha) Spain to regions like
Galicia,
Asturias,
Castile and León,
Extremadura, the
Basque Country,
Navarre,
Aragon, the
Valencian Community, and
Catalonia. Between 1820 and 1821, their numbers tripled. Prominent groups included those led by the priest
Jerónimo Merino in
Burgos;
Joaquín Ibáñez Cuevas, Baron de Eroles, and
Antonio Marañón, "
El Trapense", in Catalonia;
Pedro Zaldívar in the
Serranía de Ronda; Manuel Hernández, "
El Abuelo" ("The Grandfather"), in
Madrid and
Aranjuez; and
Manuel Freire de Andrade and Canon
Manuel Chantre of
Santiago de Compostela, who formed the
Junta Apostólica ("Apostolic Committee") in Galicia. The rise of the
partidas realistas stemmed from the convergence of the counter-revolution—driven by reactionary elites from the outset of the Liberal Triennium—and an "anti-revolution" among the lower classes, who felt culturally and socially alienated by revolutionary and liberal policies. This alliance, dominated by the counter-revolutionary elite, united under a shared opposition to the constitutional system and a defense of the king's absolute power and the Catholic Church's cultural hegemony. , leader of a
partida realista active in the
Serranía de Ronda. It was precisely the Church, predominantly opposed to the liberal regime due to the
disentailments, that played a decisive role in forming and consolidating an alliance between the two anti-liberal factions. The Church facilitated this coalition by controlling key spaces of formal peasant sociability—such as parishes, confraternities, and popular festivals—and by engaging in significant propaganda efforts to discredit the constitutional regime. Leveraging its enduring social position and moral authority, the clergy channeled widespread social discontent into support for royalism. The Church, particularly the regular clergy, provided the royalist block with ideological backing by promoting a narrative of a "war of religion." This rhetoric resonated primarily in rural areas, where, unlike in large cities, it faced little competition from liberal discourse. The counter-revolutionary message also permeated urban artisan communities, the unemployed, and the uprooted. Social discontent was thus transformed into counter-revolutionary political action—or, in other words, "anti-revolution was integrated into the counter-revolution"—thanks to the existence of "counter-revolutionary networks composed of certain nobles, members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, affluent peasant sectors, and
partida leaders, who recruited, armed, and financed the
partidas realistas (royalist guerrillas), channeling needs and sentiments. Local authorities, controlling municipalities in service of the counter-revolution, played a fundamental role here." , a guerrilla leader who fought the French during the
War of Independence, led an active
partida realista during the Liberal Triennium, supporting the French invasion of the
Spanish Expedition. At the apex of the counter-revolutionary movement stood the king. However, he was not the sole leader of the conspiracy. The counter-revolution is better understood as a network of complicity articulated across multiple centers. The monarch's primary role was to "lend coherence to the counter-revolution by providing the unifying element: that of a paternal king, beloved by the people—so long as he took up arms in their defense—and stripped of his legitimate throne by a conspiratorial, sectarian minority." In the spring of 1822, the actions of the
partidas realistas intensified significantly, particularly in Catalonia, Navarre, the Basque Country, Galicia, Aragon, and the Valencian Country, with more sporadic activity in Asturias,
Old Castile, the
León region,
Murcia, and
New Castile. A pivotal event occurred on June 21, when royalists captured
La Seu d'Urgell, as "from that moment, the counter-revolution gained a rebel stronghold on Spanish soil—one of the conditions France had set for lending its support to the king." When news reached Aranjuez, the courtiers were galvanized, and their conspiratorial activities regained momentum. The royalist uprising spread to such an extent that "during the summer and fall in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Navarre, a veritable civil war unfolded, impossible to remain neutral in, leaving the civilian population severely battered on both sides: reprisals, requisitions, war contributions, looting, and more." The royalists managed to assemble an army numbering between 25,000 and 30,000 men. However, military measures adopted by the Parliament and the government—combined with the declaration of a
martial law in Catalonia on July 23—proved effective. Over the fall and winter of 1822–1823, following a grueling six-month campaign, constitutional armies, led in part by the former guerrilla
Espoz y Mina, reversed the situation. They forced royalists from Catalonia, Navarre, and the Basque Country (approximately 12,000 men) to flee to France, while those from Galicia, Old Castile, León, and Extremadura (around 2,000 men) escaped to Portugal. The situation took a definitive turn on April 7, 1823, when the
expeditionary force sent by France—supported by Spanish royalist troops organized prior to the invasion (estimated at between 12,000 and 35,000 men, depending on sources)—entered Spain. As they advanced, surviving royalist militias from the constitutional army's offensive joined their ranks. Historians like
Juan Francisco Fuentes highlight the paradox that many members of these royalist militias and supporting troops had fought against the French fifteen years earlier during the
War of Independence. == See also ==