Boisjoly started his career at a used-aircraft company in western Massachusetts, before moving to California for work. Following several further memos, a task force was convened to investigate the matter, but after a month Boisjoly realized that the task force had no power, no resources, and no management support. In late 1985, Boisjoly advised his managers that if the problem was not fixed, there was a distinct chance that a shuttle mission would end in disaster. No action was taken.
Challenger disaster Following the announcement that the
Challenger mission was confirmed for January 28, 1986, Boisjoly and his colleagues tried to stop the flight. Temperatures were due to fall to overnight. Boisjoly felt that this would severely compromise the safety of the O-ring and potentially the flight. The matter was discussed with Morton Thiokol managers, who agreed that the issue was serious enough to recommend delaying the flight.
NASA protocols required all shuttle sub-contractors to sign off on each flight. During the go/no-go telephone conference with NASA management the night before the launch, Morton Thiokol notified NASA of their recommendation to postpone. NASA officials strongly questioned the recommendations, and asked (some say pressured) Morton Thiokol to reverse its decision. The Morton Thiokol managers asked for a few minutes off the phone to discuss their final position again. The management team held a meeting from which the engineering team, including Boisjoly and others, were deliberately excluded. The Morton Thiokol managers advised NASA that their data was inconclusive. NASA asked if there were objections. Hearing none, NASA decided to launch the
STS-51-L Challenger mission. Historians have noted that this was the first time NASA had ever launched a mission after having received an explicit no-go recommendation from a major contractor, and that questioning the recommendation and asking for a reconsideration was highly unusual. Many have also noted that the sharp questioning of the no-go recommendation stands out in contrast to the immediate and unquestioning acceptance when the recommendation was changed to a go. The concerns of Boisjoly proved correct. Initially, Boisjoly was relieved when the flight lifted off, as he had predicted that the SRB would explode before lift-off. Upon ignition, the O-ring was burned to ash, which formed a weak seal in the joint. At 58 seconds after launch, the shuttle was buffeted by high-altitude winds, the ash seal collapsed, and hot gases streamed out of the joint in a visible blowtorch-like plume that burned into the external hydrogen tank. At about 73 seconds, the rear dome of the external fuel tank became weakened enough by the flame that it broke open, dumping all of the liquid hydrogen fuel into the air at once; at about the same time, the adjacent SRB strut gave way, the right rocket booster crashed into the external fuel tank and the right wing of Challenger, and the vehicle quickly disintegrated. ==Later career==