in Soviet custody after
World War II. On January 27, 1942, he was awarded the
War Merit Cross First Class with Swords (Kriegsverdienstkreuz or KVK) for his ruthless efficiency.
Motive The Nazis wanted to eliminate the Latvian Jews in Riga to make room for Jews from Germany and Austria to be deported to the Riga ghetto. Similarly motivated mass murders of eastern Jews confined to ghettos were carried out at Kovno on October 28, 1941 (10,000 dead), and at Minsk, where 13,000 were shot on November 7 and an additional 7,000 on November 20. To carry out this plan, Himmler brought
Friedrich Jeckeln into Latvia from
Ukraine, where he had organized a number of mass murders, including
Babi Yar (30,000 dead). Jeckeln's crew of about 50 killers and supporting personnel arrived in Riga on November 5, 1941. Jeckeln did not arrive with them, but went instead to
Berlin where sometime between November 10 and November 12, 1941, he met with Himmler. Himmler told Jeckeln to kill the entire Riga ghetto and to instruct Lohse, should he object, that this was an order of Himmler's and also of
Adolf Hitler's: "Tell Lohse it is my order, which is also the Führer's wish". Jeckeln then went to Riga and explained the situation to Lohse, who raised no further objection. By mid-November 1941, Jeckeln had set himself up in a building in the old section of Riga known as the
Ritterhaus. Jeckeln's construction specialist, Ernst Hemicker, who later claimed he was shocked when he learned in advance of the number of people to be murdered, nevertheless made no objection at the time and proceeded to supervise the digging of six murder pits, sufficient to bury 25,000 people. In particular,
Erwin Schulz, head of
Einsatzkommando 5, refused to participate in
Babi Yar, another Jeckeln atrocity, and at his own request was transferred back to his pre-war position in Berlin with no loss of professional standing. He called it "sardine packing" (
Sardinenpackung). The Jeckeln method was noted, although not by name, in the judgment of the
Einsatzgruppen commanders at Nuremberg Military Tribunal, as a means of avoiding the extra work associated with having to push the bodies into the grave. It was reported that even some of the experienced
Einsatzgruppen killers claimed to have been horrified by its cruelty.
Otto Ohlendorf, himself a prolific killer, objected to Jeckeln's techniques according to his testimony at his post-war trial for crimes against humanity. Jeckeln had staff which specialized in each separate part of the process, including
Genickschußspezialisten"neck shot specialists". There were nine components to this assembly-line method as applied to the Riga ghetto. • The Security Police roused the people out of their houses in the ghetto; • The Jews were organized into columns of 1000 people and marched to the killing grounds; • The German Order Police (
Ordnungspolizei or Orpo) led the columns to Rumbula; • Three pits had already been dug where the killing would be done simultaneously; • The victims were stripped of their clothing and valuables; • The victims were run through a double cordon of guards on the way to the killing pits; • To save the trouble of tossing dead bodies into the pits, the killers forced the living victims into the trench on top of other people who had already been shot; • Russian submachine guns (another source says semi-automatic pistols
Arranging transport for infirm victims Jeckeln had at his direct disposal 10 to 12 automobiles and 6 to 8 motorcycles. This was enough to transport the killers themselves and certain official witnesses. Jeckeln needed more and heavier transport for the sick, disabled or other of his intended victims who could not make the march. Jeckeln also anticipated there would be a significant number of people murdered along the march route, and he would need about 25 trucks to pick up the bodies. Consequently, he ordered his men to scrounge through Riga to locate suitable vehicles.
Final planning and instructions On or about Thursday, November 27, 1941, Jeckeln held a meeting of the leaders of the participating units at the Riga office of the
Protective Police (Schutzpolizei), a branch of the German Order Police, (
Ordnungspolizei) to coordinate their actions in the forthcoming massacre. This appears consistent with the substantial role that the Order Police played in the Holocaust, as stated by Professor Browning: Jeckeln convened a second planning session of senior commanders on the afternoon of Saturday, November 29, 1941, this time at the Ritterhaus. According to later versions given by those in attendance, Jeckeln gave a speech to these officers to the effect that it was their patriotic duty to exterminate the Jews of the Riga ghetto, just as much as if they were on the front lines of the battles then currently raging far to the east. Officers also later claimed that Jeckeln told them that failure to participate in the murders would be considered the equivalent of desertion, and that all HSSPF personnel who would not be participating in the action were required to attend the extermination site as official witnesses. No Latvian officials were present at the November 29 Ritterhaus meeting. At about 7:00 p.m. on November 29, a brief (about 15 minutes) third meeting was held, this time at the Protective Police headquarters. This was presided over by Karl Heise, the head of the protective police. He told his men they would have to report the next morning at 4:00 a.m. to carry out a "resettlement" of the people in the Riga ghetto. Although "resettlement" was a Nazi euphemism for mass murder, Heisse and a majority of men of the participating Protective Police knew the true nature of the action. Final instructions were also passed to the Latvian militia and police who would be rounding up people in the ghetto and acting as guards along the way. The Latvian police were told they would be moving the Jews to the Rumbula station for transport to a resettlement camp. The court further found: • That by the evening meeting on November 29, 1941, the intermediate commanders knew the full extent of the intended murders; • That the intermediate commanders also knew that the 20 kilogram luggage rule was a ruse to deceive the victims into a belief that they were truly being resettled; • That the men in the lower ranks did not know what was planned until they saw the shootings in the forest. Professor Ezergailis questioned whether the Latvian police might have had a better idea of what was actually going to happen, this being their native country, but he also noted contrary evidence including misleading instructions given to the Latvian police by the Germans, and the giving of instructions, at least to some Germans, to shoot any guard who might fail to execute a "disobedient" Jew during the course of the march. ==Advance knowledge by Wehrmacht==