Reism

Kotarbiński first introduced reism in his work called Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology of the Sciences and the emergent theory was developed independent of the ideas previously put forward by the German philosopher Franz Brentano. For the theorist, mereology is too weak to address the set-theoretical means needed in mathematics. Kotarbiński's reism is also considered an account of intentionality. == Interpretations ==

Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz challenged Kotarbiński's conceptualization of reism, arguing that the statement that "every object is a thing" is a truism. For the latter, the reism principle is translated in the following: "For some a, a is an object and for all a, if a is an object then a is a thing." According to Ajdukiewicz, this statement is a truism because a can only be substituted by terms that have denotative capacity. == Ontological and semantical reism ==

Two versions of reism were introduced as Kotarbiński established that the theory is a comprehensive doctrine that contains both ontological and semantical theses. In the ontological sense, reism was condensed by Kotarbiński to the two postulates. The first is that "every object is a body" (i.e. all abstract concepts) are to be reduced to concrete objects. Secondly, no object is a state or relation, or property. It is said that Kotarbiński original conceptualization was ontological in the sense that there is only one category of objects. ==References==