The investigation was conducted by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), with representatives from the
Federal Aviation Administration,
Rocky Mountain Airways,
de Havilland Canada, the
Air Line Pilots Association, and
Pratt and Whitney. The
topography of the area influenced the formation of icing conditions. The area, situated near and over a
mountain range, allowed for
atmospheric inversion, which led to the formation of freezing rain, snow, and ice pellets. Additionally, two pilots who flew in the area on the night of the crash reported to the NTSB that they encountered moderate icing conditions. The NTSB concluded that the presence of ice on the wings likely contributed to the degraded performance observed on Flight 217. Evidence indicated that ice built up on the unprotected frontal surfaces of either wing, including residual ice on the deicing boots themselves. The geography of the area, combined with the meteorological conditions at the time of the crash, was concluded to be conductive to the formation of a
mountain wave. A mountain wave is a disruption in the horizontal wind flow on the
lee side of a terrain feature causing the disruption, usually a mountain. Mountain waves are usually associated with the presence of high surface winds. In the case of Rocky Mountain Airways Flight 217, a stable
air mass and high winds over the Park Range resulted in the formation of a mountain wave over the mountain range. The North Park basin also helped the development of the mountain wave, with the lower elevation of the plain resulting in stronger winds in the mountain wave. NTSB simulations showed that
downdrafts associated with the mountain wave had accelerations of over 500 fpm. Despite the presence of one or multiple mountain waves over the flight's planned route, neither the
SIGMET nor the
AIRMET issued to the crew mentioned mountain waves. Certification data the NTSB acquired showed that under the icing conditions the flight encountered, the crew should have been able to maintain an altitude of . But since the aircraft was not able to climb above before its diversion, the NTSB concluded that the downdrafts associated with the mountain waves in the area combined with the icing conditions on the flight was beyond the aircraft's ability to maintain flight.
Captain's decision to conduct the flight The NTSB highlighted Captain Klopfenstein's decision to conduct the flight and the flight's attempted return to Steamboat Springs. The captain's decision to return to his origin airport was prompted by the aircraft's inability to climb above before the Kater Intersection. Due to terrain that existed east of the Kater Intersection, aircraft had to climb to by Kater. The icing conditions, downdrafts from mountain waves, and a
tailwind above resulted in the aircraft's inability to climb. The NTSB speculated that if the captain did not know the strength of the tailwind and downdrafts, he might have believed that icing was the main cause for the inability to climb, and that might have influenced his decision to return. However, they concluded that the captain's decision to return was reasonable based on the information available at the time. Captain Klopfenstein's decision to depart Steamboat Springs in the first place was ruled as an even larger factor in the accident. The captain was aware of the severe weather conditions that he would later experience on the flight. Earlier on December 4, he and First Officer Coleman attempted to fly Flight 212 to Steamboat Springs via
Granby. Due to strong winds en route, the flight was unable to climb high enough, and the flight had to return to Denver. Later, on Flight 216, they encountered strong headwinds and heavy icing on the descent into Steamboat Springs. Company procedure at Rocky Mountain Airways prohibited flight into "known or forecast heavy icing conditions...unless the captain has good reason to believe that the weather conditions as forecast will not be encountered due to change or later observed conditions." The NTSB stated that the captain, who had considerable experience in mountain flying conditions, believed that the calm conditions on Flight 216 would allow for a smooth flight to Denver. He was likely unaware of the strong winds in the area as during Flight 216's descent, the severe icing likely masked the simultaneous performance degradation the winds brought. Additionally, the weather conditions at Steamboat Springs were calm and did not correlate with mountain wave conditions, and the meteorological information provided to him made no mention of such conditions. In regard to Captain's Klopfenstein's decision to fly, the NTSB concluded that he was not aware of the presence of the mountain wave(s) en route. Evidence showed that signals that showed mountain wave conditions were obscured by other weather conditions that were already on the captain's mind. This led to a false attitude of safety, where the captain believed that he could fly to Denver even if it was against company guidance.
Final report In their final report, the NTSB concluded the probable cause of the accident was: They recommended that crew members who fly for commuter airlines in mountainous areas should have survival training, and mandatory installation for shoulder harnesses in flight crew seats on
FAR part 135 flights. The latter recommendation was issued as the lack of harnesses contributed to the captains' fatal injuries. == Aftermath ==