The decision is frequently cited for its articulation of how courts may consider legislative intent when interpreting statutes. For example, in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), in which the Supreme Court held that the prohibitions against racial discrimination in
Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not bar all
affirmative action programs by private employers which favored racial minorities, the Supreme Court quoted, as part of its analysis,
Holy Trinity's principle of statutory interpretation that "[i]t is a 'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 201, quoting
Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459. The
Weber Court said that the language of Title VII "must therefore be read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical context from which the Act arose".
Id. Justice
Antonin Scalia later criticized
Holy Trinity as a leading example of courts privileging perceived legislative intent over statutory text, a practice he viewed as contrary to
textualist principles. The textualist position holds that courts should follow the text of a law rather than attempt to read exceptions into the law in accordance with the legislative intent. Scalia described the case’s interpretive approach as "an invitation to judicial lawmaking." In
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), Justice
Anthony Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, rejected reliance on Holy Trinity-style intent analysis, writing: ==See also==