During the winter, a spiritual leader named
Isatai'i emerged among the Quahadi Band of Comanches. Isa-tai claimed to have the power to render himself and others invulnerable to their enemies, including to bullets, and was able to rally an enormous number of Indians for large raids. Also, a shift occurred within the political structure of the Kiowa, bringing the war faction (influenced by the head chief
Guipago, or Gui-pah-gho, sometimes known, by modern people, as Lone Wolf "the Elder" to prevent confusion with Mamay-dayte, later named
Lone Wolf "the Younger") into a greater position of influence than they had held previously.
Early engagements , Florida 1875: The inscription on the back of the original stereograph says: L to R:
Lone Wolf, Double Vision,
White Horse,
Woman's Heart,
Mamante - Kiowas. Officer left is Capt.
Richard H. Pratt On 27 June 1874, Isa-tai'i and Comanche chief
Quanah Parker led about 250 warriors in an attack on a small outpost of buffalo hunters in the
Texas Panhandle called
Adobe Walls. The encampment consisted of just a few buildings and was occupied by only 28 men and one woman. Though a few whites were killed in the opening moments of the Second Battle of Adobe Walls, the majority were able to barricade themselves indoors and hold off the attack. Using large-caliber buffalo guns, the hunters could fire on the warriors from much greater range than the Indians had expected, and the attack failed. A second engagement involving the Kiowa took place in Texas. Warriors led by Lone Wolf attacked a patrol of Texas Rangers in July. The Lost Valley fight had light casualties on both sides, but it served to raise tensions along the frontier and push the Army into an aggressive response. The explosion of violence took the government by surprise. The "peace policy" of the Grant administration was deemed a failure, and the Army was authorized to subdue the southern Plains tribes with whatever force necessary. At this time, roughly 1,800 Cheyennes, 2,000 Comanches, and 1,000 Kiowas remained at large. Combined, they mounted about 1,200 warriors.
Army response General
Philip Sheridan ordered five army columns to converge on the general area of the Texas Panhandle and specifically upon the upper tributaries of the
Red River. The strategy was to deny the Indians any safe haven and attack them unceasingly until they went permanently to the reservations. Three of the five columns were under the command of Colonel
Ranald S. Mackenzie. The
Tenth Cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel John W. Davidson, came due west from
Fort Sill. The
Eleventh Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel
George P. Buell, moved northwest from
Fort Griffin. Mackenzie himself led the
Fourth Cavalry north from
Fort Concho. The fourth column, consisting of the
Sixth Cavalry and
Fifth Infantry, was commanded by Colonel
Nelson A. Miles and came south from
Fort Dodge. The fifth column, the
Eighth Cavalry commanded by Major William R. Price, a total of 225 officers and men, plus six Indian scouts and two guides originated from
Fort Union, marched east via
Fort Bascom in New Mexico. The plan called for the converging columns to maintain a continuous offensive until a decisive defeat had been inflicted on the Indians. As many as 20 engagements took place across the Texas Panhandle. The Army, consisting entirely of soldiers and scouts, sought to engage the Indians at any opportunity. The Indians, traveling with women, children, and elderly, mostly attempted to avoid them. When the two did encounter one another, the Indians usually tried to escape before the Army could force them to surrender. However, even a successful escape could be disastrously costly if horses, food, and equipment had to be left behind. By contrast, the Army and its Indian scouts had access to essentially limitless supplies and equipment, they frequently burned anything they captured from retreating Indians, and were capable of continuing operations indefinitely. The war continued throughout the fall of 1874, but increasing numbers of Indians were forced to give up and head for Fort Sill to enter the reservation system.
Battle of the Upper Washita River On September 9, 1874, Captain Wyllys Lyman led a
wagon train full of rations to
Camp Supply in the
Indian Territory for Col. Nelson A. Miles' troops when they were confronted by a group of Comanches and Kiowas. In the ensuing battle, Lyman and 95 troops formed a
wagon corral and held off their adversaries, numbered at about 400, and a scout was dispatched to send word to Camp Supply. Soon after, the Sixth Cavalry was sent without rest and during a rainstorm to aid the wagon train. Upon their arrival on September 14, the attackers fled. The battle was the longest and one of the most publicized of the War. It is known as both the Battle of the Upper
Washita River and the Battle of Lyman's Wagon Train.
Battle of Palo Duro Canyon Early in September,
Tonkawa and
Black Seminole Scouts in advance of the Fourth Cavalry were ambushed by Comanche near the
Staked Plains and escaped with their lives. The scouts relayed the Comanche position and alerted Col. Mackenzie of their whereabouts. The largest Army victory came when Mackenzie's scouts found a large village of Comanche, Kiowa, and Cheyenne, including their horses and winter food supply, in upper Palo Duro Canyon. At dawn on September 28, Mackenzie's troops attacked down a steep canyon wall. The Native Americans were unprepared and did not have time to gather their horses or supplies before retreating. Sergeant John Charlton wrote of the battle: The warriors held their ground for a time, fighting desperately to cover the exit of their squaws and pack animals, but under the persistent fire of the troops, they soon began falling back. Only four Indians were killed, but the effect was devastating. Mackenzie's men burned over 450 lodges and destroyed countless pounds of buffalo meat. They also took 1,400 horses, most of which were subsequently shot to prevent the Indians from recapturing them. Except for its unusually large size, the Battle of Palo Duro Canyon was typical of the war. Most encounters produced little to no casualties, but the Indians could not afford the constant loss of food and mounts. Even if it escaped immediate danger, an Indian band that found itself on foot and with limited options for food generally had no choice but to give up and head for the reservation. ==Aftermath==