Byrne and Hoffman wrote in 1996, that since the 1980s the NRC has generally favored the interests of nuclear industry, and been unduly responsive to industry concerns, while failing to pursue tough regulation. The NRC has often sought to hamper or deny public access to the regulatory process, and created new barriers to public participation.
Barack Obama, when running for
president in 2007, said that the five-member NRC had become "captive of the industries that it regulates". The NRC has been accused of having conflicting roles as regulator and "salesman" in a 2011 Reuters article, doing an inadequate job by the
Union of Concerned Scientists, and the agency approval process has been called a "rubber stamp".
Frank N. von Hippel wrote in March 2011, that despite the 1979
Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania, the NRC has often been too timid in ensuring that America's commercial reactors are operated safely: Nuclear power regulation is a textbook example of the problem of "regulatory capture" — in which an industry gains control of an agency meant to regulate it. Regulatory capture can be countered only by vigorous public scrutiny and Congressional oversight, but in the 32 years since Three Mile Island, interest in nuclear regulation has declined precipitously. An article in the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists stated that many forms of NRC regulatory failure exist, including regulations ignored by the common consent of NRC and industry: A worker (named
George Galatis) at the
Millstone Nuclear Power Plant in Connecticut kept warning management, that the spent fuel rods were being put too quickly into the spent storage pool and that the number of rods in the pool exceeded specifications. Management ignored him, so he went directly to the NRC, which eventually admitted that it knew of both of the forbidden practices, which happened at many plants, but chose to ignore them. The whistleblower was fired and blacklisted.
Terrorism concerns and threats Terrorist attacks such as those executed by
al-Qaeda on
New York City and
Washington, D.C., on
September 11, 2001, and in
London on
July 7, 2005, have prompted fears that extremist groups might use radioactive
dirty bombs in further attacks in the United States and elsewhere. In March 2007, undercover investigators from the
Government Accountability Office set up a false company and obtained a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that would have allowed them to buy the radioactive materials needed for a dirty bomb. According to the GAO report, NRC officials did not visit the company or attempt to personally interview its executives. Instead, within 28 days, the NRC mailed the license to the West Virginia postal box. Upon receipt of the license, GAO officials were able to easily modify its stipulations and remove a limit on the amount of radioactive material they could buy. A spokesman for the NRC said that the agency considered the radioactive devices a "lower-level threat"; a bomb built with the materials could have contaminated an area about the length of a city block but would not have presented an immediate health hazard.
1987 congressional report Twelve years into NRC operations, a 1987 congressional report entitled "NRC Coziness with Industry" concluded, that the NRC "has not maintained an arms length regulatory posture with the commercial nuclear power industry ... [and] has, in some critical areas, abdicated its role as a regulator altogether". It also found that the NRC management had significantly underestimated the risk and consequences posed by a severe reactor accident such as a full-scale nuclear meltdown. NRC management asserted, without scientific evidence, that the risk of such accidents were so "Small" that the impacts could be dismissed and therefore no analysis of human and environmental was even performed. Such a conclusion is scientifically indefensible given the experience of the
Three Mile Island,
Chernobyl, and
Fukushima accidents. Another finding was that NRC had concealed the risk posed to the public at large by disregarding one of the most important EIS requirements, mandating that
cumulative impacts be assessed (40 Code of Federal Regulations §1508.7). By disregarding this basic requirement, NRC effectively misrepresented the risk posed to the nation by approximately two orders of magnitude (i.e., the true risk is about 100 greater than NRC represented). These findings were corroborated in a final report prepared by a special Washington State Legislature Nuclear Power Task Force, titled, "Doesn't NRC Address Consequences of Severe Accidents in EISs for re-licensing?"
Post-Fukushima In Vermont, the day before the
2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami that
damaged Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the NRC approved a 20-year extension for the license of
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, although the
Vermont state legislature voted overwhelmingly to deny an extension. In April 2011, Reuters reported that diplomatic cables showed NRC sometimes being used as a sales tool to help push American technology to foreign governments, when "lobbying for the purchase of equipment made by
Westinghouse Electric Company and other domestic manufacturers". This gives the appearance of a regulator which is acting in a commercial capacity, "raising concerns about a potential
conflict of interest". In 2011, the
Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami led to unprecedented damage and flooding of the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The subsequent loss of offsite power and flooding of onsite emergency diesel generators led to loss of coolant and subsequent
Nuclear meltdown of three reactor cores. The
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster led to an uncontrolled release of radioactive contamination, and forced the Japanese Government to evacuate approximately 100,000 citizens.
Gregory Jaczko was chairman of the NRC when the 2011
Fukushima disaster occurred in Japan. Jaczko looked for lessons for the US, and strengthened security regulations for
nuclear power plants. For example, he supported the requirement that new plants be able to withstand an aircraft crash. In July 2011, Mark Cooper said that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is "on the defensive to prove it is doing its job of ensuring safety". In October 2011, Jaczko described "a tension between wanting to move in a timely manner on regulatory questions, and not wanting to go too fast". In 2011
Edward J. Markey, Democrat of Massachusetts, criticized the NRC's response to the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and the decision-making on the proposed Westinghouse
AP1000 reactor design. In 2011, a total of 45 groups and individuals from across the nation formally asked the NRC to suspend all licensing and other activities at 21 proposed nuclear reactor projects in 15 states until the NRC completed a thorough post-
Fukushima nuclear disaster examination: The petition seeks suspension of six existing reactor license renewal decisions (
Columbia Generating Station, WA
Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH,
Diablo Canyon Power Plant, CA,
Indian Point Energy Center, NY,
Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, MA, and
Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant, NH); 13 new reactor combined construction permit and operating license decisions (
Bellefonte Nuclear Generating Station Units 3 and 4, AL, Bell Bend,
Callaway Nuclear Generating Station, MO,
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Generating Station, MD,
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, TX,
Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station, MI,
Levy County Nuclear Power Plant, FL
North Anna Nuclear Generating Station, VA,
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, NC,
South Texas Nuclear Generating Station, TX,
Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station, FL,
Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, GA, and
William States Lee III Nuclear Generating Station, SC);a construction permit decision (Bellefonte Units 1 and 2); and an operating license decision (
Watts Bar Nuclear Generating Station, TN). In addition, the petition asks the NRC to halt proceedings to approve the standardized
AP1000 and
Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor designs. Larry Criscione, a second NRC risk engineer also raised concerns about the NRC withholding information concerning the risk of flooding. He stated that assertions by NRC's management that plants are "currently able to mitigate flooding events," was false. David Lochbaum, a nuclear engineer and safety advocate with the
Union of Concerned Scientists: "The redacted information shows that the NRC is lying to the American public about the safety of U.S. reactors," NRC's 2011 leaked report notes that "dam failure incidents are common". NRC estimated the odds that dams constructed like Jocassee will fail is about 1 in 3,600 failures per year. Oconee is licensed to operate for another 20 years. The odds of the Jocassee Dam failing over that period are 1 in 180. NRC requires risks to be investigated if they have a frequency of more than 1 in 10,000 years. For a reactor operating over a period of 40 years, these risks must be evaluated if they have a chance greater than a 1 in 250 of occurring. NRC identified 34 reactors that lie downstream from a total of more than 50 dams. More than half of these dams are roughly the size of the Jocassee dam. Assuming the NRC's failure rate applies to all of these dams, the chance that one will fail over the next 40 years is about one in four or 25 percent chance. This dam failure rate does not include risks posed by earthquakes or terrorism. Thus, the true probability may be much higher. This raised a second and potentially larger issue. NRC recently completed its license renewal program which extended the operating licenses of the nation's fleet of nuclear reactors for an additional 20 years. NRC stated that the probability of a severe accident is so incredible that the consequences can be dismissed from the analysis of impacts in its relicensing
environmental impact statements (EIS). Yet this conflicts with NRC's internal analyses which concluded that flooding presented a serious human and environmental risk. Critics charge that if these relicensing EISs failed to evaluate the risks of flooding, then how can the public be confident that NRC did not mislead stakeholders concerning other risks such as the potential for a nuclear meltdown. NRC officials stated in June 2011 that US nuclear safety rules do not adequately weigh the risk of a single event that would knock out electricity from the grid and from emergency generators, as a quake and tsunami did in Japan. , and NRC instructed agency staff to move forward with seven of the 12 safety recommendations put forward by a federal task force in July 2011. The recommendations include "new standards aimed at strengthening operators' ability to deal with a complete loss of power, ensuring plants can withstand floods and earthquakes and improving emergency response capabilities". The new safety standards will take up to five years to fully implement. , Jaczko warned power companies against complacency and said the agency must "push ahead with new rules prompted by the nuclear crisis in Japan, while also resolving long-running issues involving fire protection and a new analysis of earthquake risks". The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also been criticized for its reluctance to allow for innovation and experimentation, even controlled for and purportedly safe methods of deploying nuclear power that countries such as Poland are approving before the United States. As reported by
Reason magazine in May 2022:
Exceeding powers licensing off-site interim storage facility In September 2021 the NRC issued a license for a privately operated temporary consolidated interim storage facility (CISF) for
spent nuclear fuel in
Andrews County,
Texas. However a group including the
State of Texas, which had passed a law in 2022 prohibiting the storage of
high-level waste in the state, petitioned for a court review of the license. In August 2023 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the NRC does not have the authority from Congress under the
Atomic Energy Act or the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act to license such a temporary storage facility that is not at a nuclear power station or federal site, nullifying the purported license. Another CISF in
New Mexico is similarly being challenged in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. ==See also==