Background The disintegration, or parcelling, of the polity of
Kievan Rus' in the 11th century resulted in considerable population shifts and a political, social, and economic regrouping. The resultant effect of these forces coalescing was the marked emergence of new peoples. While these processes began long before the fall of Kiev, its fall expedited these gradual developments into a significant linguistic and ethnic differentiation among the
Rus' people into
Ukrainians,
Belarusians, and
Russians. All of this was emphasized by the subsequent polities these groups migrated into: southwestern and western Rus', where the
Ruthenian and later Ukrainian and Belarusian identities developed, was subject to
Lithuanian and later
Polish influence; whereas the (Great) Russian ethnic identity that developed in the
Vladimir-Suzdal principality and the
Novgorodian Russian north, an area also inhabited by
Finno-Ugric,
Slavic and
Tatar-Turkic tribes, isolated from its Ruthene relatives. Muscovite princes considered themselves to be rightful heirs of the "Kievan inheritance", and associated their survival with fulfilling the historical destiny of reunifying the lands of Rus'. This ideology was ostensibly seen in their given titles (grand princes and tsars) which defined themselves as rulers of "all Rus. In 1328
Ivan I of Moscow persuaded
Theognost, the Metropolitan of Kiev, to settle in Moscow; from which point forward the title changed to "of Kiev and [all Rus']"—a title which was retained until the mid-fifteenth century. Later, in 1341
Simeon of Moscow was appointed Grand Prince "of all Russia" by the Khan of the
Mongol Golden Horde. This trend continued to evolve and by the mid-17th century transformed into "Tsar of All Great, Little, and White Rus, and with
Peter I's creation of a
Russian Empire, "Little Russian" came be a
demonym for all inhabitants of Ukraine under imperial rule. While the political reintegration of the Rus' can be seen in the politics of Russia's tsardom, the
Kievan Synopsis, written in the 16th century by the
Prussian-born archimandrite of the
Kiev Caves monastery Innocent Gizel, contains a description of the ancient unity between the "Russian peoples". This is seen as the earliest historical record of a common Rus' ethnic identity. Meanwhile, in the late 16th century, the word '
Ukraine' was used extensively to describe Poland's "borderland" region (cf.
krajina), and local Ruthenian (Rus') inhabitants adopted the
Ukrainian identity to "distinguish their nationality from the Polish". Ukrainian Cossack leader
Bohdan Khmelnytsky also declared himself the "ruler of all Rus in 1648, after driving the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth out of Ukraine in the
Khmelnytsky Uprising.
18th century Very shortly after
Catherine II's ascension to the throne she issued the ukase of May 1763, declaring the
Cossack Hetmanate to be administered according to 'Little Russian rights'. This prompted the Hetmanate's General Military Chancellery of
Hlukhiv to be convened the following September by Hetman
Kyrylo Rozumovskyi, at which the council accepted the imperial (All-Russian) narrative by demanding recognition of Peter I's decree of 1708 which stated that "no other people had such privileges as the Little Russian nation", and indicated their descent from and the loyalty to the 'Little Russian nation' (in whose ranks they included everyone except the peasants). The concept of the "All-Russian nation" gained in political importance near the end of the 18th century as a means of legitimizing Russian imperial claims to the eastern territories of
the partitioned Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.
19th century of 1897 showing the "Distribution of the principal nationalities of European Russia (in the native language)" including Great Russian, Little Russian, White Russian, and Russian 'in general' In the 19th century the territory of Ukraine "became an object of a terminological war"; in Russia they were referred to as the "southwestern" or "restored" lands. Some favored repressive measures to 'cleanse the Russian soul of the Western borderlands from alien Polish influences' in order to "uncover the pure Russian nature" of the population. Proponents of the triune Russian nation saw the
Ukrainian and
Belarusian languages to be
dialects of the
Russian language; this view was official and dominated popular opinion in the 19th century. In the terminological battle, Poles called Ukrainians 'Ruthenians' () while (Great) Russians were called 'Muscovites' (); "stressing the ethnic difference between them". By the second half of the 19th century, Russian publicists adopted, and transformed, the ideology of Pan-Slavism; "convinced of their own political superiority [they] argued that all Slavs might as well merge with the Great Russians." This ideological concept is reciprocated by Romantic-era poet,
Alexander Pushkin: "Will not all the Slavic streams merge into the Russian sea?" The national project of western and southwestern Russia in the late 19th century has been defined by
Alexei I. Miller as the project of the 'great Russian nation'; "supported and carried out by the government, it was meant to create one modern Russian nation out of the Great, Little, and White Russians." Compared to
British Orientalism, "The Russian gentry also felt that the Ukrainian peasantry, by virtue of their Orthodox faith, related language, and history, should be included in a tripartite 'Russian' nation made up of the East Slavs". The system of 'All-Russian unity' debated on two models: the
French model of national assimilation, and the
British model of regional countries under a common nation and identity, and Ukrainian Russophiles of the mid-19th century abandoned the idea of constituting a distinct Ukrainian (Old Ruthenian) identity in favor of the triune nationality. Following the
January Uprising in 1863 the Russian government became extremely determined to eliminate all manifestations of separatism, and claims for a collective identity separate from the All-Russian identity were wholly rejected by Russian nationalists as attempts to divide the nation. however, "systematic repression was applied to all individuals who upheld a distinct
Ukrainian identity whether in the political or in the cultural sphere" and "upward mobility could only be achieved through the acquisition of Russian language and culture". Following the revolution, a majority of Russians (as well as the authorities) viewed the Ukrainian identity as a superficial invention of the west, namely
Austria-Hungary and
Germany, with no support from the local "Russian" population outside of a "few misguided intellectuals". and Soviet policy codified East Slavs as historically belonging to one Russian people (
Russkiy narod). and the concept of a triune Russian people has persisted in different forms in the political and publicist spheres of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Also, from the past century that needs to be Early in the tenure of
Boris Yeltsin, Russia preoccupied itself with recreating a national identity based either on Soviet or pre-Soviet traditions. "one people", especially in the midst of the
Yanukovich government's
balk at the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement, followed by the
Euromaidan protests and the
Revolution of Dignity. In 2013, Russian presidential spokesman
Dmitry Peskov likewise referred to Ukraine as a "brotherly country". Such rhetoric has significantly informed Putin's justification for the
Russo-Ukrainian War, including its
invasion of Ukraine: on 21 February 2022, three days before the start of the invasion, Putin claimed that Ukraine "has never had its own authentic statehood," and that it is "an integral part of our own history, culture, [and] spiritual space." During the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the
Security Council of Russia and former Russian president, publicly wrote that "Ukraine is NOT a country, but artificially collected territories" and that
Ukrainian "is NOT a language" but a "mongrel dialect" of Russian. Medvedev has also said that Ukraine should not exist in any form and that Russia will continue to wage war against any independent Ukrainian state. Moreover, Medvedev claimed in July 2023 that Russia would have had to
use a nuclear weapon if the
2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive was a success. According to Medvedev, the "existence of Ukraine is fatally dangerous for
Ukrainians and that they will understand that life in a large common state is better than death. Their deaths and the deaths of their loved ones. And the sooner Ukrainians realize this, the better". On 22 February 2024, Medvedev described the future plans of Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War when he claimed that the Russian Army will go further into Ukraine, taking the southern city of
Odesa and may again push on to the Ukrainian capital
Kyiv, and stated that "Where should we stop? I don't know". For his claims Medvedev has been described as "Russian rashist (Russian fascist)" by Ukrainian and American media. A poll conducted in April 2022 by "
Rating" found that the vast majority (91%) of Ukrainians (excluding the
Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine) do not support the thesis that "Russians and Ukrainians are one people".
Polls A nationwide poll conducted in March 2000 in Belarus found that 42.6% of the respondents said that they regard Belarusians as a branch of a triune Russian nation. According to a survey conducted in 2015 by the Vilnius-based Independent Institute for Social, Political and Economic Research (IISEPS), exactly two thirds of Belarusians still believe that Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians are three branches of one nation, with 27.1 per cent of respondents considering them to be different peoples. A poll conducted in July 2021 by the Ukrainian pollster "
Rating" found that 55% of Ukrainian respondents (excluding Russian-annexed Crimea and separatist-controlled territories) disagreed with Putin's recent statements that "Russians and Ukrainians are one people belonging to the same historical and spiritual space", while 41% agreed. In
Eastern Ukraine, 65% agreed with the statements while 30% disagreed, in
Southern Ukraine, 56% agreed while 40% disagreed, in
Central Ukraine, 36% agreed while 60% disagreed, and in
Western Ukraine, 22% agreed while 75% disagreed. However, a poll conducted between July and August 2021 by a Ukrainian public policy think tank "
Razumkov Center" discovered that 70% disagreed with Putin's thesis that "that there was no historical basis for the idea of a Ukrainian people separate from the Russian people and that the separation of Ukrainians and Belarusians as separate peoples was the result of Soviet national policy", while 12.5% agreed (excluding Russian-annexed Crimea and militant-controlled territories in the Donbas). When examining sub-regional groupings, one could find higher levels of support for this claim in Eastern and Southern (21.8% and 18.8%) versus Central Ukraine (11.7%), respectively. In Western Ukraine, only 0.4% of respondents agreed with the aforementioned idea. Similarly, there was a higher number of interviewees struggling to give a certain answer to Putin's claim in the East and South. But overall, the survey found majority opposition to said thesis amongst all sub-regional categories. A poll conducted in April 2022 by "
Rating" found that the vast majority (91%) of Ukrainians (excluding the
Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine) do not support the thesis that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people”. The number of those who share this opinion was only 8% (in August 2021, it was 41%, in March 2022 – 21%). Support for this idea was still recorded among 23% of residents of the
East and 13% of older respondents. In contrast, in other macro-regions and age groups, there was almost no support for this thesis.
Religion The title "Of all Rus, always used by Russian rulers, is still in use by the Orthodox patriarchs in both
Russia and
Ukraine. In this case the
Russian patriarch uses the title "
Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus', while the
Ukrainian patriarch of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate used the title "Patriarch of Kyiv and all Rus, implying competing claims on spiritual leadership of the
Orthodox people on all the territory of former
Kievan Rus'. An initiative of both Kremlin foreign policy and the
Russian Orthodox Church is the concept of the "
Russian world" (), seen as the "reunification" of the triune Russian people, and sometimes as the main task for the 21st century. This initiative has been promoted in conjunction with the Russian government in its foreign policy in order to consolidate its position in the post-Soviet area, as it puts Moscow "at the center of an
Orthodox civilization of kindred neighbors: Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine". == Status of the Rusyns ==